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The thesis seeks to develop an account of collaborative activities within the framework
of ecological realism—an approach to psychology developed by James J. Gibson in
the course of work on visual perception. Two main questions are addressed; one onto-
logical, and one methodological. The ontological question is: given that collaborative
activities take place within an environment, what kinds of structure must this envi-
ronment contain? The response emphasizes the importance of relations which exist
between entities, and which connect a given perceiver-actor with the other objects and
individuals in its surroundings, and with the relations between those entities. It is held
that activities take place within a field of relations. This description draws on the radi-
cal empiricist doctrine that relations are real, are external, and are directly perceivable.
The present proposal insists that, in addition to being directly perceivable, relations can
also be directly acted upon: throwing a ball for a dog is acting on a relation between
dog and ball in space. The relational field account of collaboration naturally extends
to an account of speaking: people, through their history of acting in an environment
populated by other speakers, come to stand in a set of relations with objects and events
around them, and these relations can be directly acted upon by others through the use
of verbal actions. Verbal actions serve to direct the attention of others to relevant as-
pects of the environment, and this allows us as speakers to coordinate and manage one
another’s activity.
The methodological question is this: granting that the environment may be struc-
tured as a field of relations, how are we to conduct our empirical investigations, such
that we can ask precise questions which lead to useful insights about how a given
collaborative activity is carried out in practice? The central issue here concerns the
concept of the task. Psychologists are in the habit of using this term quite loosely, to
denote the actions of an individual or a group, in a laboratory or outside. This creates
confusion in discussions of collaborative phenomena: who is the agent of a ‘collabo-
rative task’? The definition offered here states that a task is a researcher-defined unit
of study that corresponds to a change in the structure of the environment that has a
characteristic pattern and that is meaningful from the first-person perspective of a par-
ticular actor. On this definition, the task is a tool that allows ecological psychologists to
carve up the problem space into specific, tractable questions; the task is the equivalent
i
of the cognitivist’s mental module. Task-oriented psychology encourages us to ask the
question: which specific resources is the individual making use of in controlling this
particular activity?
The methodology is developed through an examination of the alarm calling be-
haviour of vervet monkeys, which is explained in terms of actions on the relational
field, and through an analysis of corpus data from a laboratory-based collaborative as-
sembly game. The relational field model promises to provide a way of studying social
and collaborative activities on ecological realist principles. The concluding chapter
identifies two particular areas in which the model might fruitfully be developed: in the
study of learning, and in the theory of designing objects and spaces for interaction.
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Lay summary
The thesis attempts to develop an account of how some animals, including hu-
mans, are able to engage in activities together. I approach this question not by asking
about features of the actors’ brains, but by noting that the environment surrounding
a given individual is populated with other actors, and by seeking relevant features of
that environment that may support action. I outline, first, a scheme for describing the
environment surrounding a given actor, and, second, a methodological programme for
studying the behaviour of actors in populated environments. In the descriptive part,
the environment is conceived as a richly structured network of relations in which the
intentions of one’s fellow actors can be perceived over time in the unfolding of the
activities in which those actors are engaged. I use this scheme to outline an account
of language learning in which young children learn to speak by first attending to the
consequences of the sounds that they themselves make, and specifically to the effects
of those sounds on the behaviour of other actors in the child’s environment. I relate
this account to existing research on spoken dialogue.
The methodological part of the thesis proposes that in order to study behaviour in
complex multi-actor settings it is first necessary to clarify the notion of the ‘task’. I
propose that a task is a unit that is defined by a researcher for the purpose of being
able to study it. A task involves a reproducible structured pattern that appears in the
environment of an actor and that is meaningful to that actor. On this definition, the task
is a tool that allows psychologists to carve up the overall problem space into smaller,
more manageable units. It allows us to ask not, ‘What explains the actor’s behaviour in
general?’ but ‘What precise structure is the actor using to control this particular action
in this specific context?’ I identify two particular areas where the model developed
might be fruitfully applied. First, in education, where learning can be understood in
terms of a learner’s developing ability to make use of structure inherent to a particular,
well-defined task. And second, in design, where user experience can be understood in
terms of the task structure that arises whenever the actor tries to achieve some particular
outcome (e.g., the experience of vehicles approaching from a distance that arises when
a pedestrian attempts to cross a road).
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Included in a posthumously published collection of the papers of James J. Gibson
is a two-page memo outlining some of his thoughts on language (Gibson, 1982, pp.
411–412). In it, he asserts that language is a tool for indirect perception—a means of
seeing at second-hand. I believe this view of language is ultimately incompatible with
Gibson’s ecological realist programme as a whole, for reasons I will discuss in chapter
3. The argument will be that this view of language inherits from earlier philosophers an
untenable dualism between language and the physical world. I mention the memo here
because of its title: ‘Note on perceiving in a populated environment’. This, it seems to
me, makes explicit a point that is of fundamental importance. To study how an animal
collaborates with its fellows is to study how that animal behaves in an environment
that is populated. This point is, of course, absolutely obvious. Yet it is one that is
insufficiently appreciated and frequently forgotten by philosophers and psychologists
attempting to explain collaborative activity. If I were to summarize the present thesis
in one sentence, it might be this: That the environment is populated is a fact that
should not be forgotten. The thesis aims to identify some principles for studying the
collaborating animal in a manner that fully recognizes the fact that the animal occupies
a place in an animate world. I have borrowed Gibson’s phrase for the title.
Naturally, there already exist several competing approaches to the study of the
collaborating animal. It is not my aim to prove that these existing approaches are
wrong, nor that the theoretical approach adopted here is the only possible correct one.
To do so would be to construct what Chemero (2009) calls a ‘Hegelian argument’.1
1This phrase refers to an argument made by Hegel in relation to the possibility that astronomers
might discover a new planet between Mars and Jupiter; he argued that such a discovery was impossible.
According to Chemero (2009, p. 5), Hegel’s argument was not made on the basis of any empirical data
drawn from observation of the heavens, but simply on the a priori belief that the order of the planets must
necessarily conform to a certain number series described in Plato’s Timaeus. A ‘Hegelian argument’ is
x
I have, however, found it necessary to spend some time, particularly in chapters 1,
4, and 5, discussing the differences between the approach being outlined and some
competing approaches. I hope that this emphasis on differences between approaches,
where it exists, serves to make clear the metatheoretical assumptions that are being
made.
The positive account that is set out in the following chapters is constructed within
the framework of ecological realism. This is a coherent and well-established pro-
gramme, with a well-defined set of basic principles, which differ in important ways
from the principles adopted by other approaches. One such difference concerns the
question of other minds. Most attempts to construct a psychology of collaborative ac-
tivity run up against the ‘problem of other minds’: if minds are private entities which
contain images or representations, how are we able to gain knowledge of other indi-
viduals’ minds, and how are we able to coordinate activities between ourselves? The
ecological approach, though, rejects the notion of mental content: mental content is not
among its basic principles. Within the ecological system, the problem of other minds
simply does not arise. Attending to basic differences between competing approaches,
then, is necessary if we wish to avoid blind alleys. The only way to discern which of
the traditional problems are relevant for the ecological realist is to be clear about what
our starting assumptions are.
A note on the structure of the text. The bulk of what follows is divided into two
parts. The first part is intended to deal with some basic ontological issues: what kinds
of causal machinery must exist in the world if an ecological account of collaboration
is to be viable? The second part aims to develop an empirical methodology: how can
we use the causal machinery we have identified to ask questions about how actors go
about achieving specific tasks? The reader may note that this division does not always
hold—that the first part contains some discussion of methodological issues, and that the
second introduces a good deal of ontological detail that was not mentioned in the first
part. It is hoped that such departures from the grand structure will not detract unduly
from the reader’s enjoyment of the text. Part three consists of a closing chapter which
an argument ‘based on little or no empirical evidence’ that some scientific research programme is futile
(p. 7). Chemero sets out a persuasive case that such arguments are unproductive and that a scientific
research programme should be judged not on how sensible it seems at the outset but on its success over
the long term.
xi
does not attempt to summarize parts one and two but instead picks up on some under-
examined themes about the practice of research, and then looks forward to potential
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A brief introduction to ecological
realism
Following Michaels and Carello (1981), I will use the term ecological realism as a
label for the ontological framework within which the present thesis is written. The aim
of this first part of the thesis is to outline the existing ontology of that framework and to
describe how that ontology can be applied to collaborative activities. This first chapter
briefly identifies the central tenets of the ecological approach. I do not attempt a com-
plete defence of the approach (a task that has been ably attempted elsewhere).1 Nor
do I attempt an exhaustive overview of everything that ecological psychologists have
to say. Rather, the aim of the present chapter is to provide a set of orienting tools that
will be necessary in what will follow. Specifically, I aim to identify the most important
characteristics of ecological realism that distinguish it from the mainstream, i.e. cog-
nitivist, understanding of psychology, and to draw particular attention to overlapping
terminology which is apt to obscure those differences and cause confusion. Note that
I have also provided a glossary in Appendix B. The first part of this chapter will intro-
duce the ecological approach to perceiving and acting. The second part will introduce
the idea of an ecosystem as a network of relations within which the animal is situated;
this second part will identify some tools that will be called upon in later chapters, as
1For a more comprehensive and highly readable introduction to the philosophy of ecological real-
ism, I refer the reader to Michaels and Carello’s Direct Perception (1981). The present chapter is also
informed by more recent books (Shapiro, 2011; Chemero, 2009; Barrett, 2011), and by Gibson’s own
writing (Gibson, 1966, 1979).
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we attempt to develop a way to incorporate collaborative activities into the ecological
realist programme.
1.1 The ecological approach to perceiving and act-
ing
James J. Gibson developed his ecological approach to psychology in the course of his
work on perception—principally visual perception (Gibson, 1966, 1979). The study
of perception remains the area in which the ecological approach is most thoroughly
developed. Gibson conceived of perceiving as an active process that extends through
time as an animal constantly explores its environment. The environment is said to be
richly structured, and to be perceived directly, that is, without the mediation of mental
pictures or symbols, and without the need for the animal to carry out any inferential
processing of the ‘input’. Perceiving is further held to be indivisible from acting:2
the targets of perceiving are never pure forms, but are affordances, or opportunities
for the animal to act that arise from correspondences between the animal’s body and
appropriately-sized structures in the animal’s environment.
It is important to grasp that Gibson’s approach to psychology is quite different
from the standard cognitivist approach. Crudely put, the standard approach starts with
the assumption that the world exists as an external reality, and asks what it is about
the internal structure of the animal that allows the animal to behave adaptively with
reference to that reality.3 Gibson’s approach starts instead from the position that the
animal and its environment constitute, from the beginning, a single, coherent system.
Gibson focuses his attention on the structure that stands between the animal and its
surroundings; he asks: what is it about this relational structure that enables the animal
to successfully coordinate its behaviour?
2For a related argument, see Noë’s (2004) enactive account of perception, according to which per-
ception is itself conceived as a kind of action.
3For a sympathetic outline of cognitivism, see Haugeland (1978): ‘Cognitivism in psychology and
philosophy is roughly the position that intelligent behavior can (only) be explained by appeal to internal
“cognitive processes,” that is, rational thought in a very broad sense.’
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1.1.1 The animal-specific environment v. the physical world
At the very start of his final book, Gibson introduces his concept of the environment by
contrasting it with the standard view of the physical world. The terms ‘environment’
and ‘physical world’, he claims, should not be treated as synonyms. Understanding
this distinction is key to understanding the radical difference between Gibson’s psy-
chology and the standard approach. (The distinction is evidently very important to
Gibson: he makes it on page 2 of chapter 1, a chapter whose title is “The animal and
the environment”.)
The environment, according to Gibson, is that which surrounds an individual ani-
mal (1979, p. 8):
[I]t is often neglected that the words animal and environment make an
inseparable pair. Each term implies the other. No animal could exist with-
out an environment surrounding it. Equally, although not so obvious, an
environment implies an animal (or at least an organism) to be surrounded.
This means that the surface of the earth, millions of years ago before life
developed on it, was not an environment, properly speaking. The earth was
a physical reality, a part of the universe, and the subject matter of geology.
[...] We might agree to call it a world, but it was not an environment.
Gibson is here insisting that animals do not perceive the world of physics, we do not
perceive the bare physical world. What we perceive is our surroundings: the structured
collection of surfaces and objects that are meaningful by virtue of our capacity to act
relative to them. The environment ultimately only exists at the approximate scale of
our bodies. (This is true even if we have invented such instruments as microscopes
and mass spectrometers that allow us to peer into the structure of the world at scales
that we are not evolved to perceive directly.) When ecological psychologists talk about
the ‘animal–environment system’, this is not some vague device for pointing out that
our bodies are situated in space and that we perceive things in that space (a fact which
no cognitivist would deny). It is, rather, an assertion that we never in fact perceive
pure ‘space’. What we perceive is our surroundings; we perceive our own unique
environment relative to our ability to act in it.
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1.1.2 The concept of the invariant
To point out that the animal has its own unique set of surroundings is not sufficient, of
course, to explain how it is that that animal is able to act relative to those surroundings.
In order to move in that direction, we need take up the concept of the invariant. This
is perhaps the most important concept within ecological psychology. It is this con-
cept that allows ecological psychology to provide a viable account of perceiving as a
process unmediated by mental images—as a process that is direct, active, and for the
detection of affordances.
For Gibson, the great mistake of previous approaches to visual perception was the
idea that perceiving is reconstructing a picture of the world from the distorted image
that is projected onto the retina. It is easy to make this mistake. We are encouraged by
the ubiquitous metaphor of the eye as a camera. In fact, the eye is not a camera, and the
retina is not a photographic plate: the retina does not produce a very useful photograph
and even if it did, there would normally never be anybody there to see it (the only way
in which a retinal image can be perceived is by removing the eyeball from an animal,
shining a light through it, and observing it from behind—a feat once demonstrated by
René Descartes, who used the eye of a bull). Gibson concluded that the retinal image,
at least as a causal component in perceiving, is a fiction. Perceiving cannot be about
reconstructing an imperfect image, but must be about something else. He recognized
that an alternative account was needed, and set out to provide that account.
The account he devised says that light—the kind of light that is present in an an-
imal’s evolutionary environment—contains structure which is specific to the animal’s
surroundings, structure which the animal can to learn to respond to in increasingly
sophisticated ways. Contrary to the assumption that stimulus-data is impoverished—
the assumption that motivates the traditional view of perceiving as reconstructing (e.g.,
Fodor, 1983)—this alternative account says that the stimulus is in fact richly structured,
sufficiently so that the stimulus itself can be used to guide action.
Further, this structure can be divided into two parts: structure that changes under
transformation as the animal moves about, and other structure that does not change.
For example, when a flat rectangular surface is viewed from an angle, it projects a
different shape to the viewer’s point of observation than it does when viewed from
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directly above. The act of moving towards the rectangle causes this projected shape
to transform. At the same time, there are properties of the projected shape that do not
change as one walks towards the rectangle. The internal angles of the shape remain
constant, as does the number of sides, the positions of the sides ABCD relative to
one another, the surface texture, the colour. Gibson’s insight was to suggest that these
unchanging aspects of the stimulus (the patterns in light) are the kinds of structure that
are reliable enough to to underpin the control of action. This unchanging structure
is invariant structure: structure that specifies the layout of the animal’s environment.
Notice that in order to make use of this structure, the animal must already be able to
move about. This meant that for Gibson the stationary image was in fact a special case
of perception in motion, not the other way around. Gibson had turned the traditional
approach on its head.
To see how difficult it is to grasp this inversion of thinking, it is interesting to note
how researchers in the cognitivist tradition haves attempted to respond to Gibson’s
proposals. We will take one example here. David Marr, in his influential book Vision
(1982), recognized in Gibson’s account an attempt at a computational-level description
(in Marr’s terms) of what the problem is that the perceiving animal must solve (p. 29):
‘In perception, perhaps the nearest anyone came to the level of com-
putational theory was Gibson (1966). However, although some aspects of
his thinking were on the right lines, he did not understand properly what
information processing was, which led him to seriously underestimate the
complexity of the information-processing problems involved in vision and
the consequent subtlety that is necessary in approaching them.’
According to Marr, Gibson’s proposals suffered from two fatal shortcomings: 1)
Gibson is too quick to reject information-processing as a mechanism: ‘the detection
of physical invariants, like [the detection of] image surfaces, is exactly and precisely
an information-processing problem, in modern terminology’, and 2) Gibson underes-
timates how difficult this problem is: ‘Detecting physical invariants is just as difficult
as Gibson feared, but nevertheless we can do it. And the only way to understand how
is to treat it as an information-processing problem.’
What appears to be going on here is that Marr has misinterpreted the meaning of
‘invariant’, as Gibson uses the term. Marr takes it merely as a label for the fact that
objects remain the same shape and size over time, i.e. as a synonym for ‘constancy’.
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In other words, Marr is interpreting the word as referring to a property of the external
environment, while Gibson intends it to refer to a property of the stimulus, i.e. the
structured light that is intercepted by an exploring animal (Gibson, 1960). For Gibson,
the animal perceives the structure of the environment by attending to invariant struc-
ture in light. This structure specifies the layout of the environment as a consequence
of the lawful way in which light is reflected from surfaces: light is structured by the
environment. Consequently there is no information-processing problem: the struc-
ture is already there in the light. Or put another way, the structure in light is already
‘processed’ at the point at which it is intercepted by the animal, by the fact that it is
reflected in a lawful way from the environment’s surfaces. The task for the animal is
to learn how to make use of this structure in order to control its actions.
What ecological psychologists mean when they refer to ‘an invariant’ is this kind of
detectable property in the higher-order structure of light (or another medium): structure
that guides action. A simple example is the invariant that enables an animal to move
towards a stationary object. In this case, what the animal needs to do is to focus the
intended destination in its centre of optical expansion as it moves (Gibson, 1958).
As the animal moves towards the object, the object itself gradually expands to fill a
larger portion of the animal’s visual field, while the surrounding surfaces appear to
shear off to one side and eventually disappear from the field of vision altogether (at
least for an animal with forward-facing eyes). Thus the position of the target object
is constant during this particular act of locomotion, while structure that is not being
used in the control of this action is allowed to vary: everything else blurs off to the
side. Meanwhile, if the target object itself begins to blur to the side, this constitutes
information for the animal that it has veered off course and needs to correct its direction
of travel. This is what is signified by ‘an invariant’: a feature of the stimulus (light)
that is revealed through motion and that can be reliably used to control a particular
action.
Marr’s misinterpretation usefully illustrates two things. Firstly, it highlights that
the term invariant is one that needs to be introduced with some care. And secondly,
once the term has been correctly defined, it becomes clear that Marr and Gibson are
simply pursuing different hypotheses about how vision works. What does it mean to
say that apprehending an invariant in light is an information-processing problem? This
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assertion makes sense only if we continue to insist upon the traditional conception of
seeing as reconstructing a mental picture that is in turn perceived by a mind.4 But
Gibson explicitly rejects this account of seeing. On Gibson’s account, there is no need
to reconstruct anything. Rather the structure is already there, or rather, it arises in
the act of movement. The problem for the animal is to work out how to produce the
relevant structure and to learn what that structure means.5
1.1.3 Ecological optics v. physical optics
Another way to try to make clear the deep differences between the ecological and the
cognitivist approaches is in the distinction between classical or physical optics and
Gibson’s system of ecological optics (Gibson, 1961).
Physical optics is about measuring wavelengths and intensity of light, and about
matching points in an image to corresponding points in a three-dimensional coordinate
scheme: length, width, and depth. Here the measuring tools are themselves artifacts:
rulers, protractors, light meters. These instruments are designed to give a reproducible
measure of some property of the environment independent of how the environment is
perceived subjectively. Additionally, the coordinate scheme itself is a formal tool for
denoting specific points in physical space, again independent of subjective experience.
Ecological optics, by contrast, is about how the animal uses the structure available
4Marr (1982) does appear to allow that certain visual systems might function without the interven-
tion of mental representations. He describes the landing system of the housefly thus (p.33): ‘if the visual
field “explodes” fast enough (because a surface looms nearby), the fly automatically “lands” towards its
center.’ This description is congruent with Gibson’s (1958) description of the visual control of loco-
motion in humans. However, what Marr may be willing to allow for the fly, he is not willing to allow
for humans. The fly’s visual system is ‘not very complicated’ (p. 34). The human visual system, Marr
asserts, is engaged in a different game, that of ‘building a description of the shapes and positions of
things from images’; the job of human vision is ‘to derive a representation of shape’ (p. 36).
5It is perhaps worth noting here that some ecological psychologists have made a distinction between
two different types of invariant: ‘structural invariants’, and ‘transformational invariants’ (Pittenger and
Shaw, 1975; Michaels and Carello, 1981). Both of these terms are supposed to denote a property of
the stimulus (light). The former is supposed to denote structure in light that specifies inanimate objects
(notice that this is still not the same thing as Marr’s interpretation of an invariant as a property of the
object itself), while the latter is supposed to denote structure in light that specifies events in the world.
Personally, I find this distinction unhelpful: it seems to be one that is more likely to increase confusion
rather than reduce it. After all, any act of perceiving is an event, whether or not the object being
perceived is itself moving. This is not a distinction made by Gibson himself; in fact, this cuts to a deep
difference in perspective between Gibson and some of his followers, a topic that is too arcane to get into
here (Cutting, 1982).
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in light to guide its own actions. For an animal, there is no formal requirement that
an environment has to be perceived in exactly the same way from one point in time to
another. The animal’s perceptual systems—its measuring tools—are scaled not in the
units of some abstract, formal system, but in terms of the actions the animal is currently
capable of carrying out. The animal is not merely a perceiver, but a perceiver–actor:
perceiving is inherently bound to the potential to act. Perceiving and acting are one
and the same phenomenon.
What makes possible this alternative way of measuring light is the very fact that
light is structured in a complex way. Rulers and light meters measure this structure
in one manner: that is, they measure a particular aspect of the overall structure. But
ecological optics says that the structure that animals use to guide their activity is not
the same thing as the structure that happens to have been measured by the tools we
have so far invented.
How is light structured? Ambient light is structured by the surfaces in an environ-
ment. Light enters the environment from a light source (the sun) and bounces around
near-instantaneously from surface to surface such that, at the time scale of human ex-
perience, the environment is constantly filled with light from all directions. At any
potential point of observation, the light that reaches that point is structured in a law-
ful way by the surrounding surfaces, and in a way that is unique to that point at that
particular moment. The set of all such potential points of observation is referred to
as the ambient optic array. (In the jargon of ecological psychology, the medium of
perception is always an energy array. In the case of visual perception, the energy is
light; for acoustic perception the energy is sound waves; and so on.)
This gives an indication of the richness of the structure available to perception. At
any given point of observation, there is structure that specifies (structure in light that
is specific to) the entire surroundings. Meanwhile, if an animal is unable to unam-
biguously perceive some part of its surroundings from a given stationary point, it need
only move in some direction in order to generate for itself more information about the
ambiguous structure. And since perceiving is not bound in time to a single moment,
it is not a problem if the animal has to physically explore a part of its surroundings
before it has satisfactorily perceived that structure.
Chapter 1. A brief introduction to ecological realism 10
1.1.4 The concept of information
Perhaps the term most apt to cause confusion within ecological psychology is the word
‘information’. One problem is that this is the same word as is used in the mainstream,
information-processing account, where information is understood formally in terms of
particular units or bits; that is, information is something that is held to exist indepen-
dently of experience.6 By contrast, the ecological conception of information is again
specific to a particular animal-environment system, and it does not make sense to talk
about this kind of information except in the context of such a system: without ani-
mals, there is no information, there is only structure. Information is here defined as
information-for an organism, as something incorporated into an ongoing activity that
imposes constraints or direction on that activity (Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 37).7
This conception of information is animal-relative, action-oriented, and content-free.
Information arises in the course of the animal’s activity; it is for the detection of af-
fordances, and not about the world outside in some generic sense. It makes no sense
to say that light ‘carries’ information, although light is structured. This structure only
becomes information when an animal detects it (van Dijk et al., 2015).
The habitual cognitivist will likely remain unconvinced by the assertion above that
structure in light is simply available to a perceiving organism. In particular, it will
likely be pointed out that to say that information is something that can be extracted
from structure in light is to produce a fancy description while avoiding getting down
to brass tacks. What is missing, it will be declared, is a plausible mechanism for how
the nervous system turns structure in light into genuine constraints on action.
The challenge put forward by ecological psychology is to suggest that the nervous
system by itself cannot be said to be doing anything. The nervous system does not, by
itself, have agency. The nervous system is merely one component in a larger animal-
environment system. To try to explain an animal’s behaviour purely from a description
of its nervous system is like trying to explain the workings of a railway station from a
description of the positions of the levers in the signal box.
6There are many ways of trying to define non-ecological information. I will not get into these here;
I here confine myself to trying to summarize the nature of ecological information. See Adriaans (2013).
7The ecological realist proposal here anticipates a similar critique of the concept of information in
biology: that it does not make sense to talk about information at all except relative to some process that
makes use of the information (Oyama, 2000; Jablonka, 2002).
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The position that ecological psychologists have often adopted on this problem is
to say that in fact we cannot even begin to describe the activity within the nervous
system until we have a satisfactory account of what the task is that the animal-in-
its-environment is trying to accomplish (Wilson and Golonka, 2013). The animal-
environment system is the unit of analysis; the working of any particular subcompo-
nent, such as a nervous system, can only be assessed relative to the entire system.
Another way in which this same point is put is that psychology, as a science, must
operate at its own level of explanation, with its own set of primitives, and not with the
same set of primitives as are used in physics, say (Michaels and Carello, 1981). Psy-
chological primitives might include: the fact of subjective experience (Reed, 1996b),
the fact that experience is inherently directed at external structure (and thus there is no
problem of intentionality), and the fact of relations as perceivable entities (see below).
This kind of thinking about psychology at its own level of explanation is what mo-
tivated the development of ecological optics in contrast to traditional physical optics
(above).
At the psychological level of explanation, then, the nervous system is to be treated
as a black box: a component somehow implicated in the conversion of structure into
action. But if we step down to the level of the nervous system, the psychological expla-
nation becomes a description of the task to be solved, and there are some preliminary
points we can make here. Firstly, we can be confident that nervous system is not in the
business of reconstructing a moving image of the world from impoverished sense data.
Secondly, we can say, approximately, that the function that the nervous system does
have has something to do with attuning the animal to invariants that are instrumental
in constraining an ongoing action. This job description must also be informed by a set
of properties at an even higher level of description, namely affordances.
1.1.5 The concept of affordances
The concept of the affordance is probably the concept most readily associated with
ecological psychology by those outside the field, and in general it appears to be the
case that those outside the field believe they understand what it means; cognitivists, for
instance, are quite happy to import the concept into their own own explanatory toolbox
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(e.g., Kaschak and Glenberg, 2000). In fact, however, by appropriating the term for use
within their own scheme, cognitivists are radically distorting its meaning. The concept
of affordances follows from the more basic tenets of ecological psychology: direct
perception by an animal that must actively explore its richly structured environment.
In order to understand the concept it is necessary to first conceptualize the animal
and its environment as constituting a system (Stoffregen, 2003). Just as perceiving and
acting were characterized above as in fact two different ways of referring to a single
phenomenon, namely perception-action, so the animal and its environment must be
conceived as inherently inseparable: the one is strictly meaningless without the other,
as Gibson insisted at the start of his book. An environment, recall, is defined here as
the entirety of what surrounds an animal; it is not a synonym for the world.
Since animal and environment are conceived as a system, there must exist some
mechanism by which the component parts fit together. Affordances provide such a
mechanism. They are the relations that link an animal to particular assemblages of
structure in its surroundings (Chemero, 2003, 2009). Specifically, they are relations
that enable the animal to engage in perception-action. Affordances furnish opportuni-
ties for action and thus provide meaning to perception.8
Affordances, in the ecological scheme, pick out real correspondences between an
animal’s body and appropriately-scaled structures in the animal’s environment. Some
examples are self-enclosing surfaces whose diameter is no broader than the grip aper-
ture of an animal’s hand (a handle), or rigid surfaces that span a body of water and that
are strong enough to support a specific animal (a bridge). These correspondences are
specific to a particular animal and a particular piece of structure: what constitutes a
handle for a chimpanzee does not constitute a handle for a tadpole or a parrot. These
correspondences can be discovered, explored, and created. They physically provide
and constrain the things an animal can do because they are the things an animal can
8Not everyone agrees that ‘affordance’ is the label of a relation; some writers, for instance, say
that an affordance is a dispositional property of an external object, which is itself complemented by
a corresponding property in the animal (Turvey, 1992; Fajen et al., 2009). It has also recently been
pointed out that the affordances-as-relations view is too broad, because it does not distinguish between
action opportunities that merely exist in the animal’s surroundings and those that enter into the animal’s
experience, or its directed activity, and which would seem to invite particular actions (Withagen et al.,
2012). See Käufer and Chemero (2015) for further dicussion. For present purposes, I simply adopt the
affordances-as-relations position, and will use the term consistently throughout.
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do.
In contrast, the cognitivist appropriation of the term appears to treat ‘affordance’
as a synonym for ‘category’: it treats perceiving affordances not as perceiving the
actions that things afford, but rather as a special manner of perceiving objects, of per-
ceiving them as things that afford particular actions. Cognitivists talk of constructing
a mental model of an environment and exploring the affordances of that model (e.g.,
Kaschak and Glenberg, 2000). This, I suggest, is merely creating an unnecessary step,
and moreover an entirely unhelpful step: it is changing affordances from tractable, di-
rectly measurable phenomena (actual correspondences between animals and physical
structures) into opaque mental phenomena that can at best be inferred indirectly.
1.1.6 The role of learning: the doctrine of the new ball
All this talk of perceiving and acting as direct exploitation of a richly structured en-
vironment may appear to come up short when confronted with the fact that animals
learn. If nothing ever really enters the animal in the form of mental content,9 how is it
that animals learn new skills as they grow, and perform actions that appear to rely on
remembered events?
To answer this it is necessary to recognize another deep difference in thinking be-
tween the ecological approach and the mentalist alternative. Here the question is: what
is learning? The traditional answer is framed in terms of accretion: learning is adding
to a pre-existing knowledge base, which may be organized as a set of internal sym-
bols, or as an increasingly complex neural structure. The ecological answer is framed
in terms of change: learning is change in a subcomponent of the animal-environment
system which tends to make the animal gradually more adapted to some part of its
surroundings (Gibson and Gibson, 1955).
The traditional view of learning is encapsulated in the doctrine of the blank slate.
This says that infants are born with the ability to accumulate knowledge, but without
necessarily having any knowledge built in at the outset. Much argument has been
engaged in over the the question of whether the slate can really be blank at birth. To
deny inborn knowledge, it is said, is to deny human nature (Pinker, 2003). I will here
9For a discussion of the concept of content, and a defence of the claim that content is not needed to
explain behaviour (albeit mostly limited to basic organisms), see Hutto and Myin (2013).
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suggest that the problem with the doctrine of the blank slate is not so much that the
slate is blank; the problem is that it is a slate. A slate can only act as a device for
storing symbols. This is not a suitable metaphor for describing a living organism that
actively adapts to its surroundings.
As an alternative to the blank slate, therefore, I propose the doctrine of the new
ball. This will be an analogy based on a well-known phenomenon in cricket. It is a
recognized part of the game that the behaviour of the cricket ball changes as the ball
gets older. Specifically, when bowled, an older ball can be made to swing, or curve,
in a different way from a new ball. A cricket ball is made of two leather-covered
hemispheres separated by a seam. On a new ball both sides are polished. As the
game goes on the bowling team deliberately keep one side polished while allowing the
other to wear down and become rough. The new ball can be made to swing in one
direction—curving away from the batsman, say. This is called conventional swing; it
is a consequence of aerodynamic forces acting on one polished side and on the seam
separating the two halves of the ball (needless to say, the details are not important to
the present analogy). An older ball can be turned over and bowled with the polished
side facing the other way. This creates what is called reverse swing: the ball now
swings in the opposite direction. ‘The whole beauty (and success) of this phenomenon
is that a bowler who could bowl only outswingers at the onset (with the new ball) can
now bowl inswingers without any change in grip or bowling action’ (Mehta, 2005).
The point of this is that it is clear that the behaviour of the ball has changed, and it
is equally clear that this change is not the result of any increase in symbolic knowledge
on the ball’s part. Rather, what has changed is something in the physical properties
of the ball. The change is brought about here by the actions of the ball’s environment
(the actions of the bowling team, and the impacts of the ball with various surfaces).
This gives us a view of the process of learning that is in quite clear contrast to that
provided by the blank slate. Of course, the new ball analogy is not perfect. A ball is
still an inanimate object, which can only be acted upon by its environment; it is not an
actively exploring, self-adapting machine like a learning animal is. Nevertheless, the
contrast is perhaps clear enough to establish that we really are dealing here with two
quite different views of learning: one is accumulation, the other is change.
What learning animals have that cricket balls lack is that animals stand in a par-
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ticular kind of relation to their surroundings, namely a perception-action relation. In
the previous section it was suggested that affordances are the properties of an animal-
environment system that allow the parts to fit together. I here suggest that perception-
action is best conceived as the mechanism which allows those parts to interact. It is
the process by which environments change animals and by which simultaneously ani-
mals change their environments. This formulation will be a key part of the account of
collaborative activity to be developed.
1.2 The radical empiricist ontology
What has been presented so far is the core of the ecological account of perception-
action as it has been developed to capture the phenomenon of a single animal engaging
with the world, or rather with some particular aspect of the world, one piece at a time.
We have so far described perceiving as attending to particular pieces of structure, and
of affordances as single correspondences standing directly between the animal and
some particular physical assembly of surfaces.
But this is clearly not enough to encompass the range of behaviours that people
engage in. Human behaviours that we think of as among the most primitive involve
using one object to act upon a second object. We use tools to change the structure of
other surfaces; we throw stones into ponds, use sticks to extend our reach, brushes to
smear paint onto a wall, and so on. And when we act with other people it may be the
case that what we are doing is acting directly upon them in an effort to change them in
some way to our liking, but more likely we are drawing their attention to some outside
object, or acting with them to change some component of our shared environment, or
engaging in some other endeavour that involves not only two people but some other
structure besides. All of these things go beyond the simple dyadic engagement of a
perceiver-actor with a single piece of structure (be it an object or another animal).
In order to incorporate these basic behaviours into our framework, then, we need to
extend our ontology in some way. I have been persuaded that the right ontology for
the job is that provided by radical empiricism, a philosophy which asserts not only that
external objects are real and directly perceivable, but that relations between external
objects are equally real and equally accessible to direct perception.
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The radical empiricist perspective originates in the later writings of William James,
collected in his Essays on radical empiricism, and was developed in the work of James’
student E. B. Holt (Holt, 1912, 1915). Holt renamed the approach the New Realism.
The programme failed to gain much traction outside of a small band of James’ follow-
ers; this fact has been attributed to the simultaneous rise of John B. Watson’s overly
simplistic behaviorist programme (Charles, 2011). But perhaps another reason why
the New Realism did not take off in the early part of the twentieth century was sim-
ply that it had no satisfactory account of what relations are or how they might become
available to perception, and it therefore provided no suitable basis for an empirical pro-
gramme in psychology. What was missing was perhaps a conception of the organism
as occupying a place within an ecosystem. Heft (2013) argues that the separation of
mind and body implied by internalist approaches is a consequence of 19th century psy-
chologists’ failure to adopt Darwinian ecology, which places the organism in a field of
relations with its environment and with other organisms. Nowadays, however, we do
have a suitable ecosystems perspective in psychology; this is what Gibson’s ecological
approach is all about. (Gibson was himself mentored in graduate school by E. B. Holt).
There is reason to believe that this perspective can provide a useful set of tools for a
study of social phenomena in the radical empicist tradition (Charles, 2011).
Ecological psychology as a field, following Gibson, has been somewhat ambiva-
lent about its radical empiricist roots. As a consequence, ecological psychologists have
attempted to find other ways to incorporate basic triadic phenomena into their frame-
work, usually by recourse to the concept of affordances. This is at least partly the result
of some somewhat ambiguous statements in Gibson’s final book. In his chapter on the
theory of affordances, Gibson had this to say about social phenomena (1979, p. 128):
The other animals afford, above all, a rich and complex set of inter-
actions, sexual, predatory, nurturing, fighting, playing, cooperating, and
communicating. What other persons afford, comprises the whole realm of
social significance for humans. We pay the closest attention to the optical
and acoustic information that specifies what the other person is, invites,
threatens, and does.
Subsequent attempts by others to expand on this have invoked the concept of affor-
dances to deal with the perception of personality traits (McArthur and Baron, 1983),
with language (Worgan and Moore, 2010), and with collaborative activity (Marsh et al.,
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2006), among other things. Clearly the concept of affordances has to play an important
part in our understanding of these phenomena in ecological realist terms. Nevertheless,
the concept of affordances may not be the right place to start.10
Affordances are a property of the higher-order structure that exists between an ex-
periencing animal and some aspect of its environment. In order to understand where
these affordances fit in the overall scheme, and in order to work out how this descrip-
tion can be reconciled with the kinds of triadic phenomena mentioned above, it is
necessary to begin with a rough description of the more fundamental structure that
exists to support these activities, and out of which affordances arise. This description
is provided by the radical empiricist ontology. The radical empiricist ontology also
fits together neatly with two concepts from evolutionary ecology—the concept of the
ecosystem and the concept of niche construction. Together, these ideas may constitute
a suitable framework within which to build a psychology of collaborative activity.
1.2.1 The reality of relations
Since the distinguishing feature of the radical empicist philosophy is that it posits the
reality of relations, it will be as well to say something about what relations are. I will
illustrate this with two examples involving dogs.
A standard example of a relation is the relation of height—of one thing being taller
than another. This is a relation we might readily see when we line up two dogs and
stand them next to one another. It is perhaps easy to accept that what we can see is
both a pair of dogs and a relation between them (although of course the cognitivist may
counter that what is seen is a pair of dogs, while the relation is inferred from the mental
representation). An interesting question arises as to whether it is ever possible to see
the relation without being able to see the two entities. Suppose we can only see one
dog, the other being obscured behind a wall, say. Nevertheless, the relation may reveal
itself in how the dog that we can see acts towards the one that is presently obscured.
10Costall (1995) provides an insightful discussion of the origins of the problems here. He shows that
Gibson’s thinking maintained a crucial ambiguity about the status of the social. Gibson was attempting
to maintain two conflicting ideas: on the one hand, that meaning is a relational property arising from the
mutuality of animal and environment (and here it is acknowledged that the environment encompasses
other actors), but on the other hand, that in order to avoid slipping into cultural relativism it is necessary
to assert that the asocial physical structure of the environment is primary. This ambiguity seemingly
threatens to relegate the social to the status of secondary property.
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The dog we can see will direct its gaze upwards or downwards in a characteristic way.
Granted the information available to the observer here is ambiguous: we may round
the corner and see that the second dog is in fact a small dog stood on a box, or is not
a dog at all. But ambiguous or not, the structure exists from the point of view of the
perceiver.
For the second example, consider a dog on a leash, being taken for a walk. The
leash constitutes a physical connection between a dog and its owner. There is no need
to worry about whether the leash is perceivable. Now consider a dog without a leash,
running free in the park. Is it now impossible to see whose dog this is? Not at all. The
connection between dog and owner reveals itself in the way the latter periodically calls
out, or the way the dog periodically runs to catch up. Take away the leash and there is
still something connecting dog and owner. The radical empiricist might be inclined to
say that this connection is a relation, perceivable in the ongoing stream of events.
1.2.2 The animal in a field of relations
The animal is not merely an actor presented with a static environment upon which to
act. Rather, the environment is itself a constantly changing thing. It is an ecosystem,
made up of inanimate entities and other animals, including mates, predators, and po-
tential prey. It is a source of diseases and of resources for food and shelter, and it is
affected by the seasons and by other disruptions which may bring resource shortages
or other disasters. These ecosystems are what we have evolved to live in. An ecosys-
tem is a system of entities joined together by a network of relations (cf. Rietveld and
Kiverstein, 2014).
In order to survive, an animal must not merely be able to act upon a passively per-
ceived environment, but must be able to react to relevant changes in its surroundings. It
must be useful, then, for an animal to be able to perceive the relations in its ecosystem
directly, and not merely wait to be acted upon.
It was suggested above that perception-action is a relation that stands between an
animal and a piece of external structure. This relation may itself provide a useful
source of information for a second, observing animal. If relations are amenable to
direct perception, then the observing animal must be able to directly perceive what
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the first animal is doing, at least under certain conditions. Furthermore, the fact that
perception is extended in time means that it does not matter if the observer cannot
immediately discern what the actor is up to: this will be revealed as the action itself
progresses and as the observer is able to gather more information. The suggestion
here is that the perception of others is about attending to the right structure in a set
of changing relations between entities, and not about inferring mental content from
observed actions. This is a basic commitment of the radical empiricist account of
social perception (Charles, 2011).
1.2.3 The animal as a builder of its environment
The final concept I will introduce in this chapter is the concept of niche construction.
This is by now a concept fairly commonly invoked by psychologists, particularly in
relation to cultural change (Laland et al., 2000). The concept comes from evolution-
ary biology. It was originally intended as a correction to certain dogmatic assertions
that biologists have been given to make about how adaptation works (Lewontin, 1983;
Laland and Sterelny, 2006). Biologists pursuing a strong adaptationist programme
have held that evolutionary selection pressures are something imposed on organisms
by their environments: the relationship is held to be unidirectional. Niche construction
theory says that this is too simplistic. While it is true that environments do constrain
what animals can do, it says, it is equally true that animals actively change their envi-
ronments through the activities they engage in. And such animal-created changes can
themselves feed back into selection pressures.
Some common examples are: that birds build nests, that beavers build dams, and
that worms change the chemical make-up of the soil in a way that suits their diges-
tive systems. All of these are actions that shape the physical habitat in which young
members of these species live. Since these developmental environments are shaped in
an important way by the actions of the species, it can no longer be true that selection
pressures are simply furnished by nature. Rather, there is now a selection pressure in
favour of the animals that are best suited to these very constructed habitats.
The standard human example concerns the origin of lactose tolerance in western
populations. It is hypothesized that what came first was a cultural innovation: people
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started keeping cattle and drinking cows’ milk, and only as a consequence of this did
a selection pressure arise in favour of lactose tolerant humans. This process is known
as the Baldwin effect: adaptation as a result of a selection pressure arising out of the
activities of previous generations (Baldwin, 1896).
A similar problem appears at the scale of psychological study, where a similar
unidirectional environment-animal link has often been assumed by cognitivists. In this
version, the world provides input to the cognitive system which then treats that input
as a symbolic problem to be solved internally. These two ideas about environments
imposing constraints on both evolution and cognition are neatly brought together in
a suggestion made within cognitivist evolutionary psychology that human culture has
arisen as an adaptation to the ‘cognitive niche’ (Pinker, 2010). The argument here is
that the entire human world was in some sense already there before humans evolved:
the niche already existed, it was just waiting for a species to come along and evolve
into it.11
But at the psychological level, too, there is no good reason why the direction of fit
should be unidirectional—why the environment should provide input to the cognitive
system but not vice versa. The distributed cognition perspective makes a big deal of
the observation that in the carrying out of many tasks, we actively make use of the
environment itself: we draw diagrams to make sense of word puzzles, physically ma-
nipulate jigsaw pieces to see where they fit, make notes of things we need to remember,
and so on (Kirsh, 2010). Moreover, when we change the environment for ourselves we
are also changing it for others. This is clearly a fact which should be of some relevance
to any analysis of collaborative activity.
Clearly human niche construction is of a different order to the nest-building of birds
or ants. Human activity has so comprehensively altered our surroundings that we are
now largely unaffected by the instabilities of natural ecosystems: changes in seasons,
periodic resource shortages, threats from predators, and the like. Or at least we have the
impression that these things no longer affect us. The human ecosystem—the system
11‘The cognitive niche is [...] based on the idea that in any ecosystem, the possibility exists for an
organism to overtake other organisms’ fixed defenses by cause-and-effect reasoning and cooperative
action—to deploy information and inference, rather than particular features of physics and chemistry,
to extract resources from other organisms in opposition to their adaptations to protect those resources.’
(emphasis added; Pinker, 2010).
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of entities in our immediate surroundings—is in great part constructed by the previous
activities of the species. If human cognition was all about internal reasoning, why
would we go to the trouble of constructing so much stuff? A psychology of human
activity must at some point address the reality and significance of material culture
(Sterelny, 2014; Searle, 1995; Malafouris, 2013). The concept of niche construction
will therefore be one of increasing importance to psychologists.
1.3 Summary
A basic commitment of the ecological realist approach is to the idea that many of
the things that psychologists are inclined to attribute to minds are better understood
as aspects of an animal-environment system. The first part of this chapter aimed to
demonstrate that the ecological realist approach provides a genuinely different way of
conceptualizing the animal’s place in the world, compared to the way it is conceptual-
ized within cognitivism. The ecological realist perspective does away with the tradi-
tional animal-environment dichotomy. The aim of this first part was to contest the view
that ecological realism is merely a different way of describing the input, a description
that in the limit maintains the old animal-environment dichotomy after all, and still
requires cognitivist explanatory mechanisms (this seems to have been the conclusion
drawn by David Marr). The second part of the chapter sketched some extensions to
the ecological realist ontology that will be of some use as we attempt to incorporate
into our scheme activities involving collaboration between multiple animals. These
activities are generally triadic or polyadic: they involve not just a meeting of a single
animal and a single object, but potentially of multiple animals and multiple objects at
the same time. They are a test for any fundamental psychological theory.
Chapter 2
Ecological realism socialized:
Acting in a populated environment
The concept of the animal-environment system is designed to capture how it is that an
individual animal coordinates its behaviour relative to its surroundings. But what about
situations involving multiple actors? How might these be brought into our scheme?
It is commonly assumed that collaborative activities must be treated as a special
category, distinct from the kinds of phenomena that have traditionally been studied
by psychologists—the kinds of phenomena that can be studied by asking individual
research volunteers to solve problems in isolated booths.1 I will set out the case, in this
chapter, that this is actually the wrong way to look at things. In fact, it is unnecessary,
and perhaps counterproductive, to assume that collaborative activities are inherently
special and different. This is because, in reality, it is not the case that we live in a
world where we have to perform activities in isolation from our peers. From birth, we
are surrounded by other actors. All activity is activity that takes place in a populated
environment.
To draw a line between individual behaviour and group behaviour is to create a divi-
sion that does not exist in nature. In nature, the kinds of things that we are accustomed
to calling ‘collaborative’ or ‘social’—playing a musical instrument in an orchestra,
making movements for the benefit of one’s teammates in a soccer team, keeping to one
1For a brief overview of some existing approaches to the study of collaborative activities, see Ap-
pendix A.
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side in a corridor to allow people coming the other way to pass—are behaviours that
emerge in development as the child learns to participate in ongoing activities in the
world with increasing levels of skill and increasing acuteness of attention. We grow
into our ecological environment and grow with them rather than constructing those
environments from the ground up.
In this chapter I will restrict the discussion to non-verbal activities. In the next
chapter I will turn to speaking.
2.1 Against ‘joint action’
In recent years, much of the research on action in multi-actor settings has been carried
out under the label ‘joint action’ (Sebanz et al., 2006). There exists an influential line
of reasoning within this ‘joint action’ literature, particularly in work by philosophers,
in which an attempt is made to define strict diagnostic criteria for identifying which
activities we should count as genuinely collaborative, and which we should exclude
from this category.2
This way of thinking is predicated on the assumption that collaborative activity is
a natural kind—the idea that all collaborative activities have something in common
that distinguishes them from other kinds of activity. It is then taken to follow that
in order to understand collaborative activity we first have to discover the source of
this specialness. There are two good reasons to reject this. Firstly, it is impossible
2Two names often come up here, those of Michael Bratman and Margaret Gilbert. Bratman (1992)
proposes three features as being characteristic of joint activities: (i) each party is mutually responsive
to the other’s intentions and actions; (ii) each has an ‘appropriate commitment’ to the joint activity;
(iii) each is committed to supporting the efforts of the other. These criteria may capture some of our
intuitions about what ‘joint actions’ are. It is not clear, however, how such criteria could serve as a guide
for telling us where to look for explanatory mechanisms. Note also that the second ‘feature’ here seems
to invoke the very concept it is supposed to illuminate (although Bratman believes he can avoid this
circularity by inventing the phrase ‘cooperatively neutral joint-act-type’ and appealing to that). Gilbert
(1990) centres her discussion on a single ‘paradigmatic’ activity, namely, going for a walk together,
which she understands in terms of rights and obligations that hold between the individuals. She argues
that what makes this a true collaborative activity is explicit consent on all sides to form part of a ‘plural
subject’: ‘in order to go for a walk together, each of the parties must express willingness to constitute
with the other a plural subject of the goal that they walk along in one another’s company.’ [Her italics.]
This is a distinctly legalistic description, and it is doubtful whether it describes the first-person concerns
of people engaging in activities together in general. It also seems to rule out children and other animals
from being able to engage in joint activities, unless we grant that they too are concerned about enforcing
contractual commitments.
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in practice to come up with a workable set of necessary and sufficient conditions that
pick out a set of phenomena that everyone agrees is the set of phenomena of interest.
Consider two activities: a group of ants in the process of building a mound, and two
people carrying a sofa together (this is one of the go-to examples that philosophers
reach for when discussing joint action). Both of these could be described as ‘joint
actions’, but what could possibly unite them in a basic sense? What could be the true
essence that ensures that these two activities count as ‘joint actions’, while other non-
joint actions are excluded? ‘Collaborative activity’ is, in fact, just a label that we use to
pick out a broad set of roughly similar phenomena, with the usual boundary conditions.
It is not a natural kind.
Secondly, the view that there are genuinely such things as ‘joint actions’ goes along
with the assumption not only that there is something special about collaborative activ-
ities, but that, whatever that something is, it is part of the causal machinery involved
in the carrying out of any given collaborative task. It is assumed, for instance, that if
a group of individuals do in fact successfully collaborate on some task, then each of
those individuals must necessarily know, in some sense, that what they are doing is col-
laborating. But this is begging the question: it is positing that collaboration is special,
and then inviting us only to look for evidence that confirms this. A more productive
approach may be to assume that there is in fact nothing special about collaborative
activity that distinguishes it in all cases from individual activity, and that we should
proceed on that basis until we get to a point where the empirical facts tell us otherwise.
When we talk about ‘joint action’ we are in effect mixing two different relational
categories. ‘Jointness’ describes an interpersonal relation; it denotes the fact that a
group of actors can appear to be doing more than merely acting simultaneously, they
can appear to be acting together. ‘Action’, on the other hand, is descriptive of a rela-
tion between an individual actor and some aspect of its environment. When we act,
the action brings about change in our ecological environment. One problem here is
that, at least for traditional psychological approaches, it is not immediately obvious
that action is about animal–environment relations. Action is more often discussed
in terms of the presence or absence of some mental entity or volition, as in Donald
Davidson’s claim that an action must be ‘intentional under some description’ (David-
son, 1980). But on Gibson’s (1979) definition of the environment, an action must be
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about animal–environment relations. Even an action as simple as shaking one’s head
involves the environment. In order to coordinate that particular action in the first place,
or to perceive whether the action has been carried out successfully, one must create the
perception of optic flow while keeping static the invariant structure that specifies the
layout of the environment (when you shake your head your visual field moves but the
environment does not).
To talk of ‘joint action’ is to suggest a dichotomy between ‘individual action’ and
‘joint action’. The term invites an explanation of the behaviour of interest primarily
in terms of interpersonal relations. Other kinds of actor–environment relations are left
out of the analysis, or pushed to the background, taken for granted, described as mere
‘low-level’ action (e.g., Tomasello, 2014).
It is worth pausing over this phrase, ‘low-level action’. What could it mean? Why
should actions directed at inanimate objects be considered ‘low-level’ while actions
involving other animals are considered high-level or social? Why are we tempted to
make this distinction?
This distinction has arisen, I suggest, as an accidental by-product of the way that
action has traditionally been studied. Psychologists have tried to study behaviour by
isolating individual actors from their natural environments and placing them in care-
fully constructed artificial environments in which the sensory inputs and outputs can be
tightly controlled and measured (this is discussed at some length by Bronfenbrenner,
1979). It is tempting to believe that by getting a subject to respond to dots on a screen
we are ignoring everything that is not action and perception at the most basic level.
But real environments are not like the environments created in the laboratory. An
ant’s environment always contains other ants. That is to say, any action that the ant
might perform is one that potentially perturbs the environment of another ant. It is this
fact that allows the ants as a collective to construct great structures that could not pos-
sibly be conceived by any of the ants individually. Each ant merely acts in, and relative
to, its own environment, and in doing so it alters the structure of the environment of its
fellows.
‘Low-level action’, then, is an analyst’s construct. In reality, all action is social
because all action has the potential to perturb the environment of another animal. The
phrase I propose, ‘acting in a populated environment’, collapses the dichotomy be-
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tween joint action and individual action. There is simply no need to establish a joint
goal or to construct, ahead of time, a joint actor that is constituted by a set of interper-
sonal relations. It is sufficient for an individual to act on the available structure; this act
can then be amplified or responded to by another individual whose environment has
been perturbed.
The pay-off of this move, from talking about ‘joint action’ to talking about ‘acting
in a populated environment’, is that it allows us to avoid having to ask the question
of how it is that the group comes to perform some task together. Existing accounts
of joint action attempt to explain such behaviour primarily in terms of interpersonal
relations, asking the question: ‘How do individual actors in some situation combine to
make a joint actor or team?’ (See the discussion in Appendix A). On the alternative
view that I have outlined, this question is no longer seen as a pre-requisite to under-
standing the behaviour. Instead, we can ask a more tractable kind of question, focusing
on some specific task and asking: ‘How do we identify precisely which structures in
the actor’s environment are implicated in the control of the actor’s behaviour?’ (This
methodological pay-off will be taken up further in chapter 4.)
2.2 Acting in a populated environment
I have suggested that there is no unifying thread that runs through all instances of
the activities that we are inclined to call ‘collaborative’. In place of trying to identify
general principles of collaboration, then, it will be necessary to look at some particular
cases, to see what lessons they might yield. I will here briefly discuss two such cases:
children’s soccer games, and pack hunting behaviour observed in chimpanzees.
2.2.1 Soccer
A famous passage from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s writings on phenomenology de-
scribes the soccer field in terms of how it immediately appears to an experienced player
of the game (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 168):
For the player in action the football field is not an “object,” that is, the ideal
term which can give rise to an indefinite multiplicity of perspectival views
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and remain equivalent under its apparent transformations. It is pervaded
with lines of force (the “yard lines”; those which demarcate the “penalty
area”) and articulated in sectors (for example, the “openings” between the
adversaries) which call for a certain mode of action and which initiate and
guide the action as if the player were unaware of it. The field itself is not
given to him, but present as the immanent term of his practical intentions;
the player becomes one with it and feels the direction of the “goal,” for
example, just as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal planes of
his own body. It would not be sufficient to say that consciousness inhab-
its this milieu. At this moment consciousness is nothing other than the
dialectic of milieu and action. Each maneuver undertaken by the player
modifies the character of the field and establishes in it new lines of force
in which the action in turn unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the
phenomenal field.
This passage provides an evocative description of the kinds of structures that the
experienced player must attend to and must act with reference to. Merleau-Ponty rec-
ognizes that a soccer game does not work through a series of orderly transitions of
possession—the ball does not simply move from one player to another. The situation
is constantly shifting, and opportunities for action are constantly arising and disap-
pearing as the players move about. When one player passes the ball to another this is
best understood not as the first player ‘losing’ something and the second ‘gaining’ the
same. A pass is best understood as an action that propels the ball into a space for the
teammate to run into (Gréhaigne et al., 1997). This actions alters the structure of the
space for the passer, and simultaneously alters the structure of the space for all of the
other players.
The kinds of structures that Merleau-Ponty describes are not, however, immedi-
ately accessible to a player who is brand new to the game. When young children are
first introduced to the game, they do not try to arrange themselves into organizations
in order to exploit the openings between opposing players. Young children’s soccer
games are characterized by the entire group chasing the ball around the field en masse.
‘A child’s basic urge is to run and chase the ball’ (Quinn and Carr, 2006). Over time,
players learn to attend to information that specifies the prospective movements of the
other players (dynamical structures that specify where those players are going to be),
and they learn to exploit such structures (Gréhaigne et al., 2001). In order to reach such
levels of skill, it is necessary to first learn such basic things as how the ball behaves
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when you kick it, and how other players respond to the ball being propelled in a given
direction. To perceive that a ball can be passed into a particular space for a teammate
to run onto it, it is first necessary to be able to perceive that a ball can be passed into a
particular space. All of this is learned at a very intuitive level. The child does not need
to learn to play the game in some abstract, or theoretical way, using words, but learns
to recognize and respond to contingencies that arise in real time, through taking part in
the activity.
2.2.2 Chimpanzee pack hunting
Another example of a real-world collaborative activity is the pack hunting behaviour
of some chimpanzees. Some wild groups of chimpanzees have been observed to hunt
monkeys, the group encircling the prey before one of the chimpanzees is in a position
to attack and kill it (Boesch and Boesch, 1989).
There is some debate about whether this is really a collaborative activity at all.
Michael Tomasello (2014) has argued that it is not, and that in fact each individual
chimp’s behaviour can be explained by selfish motives (p. 35): ‘chimpanzees in a
group hunt are engaged in a kind of co-action in which each individual is pursuing his
own individual goal of capturing the monkey’. Tomasello is here engaging in the philo-
sophical game discussed above: dividing the world a priori into ‘joint’ and ‘individual
activities’.
Another description of the hunt, provided by Boesch (2002), posits the existence
of ‘roles’ as causal components of task performance. Boesch identifies four roles:
chimpanzees can act as driver, chaser, blocker, or ambusher. The suggestion is that
these roles have some normative significance: a chimpanzee’s role determines the share
of the meat that they are entitled to. If this is the case, then some form of mind-reading
must be involved, as each chimp would need to know what role the others are playing.
But is it in fact necessary to suppose that the chimpanzees are really taking on some
well-defined ‘role’ in these situations (even if we acknowledge that such a role might
be implicit, and not represented in a language of thought)?
Tomasello (2014) describes the hunt in terms of individual goals; Boesch (2002),
in terms of individual roles in the context of a single shared goal. What both of these
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description schemes obscure is the importance of external space relative to the imme-
diate positions of individual hunters and prey. In a successful hunt, individual hunters
will surround the prey in such a way that all potential escape routes are blocked. Muro
et al. (2011) present a computer simulation of a similar type of hunting behaviour in
wolves. In the wild, wolves are observed chasing a buffalo until the buffalo becomes
tired and collapses, at which point the wolves surround their prey on all sides. Muro
et al. were able to reproduce this behaviour by modeling the wolves as agents follow-
ing two rules: 1) get as close as possible to the buffalo without putting yourself directly
in its path (i.e., avoid being trampled on), and 2) maximize your distance from neigh-
bouring wolves. It is tempting to conclude from this that wolves need not possess any
kind of explicit understanding of the ‘role’ they are occupying, but rather that they are
literally following a couple of simple rules. But perhaps even these rules are unneces-
sary outside of the constraints of the computer simulation: in reality, rich perceptual
information is available to the hunter in the unfolding structure. The question is, what
aspect of this structure is it that hunters must learn to respond to?
This is the question that concerns the radical empiricist. A plausible answer is that
hunters are looking for the biggest gap in the space surrounding the prey that isn’t
already occupied by a fellow hunter. That is, individuals are responding to spaces,
not to distances from other animals per se: there is no need to calculate the distance
from one’s neighbours and deliberately adjust one’s position in order to maximize this
distance, nor is there a need for any kind of internal bird’s-eye schema of the overall
situation; rather, the apparent division of labour in the hunt simply emerges out of
individuals responding to local affordances, to directly perceivable gaps.3
The skills involved in this group hunting behaviour will necessarily have to be
learned to a great extent—through participation in the hunt itself and through such ac-
tivities as play with other chimpanzees. Identifying exactly how it is that an individual
learns to participate appropriately in the hunt is an empirical question, and one that
will, in practice, be difficult to study, given that these hunts may take place over an
3A similar process may be at work when groups of people gather together spontaneously into a circle
to have a conversation. When we do this we tend to arrange ourselves in a symmetrical fashion, with a
regular distance between participants, or in an unsymmetrical fashion that allows all the participants to
attend simultaneously to some external object in the distance. Adam Kendon (2010) calls such config-
urations ‘F-formations’, and suggests that these formations allow participants to maintain order in the
conversation and to jointly manage one another’s attention behaviour.
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extended area within a dense forest. Considering this pack hunting activity in terms
of structure available to perception from the perspective of an individual chimpanzee
does, however, promise to lead to a rich understanding of the mechanics of this be-
haviour.
2.3 Growing into one’s environment: lessons from
Holt and Vygotsky
What is clear, from the two cases discussed above, is that participating in collaborative
activities involves two things: it involves a pre-existing environment which provides
structure and provides a context for the actor’s learning, and it involves the learning
of skills which are necessary if the actor is to take control of the environment that it
finds itself in. Learning to participate in such activities is thus a dialectical process: the
environment provides structure which the developing animal learns to respond to, and
in mastering these responses the animal learns to alter the layout of its environment in
reproducible ways, and this in turn opens up the possibility for the actor to discover
new aspects of the structure of its environment. Two authors in particular have written
insightfully on this type of process: E. B. Holt, whom we encountered already in
chapter 1, and Lev Vygotsky, whose career began just a few years after Holt introduced
his new realism, and ended just a few years after that.4
2.3.1 Holt and the recession of the stimulus
Holt spoke of a process which he labelled, somewhat misleadingly, ‘the recession of
the stimulus’ (Holt, 1915, p. 75). I say misleading because the phrase would seem, on
its surface, to imply that, through the process of learning, the animal retreats into itself.
In fact, Holt intends the phrase to mean precisely the opposite of this. He intends it to
denote how, in learning to master basic level skills in the context of an environment,
the animal becomes able to engage with the environment at ever-increasing levels of
4I am not aware of any evidence that Vygotsky was familiar with Holt’s work. There are interesting
parallels. Both were very much influenced by Darwinian thinking, which itself takes a dialectical view
of the organism in an ecological context (Heft, 2014). Holt appears to inherit this most importantly from
William James (1912), while Vygotsky inherits his dialectical thinking also via Marx and Engels.
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structure. Whereas Holt talks of ‘recession’, he might just as well have spoken of
‘growth’, or ‘adaptation’, or ‘engagement’ between animal and environment.
Perhaps the clearest exposition that Holt gives of the concept is in the following
passage (Holt, 1915, p. 186):
When one first learned to walk, the process involved lively consciousness
of pressure on the soles, and at different intensities in the two feet; of
visible objects which one carefully watched in order to steady oneself,
etc., etc. One now walks with head in air and with almost total oblivion
of the steadying visual objects and the unfeeling tactual objects with sharp
corners, the stairs and the inclines, which it was once so wise to keep in
view. At first one stepped, and each step was an adventure in itself; now
one walks, or perhaps not consciously even this; for one may consciously
not be walking or running, but catching a train, thinking over a lecture,
bracing oneself to do a sharp stroke of business. The walking behavior,
although no less behavior and no less involving functional adjustment to
the environment and hence no less involving ‘content,’ has now been taken
up (along with other behavior systems) and made component of a more
highly integrated and elaborate form of behavior.
It is clear, from this passage, that when Holt talks of ‘recession’ he is talking about
the same sort of thing as was described above, in the case of the children chasing the
soccer ball around the pitch. In learning to walk, the child must initially attend care-
fully to the most basic adjustments in position. Later, the child is able to assemble
itself into a walking system in a highly efficient manner, which frees up attentional re-
sources to further explore the structure of the surroundings. and perhaps newly created
structures such as optic-flow in the context of locomotion. Similarly, the child, when
first learning to kick a soccer ball to a teammate, must first attend carefully to how
different types of leg-swinging action cause the ball to be propelled in different ways.
Later, when the child can kick the ball efficiently, and in a somewhat reliable manner
in some roughly desired direction, this frees up the child’s attention to discover new
patterns of movement that can be responded to. Now the child can start to attend not
only to where the ball is going to go, but also to where her teammates are, or where
they are going to be.
Holt describes the process of learning in terms of the integration of reflex arcs
within the learner’s nervous system. At one point he discusses a hypothetical example
of a micro-organism which learn to move towards light while also learning to back
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away from a source of heat that becomes too intense. It is clear that he understands
this learning process in dialectical terms, the animal and its environment together con-
stituting the system (Holt, 1915, p. 75):
And one could not describe what the animal as a whole is doing in terms
of the immediate stimuli; but this can be described only in terms of the
environing objects toward which the animal’s response is directed. This
is precisely the distinction between reflex action and specific response or
behavior. As the number of of component reflexes involved increases, the
immediate stimulus itself [light] recedes further and further from view as
the significant factor.
The recession of the stimulus is the growth of the animal into its environment. It
is the result of change in the actor in accordance with the doctrine of the new ball:
change that impacts the adaptedness—the fit—that exists between an animal and its
environment.
2.3.2 Vygotsky and the zone of proximal development
Lev Vygotsky’s thinking about learning is strikingly similar to Holt’s in its dialectical
nature. Vygotsky formulated a language for describing learning in a social context, a
language which has been particularly useful and influential in the context of education
(Lake, 2012). An important concept here is that of the zone of proximal development.
In introducing this concept, Vygotsky (1978) describes the standardized testing of his
day. He notes that tests administered to children were designed to measure the child’s
‘actual developmental level’: the tests measured the children’s ability to solve prob-
lems on their own, in isolation. (Of course, this remains true of much standardized
testing in childhood education settings today.) Vygotsky suspected that such testing
may be measuring the children’s true abilities in a very restricted and limited way. He
complains that the psychologists who drew up these tests ‘never entertained the notion
that what children can do with the assistance of others might be in some sense even
more indicative of their mental development than what they can do alone’ (p. 85).
The ‘zone of proximal development’ is intended to denote the space that exists
between the things the child can do in isolation (the ‘actual developmental level’) and
the things the child can do with the help of others. Vygotsky recognizes the latter
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as important. He claims that the things that a child is able to do with help today
are indicative of the child’s capacity to master those things for him- or herself in the
immediate future. Vygotsky noted, in effect, that private, mental activities are really a
special case of actions carried out first through situated action in the context of others
(a process he called ‘internaliztion’). Lake (2012, p. 49) quotes a useful passage from
a book by Bodrova and Leong (1996, p. 35), which parses word by word the phrase
‘zone of proximal development’:
Vygotsky chose the word zone because he conceived of development not
as a point on a scale, but as a continuum of behaviors or degrees of mat-
uration. By describing the zone as proximal (next to, close to), he meant
that the zone is limited by those behaviors that will develop in the near fu-
ture. Proximal refers not to all the possible behaviors that will eventually
emerge, but to those closest to emergence at any given time.
In formulating the concept of the zone of proximal development, Vygotsky was
particularly concerned with understanding the emergence of the ‘higher psychological
processes’, such as language, mathematics, and scientific reasoning. I will touch on
these briefly in the next chapter. But I will note here that if the existence of a supportive
social context is important in learning such things as mathematics and reasoning, it is
an absolutely constitutive part of the kinds of intelligence required to become a skilled
soccer player, or pack hunting chimpanzee.
A child playing with a soccer ball in isolation from her peers may learn to manoeu-
vre the ball with great skill. She may learn to keep it up in the air, to step over it in
elegant ways, to balance it on her neck. But such skills will not in themselves make
her a skilful player of the game of soccer. There are skills that are impossible to learn
in isolation: attending to the prospective movements of the other players; learning to
recognize opportunities to pass the ball to a teammate in an advantageous position;
learning to move without the ball in such a way as to distort the opponents’ defensive
system; learning to pass the ball back and forth with a team mate quickly, in a manner
that wins territory and advances the ball towards the opponents’ goal. Such skills are
recognized by soccer commentators as hallmarks of intelligent play. But this is a kind
of intelligence which, as in Vygotsky’s day, is not typically measured by standardized
testing.
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2.4 Summary
This chapter has made two major arguments. Firstly, there is no special problem of
‘joint action’, and there is no sharp divide, from the perspective of the actor, between
engaging in actions that are ‘joint’ and engaging in individual action. We are born into
a world that contains other actors, and any action we engage in is therefore an action
that takes place in a populated environment. Some of our actions may directly perturb
another actor; other actions may alter the layout of the world in a way that impacts on
how the environment appears to other actors. In rejecting the dichotomy between the
joint and the individual, we free ourselves from such problems as explaining how it
is that we come to coordinate with ‘other minds’, or how it is that a group is able to
emerge as an agent. Such concepts are not necessary. Collaborative action is possi-
ble because multiple animal-environment systems co-exist in a single world, and the
actions of any one animal can thus immediately impact the activity of another.
The second point is that learning to engage with others collaboratively is a dialec-
tical process—one in which the learner first attends to basic structures in the environ-
ment, and in responding to these opens up new opportunities to learn. This is true for
the non-verbal activities that have been discussed in this chapter, and it is also true
of those functions that Vygotsky described as the ‘higher mental processes’, the most
central of which is language—the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 3
An ecological realist guide to
speaking
In psycholinguistic theorizing, speaking—articulation—is said to be the end product
of a chain of events that starts with a thing that a speaker wants to say, which is initially
encapsulated in a mental concept or lemma; this lemma feeds into phases of word se-
lection and motor planning before finally being realized as an utterance (Levelt et al.,
1999).1 What is this lemma, in its initial state? Clearly it is supposed to be a kind
of Brentano-style intentional object: a mental counterpart of the thing that eventually
gets realized as movements of the vocal apparatus. But why suppose that such a thing
exists? A powerful reason for thinking so comes from our own experience. When we
think to ourselves we find that we are constantly formulating sentences in our heads.
This gives us the impression that what we choose to utter out loud is a subset of the
sentences of this ‘inner speech’. We thus have a strong intuitive reason for suspecting
that all utterances must be preceded by corresponding acts of thought. And if all in-
dividual utterances are preceded by an internal thought, then it is plausible to imagine
that thinking is a primary phenomenon that must take basically the same format in
pre-verbal infants as it does in adults. That is, just as a thought precedes an utterance,
the ability to speak (in general) is likewise preceded by an ability to think (in general).
On this view, thinking happens in a language of thought, and language learning is the
1A much-edited version of this chapter appears in the journal Ecological Psychology with the title
‘A radical empiricist theory of speaking: Linguistic meaning without conventions’ (Baggs, 2015).
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process of mapping this pre-existing thinking system onto whatever natural language
happens to be spoken in the vicinity of the infant. And the same may be true for other
animals as well: thinking happens in mentalese; it is just that no other species happens
to be capable of mapping its thoughts onto an external language in the way a human
infant can.
So one view of things here says that spoken utterances are externalized thought
(Chomsky, 2011). But the reverse may instead be true. It may be that speaking out
loud is primary, and that the ability to formulate internal sentences in inner speech—the
ability to speak in one’s head—is in fact a consequence of having mastered the out-loud
variety (Vygotsky, 1962, 1978). On this alternative view, the utterances of an infant at
an early stage of language learning need not be the product of an internal thought at all.
Rather, these utterances may simply be an instance of the child attempting to act upon
its environment directly. That is, utterances are exploratory actions. Only later, after
extensive exploration—after the child has tested out a wide variety of speech-actions
and learned their meanings by attending to the things that these actions bring about—
does it become possible to bundle a selection of utterances together into something
like a ‘thought’, where a thought is really a sentence in inner speech. This view of
things is perhaps less intuitively appealing than the first, at least from the standpoint
of a linguistically sophisticated adult human. But it is a view that can perhaps more
easily be reconciled with the fact that language has to be learned. (And incidentally it
seems to suggest an explanation for the fact that adults feel the need to tell children to
‘think before you speak’.)
Of course, the present realist framework does not admit representations into its
description scheme: internal mental objects are excluded as a matter of principle. The
first view of things—that spoken language is representational thought externalized—is
thus unavailable to us. The problem for the ecological realist is how to characterize
language without invoking mental terminology, and in a way that is consistent with the
tenets of ecological realism: that the things we have access to in experience must be
accessible to perception.
Ecological psychologists have attempted a number of schemes for reconciling lan-
guage and ecological realism, none of which is entirely satisfying. These attempts have
generally been of two types. One type takes some existing concept from Gibson’s
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theory—affordances, energy arrays, information, event perception—and attempts to
repurpose it for language. The other type tries to co-opt the existing mentalist descrip-
tion scheme we use to talk about language, and to strip it of all its dualistic attributes. I
will discuss some of these proposals below before outlining an alternative based on the
radical empiricist ontology. But first it will be necessary to establish what the problem
space is.
3.1 Does ‘language’ exist?
The first issue that must be addressed is the question of what kind of thing we are
talking about when we talk about language. On the view of language as external-
ized thought, this appears to have a fixed answer: language is a system for arranging
ideas. On the alternative action-based view, the issue is far less clear. One seductive
answer is that language is a kind of medium: speaking is a kind of acting, and it is
performed through the medium of language. I believe this view is quite wrong. An ar-
gument against the language-as-medium concept can be made on much the same lines
as William James’s argument against the existence of ‘consciousness’ (James, 1904).
The problem with the idea of consciousness is not the fact of subjective experience,
but the implication that experience goes on inside some kind of container. If conscious-
ness is a container, then there arises the familiar problem of how things on the inside of
it (thoughts) can ever interact with things on the outside (objects). What James rejects
is ‘consciousness’ as a label for this container: ‘It is the name of a nonentity, and has
no right to a place among first principles.’ In short, the rejection of consciousness is
a rejection of mind-body dualism. James recognizes, however, that consciousness is
also invoked to name a function—the function by which an individual comes to know
things. He proposes to re-conceive this function as a direct relation, ‘knowing’, that
exists between an experiencing animal and an object.2
The parallel argument for ‘language’ must reject a different kind of dualism: language-
environment dualism. A common way of talking about language, or communication,
is to say that a message is transmitted from a speaker to a hearer through a ‘channel’,
2This general idea was later taken up by Gibson and refined into the concept of perception-action;
see Heft (2001).
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i.e. a container, or rather a conduit (Reddy, 1979). It is easy to see how this descrip-
tion could be applied to a telephone line or an internet chat interface: there, something
is actually being encoded at one end and transmitted through a physical network of
wires to a recipient at the other end. But the concept of the channel is freely applied
by theorists to describe speaking in the normal case: between two or more people in
the same space, separated only by air. This is odd because nobody has ever seen a
speech channel connecting two people talking in this manner. The obvious candidate
for what constitutes the channel is the collection of sound waves that are produced by
a speaker and attended to by a listener. So perhaps that is why nobody has seen any
such channel: the channel is invisible. But then again, what type of existence could
this channel have? Does it still exist when two people are in the same space but not
talking to one another, or does it come into existence only for the duration of the rele-
vant sound waves? And if perceiving someone’s speech is really attending to structure
in sound, why should that sound need to be sent through any kind of conduit at all?
Why can it not just be out there?
The problem with the conduit metaphor is best seen if we consider an interaction
between two people talking about something in their immediate surroundings. What
the conduit metaphor does is it distracts us from the reality of a shared world: it cre-
ates the impression that in order to engage in an activity together we must somehow
establish that this is the activity we are engaging in, and that we must do so by sending
messages back and forth down the pipe. Any further verbal utterances that are made
while the activity is ongoing are also conceptualized as messages sent through the pipe.
The verbal actions are seen as not exactly part of the activity; they exist as a kind of
commentary on how the activity is going, or as a secondary activity that interacts with
the primary activity somehow. There is a division between the realm of physical ac-
tion and the realm of language. But if we consider even briefly the kinds of actions
that do in fact take place, it soon becomes apparent that this division is hard to main-
tain. The kinds of actions that exist do not divide naturally into just two types: verbal
actions and physical actions, or communicative actions and non-communicative ones.
Instead, there are physical actions that seem to be communicative (being handed a tea
towel by someone who is washing up); there are verbal actions that seem to be ends in
themselves (performatives); there are vocal cries that serve no obvious communicative
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purpose; and there are a great many utterances that seem to be uninterpretable except
as a combination of the physical and the linguistic, such as the expression, ‘What’s
that!’
As with consciousness and physical reality, then, there is a case to be made that the
division between language and the environment is unsustainable. But again, we must
recognize that the conduit metaphor is invoked in the service of a function. What is
the function of language? A plausible answer is that it is a tool for directing attention
(Reed, 1995; Tomasello, 1999). The rest of this chapter will therefore be an attempt to
outline how this function can be sustained in a realist framework. The suggestion will
be that the action of directing others’ attention is achieved through actions performed
on the system of relations that constitute the local ecosystem. If the function can be
achieved through the system of relations, then there is no need to invoke any additional
channel of communication.
I will here deal with a likely objection to the above. If language does not exist, how
can it be that there are different languages? The response is that obviously there are
different languages, but that these exist only in opposition to one another. To say that
languages A and B are different is really only a description of a state of affairs: it is
shorthand for something like the statement that, ‘When I hear those people two people
talking to each other, I cannot draw any useful information out of their speech.’ But it
is not the case that two people who share no common language are thereby occupying
two incompatible worlds, or that they are stuck in a shared physical environment with
no channel to communicate with. Two people with no common language can still point
to things and produce names; this fact is the basis of much anthropological fieldwork.
These two people find themselves in the same world. What is missing is not a channel,
a ‘language’, but the skills to carry out certain kinds of actions; these two people are
simply not (yet) built in such a way that they can point each other to bits of their shared
environment in an efficient way.
3.2 Reconciling speaking and ecological realism
One of the most common criticisms of the ecological approach is that it can deal
with simple things but not complex things. It can characterize simple, ‘low-level’
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activities—perception-action phenomena. But because it rejects representations it has
no hope of characterizing more complex cognitive activities that surely recruit memo-
ries and internal symbols. Language is the prototypical ‘higher-level’ cognitive activ-
ity. As such, it is unsurprisingly the case that a number of ecologically-inclined psy-
chologists have attempted to take up the challenge of providing a non-representational
account of language. I do not think a completely satisfactory account has yet been
given. Nevertheless, it is instructive to look at the strengths and weaknesses of the
proposals that have been made.
The first proposal is that perceiving someone else speaking is perceiving affordances—
it is perceiving what the other person affords. In a trivial sense this has to be true: ac-
cording to the framework, all perceiving is perceiving affordances. The trouble is that
it is not clear how a given instance of speech could itself afford anything. The structure
of speech is simply not the same kind of thing as the structure that is perceived in light,
say. Light is structured in a lawful way by the fact that it is reflected off the surfaces of
the environment—the structure in light specifies those surfaces as a consequence of the
way it is reflected. Affordances, as defined in chapter 1, arise from correspondences
between animals and the things in the world that those animals can act upon; corre-
spondences that can be perceived in the structure in light. Speech structure, by contrast,
is apparently arbitrary. Speech structure is characterized by what linguists call ‘duality
of patterning’: a finite set of sounds (phonemes) is combined into a set of meaningful
units (words or morphemes), and these meaningful units are then further combined
into larger meaningful patterns or sentences (Hockett, 1960). If the structure in speech
is not directly informative about external structure, then it does not appear reasonable
to say that hearers perceive affordances via speech in anything like the way that they
perceive affordances via light. Proponents of language-as-affordances are aware of this
problem, and attempt to resolve it by talking about ‘social affordances’ (Kono, 2009)
or ‘interaction affordances’ (Worgan and Moore, 2010). These terms appear in essence
to be placeholders for a hoped-for solution.
Another proposal says that language is a kind of energy array. Recall that in the
ecological jargon an energy array is a medium of perception. For example, the optic ar-
ray is the set of all potential points at which an animal can sample the richly-structured
light that specifies its environment; the acoustic array is the set of positions from which
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an animal can sample the noises of its environment. The proposal is that language ex-
ists in ‘dialogical arrays’ (Hodges, 2009). This is based on the observation that, by
talking to one another, conversation participants can perceive, at second-hand, infor-
mation about objects or events witnessed by others, and can learn about other people’s
dispositions and intentions.3 This, again, is clearly a true description in some sense.
But the suggestion that language is a discrete kind of energy is puzzling. What kind
of energy could it be? Clearly it is not like light or sound: dialogical energy is not
just out there constantly in the environment, but has to be created by a speaker. The
only plausible explanation appears to be that language is a kind of private energy that
resides inside people, and that has to be goaded out through verbal actions. But this
suggests a representational account (it is reminiscent of the transactive memory scheme
proposed by Wegner, 1986, according to which language is a device for transferring
memories from one mind to another). If this is so, the language-as-energy theory has
not succeeded in providing a non-representational account of speaking.
A third proposal, from Fowler (1986), says that perceiving speech is perceiving
events, where the word ‘events’ is to be understood in the ecological fashion as de-
noting temporally extended, directly observable disruptions in an energy array. This
proposal is presented specifically as an explanation of how the sounds of speech are
perceived, and relies on maintaining the standard division between ‘language’ and
‘context’. Fowler acknowledges that this division may not be perfect: ‘In ordinary
settings in which communication takes place this is almost certainly not a natural par-
titioning because it leaves out several aspects of the setting that contribute interactively
with the linguistic utterance itself to the communication. [...] For the present, how-
ever, I will preserve the partitioning [...]’ She then finds it necessary to divide the
event of talking into two: a speech event, denoting the sound pattern itself, and a
linguistic event, which is where meaning is supposed to be located. In effect, she is
committed to the idea that information has to be extracted from a message—that is,
to the idea that ‘language’ exists as a conduit through which ideas travel. As a tenta-
tive account of what is required for a listener to perceive the linguistic event, Fowler
suggests that words and sentences are meaningful because the same structures have
3This proposal is the most closely informed by James Gibson’s own notes on language, mentioned
in the preface (Gibson, 1982).
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been used in the past for similar purposes: ‘listeners apprehend the linguistic work that
the phonetically-structured vocal tract activity is doing by virtue of their sensitivity
to the historical and social context of constraint in which the activity is performed.’
This looks very similar to more recent cognitivist proposals that language perception
requires enormous statistical processing of the input (e.g., Saffran et al., 1996). How
might this be achieved without representations? Clearly this is an important gap in the
proposal.
A final proposal that I will discuss here says that perceiving the meaning of speech
is just perceiving information. This, again, is certainly true in some sense or other.
The problem is to explain the nature of this information: what is it information about?
Spoken structure is a property of the environment, but it is not simply given in the
way that structure that specifies the colour of the sky is given; spoken structure must
be created by the actions of a speaker. But speakers are unstable objects, constantly
moving about, and frequently engaging in different activities from one moment to the
next. This being so, how can it be that spoken structure is at the same time sufficiently
stable in nature that children can learn what it means?
An answer that has been frequently proposed is that words and other linguistic seg-
ments derive their meaning from convention. I will devote some space to this idea,
because it is one that is both attractive on its face and seemingly very difficult to do
without. I also think it is entirely wrong, and a hindrance to characterizing speak-
ing in a genuinely anti-representational way. The convention-based view is explicitly
endorsed by Wilson and Golonka (2013):
The only difference between perceptual information [for vision] and
linguistic information is in the relationship between the structure in the
energy array and the meaning of the information. For language, the struc-
ture in the energy array is not about the dynamics of, say, articulation; it’s
about whatever the words mean. The structure comes to have this mean-
ing because of the social conventions of the language environment and
what we learn is, therefore, a conventional meaning of the pattern. This
conventional underpinning gives stability to linguistic information, but the
difference between a law [e.g., the law that specifies the structure in light]
and a convention is very important. Conventions can change and so can
the meaning of words; language is much less stable than perception. This
decreased stability is, of course, a fact of language to be explained, so
perhaps it is not a disaster for the analogy we are developing here.
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The position, then, is that information can acquire its meaning in at least two ways:
1) through a specifying relationship that holds between structure in energy and struc-
ture in the environment (as is the case in visual perception); and 2) through a conven-
tional relationship that holds between structure in particular (sound) patterns on the
one hand, and particular entities, events, or action opportunities in the environment on
the other. In support of this position, Wilson and Golonka cite Barwise and Perry’s
(1983) situation semantics, and Chemero’s (2009) endorsement of it. Situation seman-
tics is a formal framework within which conventions are defined as constraints which
relate two different situations or events: a speech event (a sentence: ‘it’s raining’, say),
and a second event which the speech event is about (a physical event in the world: the
presence of falling water). As long as a language user has access to the constraint and
to one of the events, they can use these to access the second event: a listener can de-
rive the meaning from the speech event, and a speaker, on observing a physical event,
knows what speech event to produce.
But what are these constraints? They appear to instantiate a particular version of
the language-as-conduit model: the idea that linguistic structure, by nature, possesses
a literal meaning. The literal meaning of a sentence is the meaning that the sentence
would have in a ‘null context’ (Searle, 1978). Speaking is held to be a process of
constructing a sentence whose literal meaning encodes the thing the speaker wants to
say. If semantic constraints are rigid relations between two events, as proposed, then
conventional meaning is a species of literal meaning, and speech events are vehicles
for literal meaning.
The notion that pieces of linguistic structure have a literal meaning has been very
widely assumed by linguists and philosophers. A problem with it is that it does not
appear to be sufficiently flexible to explain actual language use: people create novel
pieces of linguistic structure all the time; how can listeners have access to the literal
meaning of sentences that have never been uttered before? However, the main problem
for present purposes is that literal meaning does not appear to be compatible with the
anti-representationalism of ecological realism. The suggestion is that a listener, upon
attending to a speech event, has access to a set of literal meanings about some ideal
physical event, and that this meaning then has to be reconciled with present circum-
stances. The listener is again faced with a problem which seems to demand internal
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processing.
Could it be possible to define conventions in such a way as to avoid invoking literal
meaning? It is not clear how it could be. The problem is perhaps that conventions are
things that we can only really define from outside the system, as observers looking in.
We can identify regularities in the way particular linguistic structures are employed
to talk about particular sets of things, and we are tempted to make sense of those
regularities by grouping all of these events based on what they have in common. Thus,
we are confident that we have collected enough instances of the structure ‘it’s raining’
that we are justified in claiming that a conventional relationship exists between that
structure and a state of affairs in the world. But this is really a simplification of a very
rich data set: a simplification because it attempts to extract the essence of a phrase,
its literal meaning, from all of the supporting structure that goes with any particular
instance of the phrase in action.
This is really the core problem with the language-as-conduit model: it treats lan-
guage as an immutable set of objects—a set of things we can identify. This point has
been invoked in support of a general criticism of the modern programme in linguistics,
made most forcibly by the philosopher Roy Harris who talks of the ‘language myth’
(Harris, 1981). The ‘myth’ is that using language is putting a set of objects into action.
The argument is that the way linguists think is heavily influenced by the existence of
things like dictionaries. Dictionaries exist to give a description of a set of regulari-
ties that can be identified in the way particular units of linguistic structure are already
used. A dictionary is a kind of simplifying descriptive device. Linguists have taken
the idea of the dictionary and posited that a similar device must exist in the heads of
speakers—that speakers must possess an internal lexicon, which is consulted in some
fashion during normal speaking. Similarly, the structure at a higher level is abstracted
and simplified in the form of syntax trees—another descriptive device. And the exis-
tence of the alphabet gives rise to the idea that the smallest units in which we perceive
language are phonemes.
There is no reason in principle why the theory of language should so closely re-
semble these tools that have been invented, for the most part, to facilitate the use of
(written) language. In fact, if we begin our analysis of speaking with the behaviour
itself, it is quite clear that these objects—dictionaries, alphabets, and the like—must
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have been derived from a much richer set of structure that is created by speakers.
Speaking is the primary phenomenon, ‘language’ is derived.4 There is a parallel here
with the problem of conceptualizing visual perception as image-based (discussed in
chapter 1). Photographs are impoverished, static samples of a much richer array. Sim-
ilarly, a dictionary entry is an impoverished sample of the things that a particular piece
of linguistic structure can be used for. In both cases, the metaphor leads to a view that
the perceiver is confronted with impoverished data which demands to be filled in—to
be placed into ‘context’: images have to be built up into a mental model, and words
have to be reconciled with knowledge about the ongoing situation. The suggestion is
that the apparent poverty of the stimulus, in both cases, is an illusion created by the
attempt to reconstruct a rich activity on the model of an impoverished sample of that
same activity. Another way that this argument has been put is that speaking is a first-
order phenomenon, a behaviour, and that ‘language’ is a second-order phenomenon, a
by-product (Thibault, 2011). The first is a verb, the second is a noun. The point is that
a psychology of language use should be concerned with the first order behaviour—the
verb, ‘speaking’.5
The question is, how do we conceptualize the first-order behaviour of speaking in
a way that recognizes its inherent richness? How do we avoid attempting to fit the
first-order phenomenon into the framework provided by the existing second-order de-
scription scheme. What is needed is a different account of the machinery that underlies
an act of speaking.
3.3 Speaking as acting on the relational field
A common observation is that a language is like a set of tools (Everett, 2012). This is
meant to stand in opposition to the view held by certain philosophers that language is in
4Harris (1988) emphasizes the distinction made by Saussure between parole and langue: the former
is the primary phenomenon—speaking; the latter denotes a formalized description of an underlying sys-
tem that is assumed to be necessary in order to generate individual acts of speaking. Saussure proposed
that linguistics should be the study of this idealized system, langue.
5Some writers have advocated the use of the word ‘languaging’ as a verb to denote the first-order
behaviour. I avoid this neologism, partly because I find the word ugly, but also because I think it subtly
invites back in the very model it is trying to replace: how else could one engage in ‘languaging’ except
by using bits of ‘language’? I prefer the term ‘speaking’, employed in a broad sense intended to include
the use of sign language as well as gestures and potentially other tools and technologies.
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fact a self-contained system of mathematical logic. The language-as-tool metaphor is
proposed in order to draw attention to the fact that when people use linguistic structure,
they are using it in service of some particular function: language is used to do things.
For present purposes, I assume that the functional, tool-based view is valid. But if
language is a tool, what is it a tool for? A drill is a tool for making holes in a wall.
This works because the drill bit comes into physical contact with the wall’s surface.
A sentence might be a tool for directing a listener’s attention to a thing in a certain
way. But what does the sentence make contact with? The obvious response is that it
makes contact with a listener, who then extracts the meaning and works out where their
attention is being directed to. But this is again to invoke the old mind-body dualism
and to demand an explanation in terms of internal representations. The proposal here
will be that what a sentence makes contact with is not the listener per se, but a relation
that connects a listener to some aspect of the structure of the world.
It will be necessary to lay out with some care exactly what is being proposed here.
Recall that in chapter 1 it was asserted that the animal occupies a place in an ecosystem
made up of objects and surfaces and other animals, and of relations between all of
these entities. In effect, the perceiving-acting animal stands at the centre of its own
web of relations connecting it to everything else around it. The specific relations that
it perceives when it explores its environment are of the affordance type. The animal,
by virtue of the things it has learned to do, is able to perceive a rich set of affordances
when it moves about in its surroundings.
What is now being proposed is that: a) these affordance relations exist even when
the animal is not attending to them; b) these relations are themselves public, and can in
principle be perceived by an observer; c) in the case of language-using humans, these
relations can be directly acted upon by other speakers; and d) the tool for acting upon
another person’s web of relations is linguistic structure.
This is not to deny that speaking involves sound patterns and ears. Clearly one’s
ability to act upon someone else’s relational web—whatever that means—must depend
crucially upon the auditory perceptual system of a cooperating addressee. There can
be no speaking except with a linguistically-competent addressee who possesses both a
functioning pair of ears and an appropriately configured nervous system. Whatever it
is that the speaker is doing to the relational web when speaking, the action of speak-
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ing must also involve acting upon the machinery inside the addressee somehow. This
is true, but it is not incompatible with the proposal here. To invoke nervous systems
and hearing organs is to construct a description at the biological level of analysis.
The present proposal is that, at the psychological level of analysis—at the ecological
scale—what is being acted upon is the set of relations connecting a listener to other
things in the speaker’s surroundings. From the point of view of the speaker, speak-
ing is not merely acting upon the addressee, but upon the relation of the addressee to
something else in the speaker’s environment. Similarly, from the point of view of the
addressee, it is not the case that the information in a piece of linguistic structure is ex-
tracted and then reconciled with the environment. Rather, the information is perceived
as part of the environment. Perceiving the information in the spoken structure is the
same as perceiving the corresponding relation.
In order for a verbal action to provoke an appropriate response, the action must be
compatible in some way with the relation it is aimed at. The action and the relation
must fit together. Below I propose that this is possible because the relation is shaped by
the learning history of the addressee. As a child learns a language, its relations become
increasingly compatible with verbal structures produced by others, and thus increas-
ingly accessible to actions from other speakers. The point for now is that if a verbal
action can be directly compatible with a certain kind of relation, then there is no need
to invoke conventional meaning or any other form of the language-as-conduit model.
Both the action and the relation are real entities: they fit together in the same way as
any other action produced by an animal fits together with a suitable affordance—in the
same way that giraffes fit together with tall trees, or that the wings of certain birds fit
together with currents of warm air.
The difficulty is that relations are not things we think of as entities that can be
acted upon. They are not things that we typically name, and thus it is hard to accept
that there is really anything there that can come into contact with other things or that
can be implicated in the causal structure of events. But something along these lines
must be necessary if we want to get beyond the second-order description scheme that
encourages an understanding of speaking as an applied use of dictionaries and other
artifacts. A theory of the first-order phenomenon will require an ontology that can
incorporate verbal actions as discrete events, rather than as composite entities made
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up of structure and context. And if what is sought is a genuinely non-representational
account of language, as is the goal here, then the only option may be to view speech
as actions upon the relational field. Considering all of the proposals discussed above,
the conclusion is this: either relations are things that can be directly acted upon, or
no plausible candidate for a non-representaional account of language has yet been
identified.6
3.3.1 Action controlled with reference to relations
It will be useful here to illustrate more fully what is meant by the idea of acting on a
relation. A more accurate description is to say that the action is being controlled with
reference to a relation. Relations are traditionally treated as a kind of property, in the
same way as the colour of an object is treated as a property of that object. Relations are
said to differ from things like colours in that they are not properties of a single object,
but exist between individual objects. But in general, properties are things that simply
exist. We can change the colour of an object by painting it, but it is odd to say that we
are thereby acting on the object’s colour property. Instead, we are inclined to say that
we are performing an action upon the object itself—the action on the object changes
one or more of the object’s properties. What, then, does it mean to say that relations,
unlike colours, can be acted upon?
Chapter 1 adopted the view that affordances are relations that stand between an
experiencing animal and a piece of structure in the environment (Chemero, 2009). On
this account, acting on affordances is necessarily acting with reference to a relation. An
action is an event that changes the nature of the relation between animal and object.
This description can readily be applied to standard examples of actions on affordances:
climbing a step (Warren, 1984) is changing the step’s affordance for the climber from
climb-up-able to climb-down-able; throwing a rock (Bingham et al., 1989; Zhu and
6For completeness, I will here mention another proposed account of language which also empha-
sizes the importance of relations: relational frame theory (Hayes et al., 2001; Tonneau, 2004). This is
an intellectual descendent of B. F. Skinner’s behaviour analysis programme. An important difference
between this account and the one presently being outlined is that the relational frame theory does not
conceive of relations as things in the environment that can be directly perceived, but as things that a
person does: ‘People frame events relationally in the moment as an active process that is a function of
their extensive learning history and stimulation in the present environment. “Storage” of these frames
as structures is not implied and not required.’ (Blackledge, 2003).
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Bingham, 2008) changes the rock from an object that affords throwing to one that
affords watching in flight; opening a door (Norman, 1988) is changing the door into
a pass-through-able state. The empirical study of affordances typically emphasizes
two questions: what precisely are the affordances that are used in the carrying out of a
specific task, and how do we perceive them? The question of how we act on affordances
is given less emphasis. Rather, the fact that affordances are clearly routinely acted upon
by animals is what motivates the study of how these relations are perceived.
The affordances just mentioned, for step climbing, rock throwing, and door open-
ing, are all examples of relations between individual people and individual objects.
Clearly, many of the affordances that we act upon have a more complex structure.
Some actions are actions controlled with reference to relations between objects. Plac-
ing a key in a lock is an example: what is being acted on is the relation between the two
objects. In order to control this action the actor must attend to the relation between key
and lock, coupling the action with the relation and monitoring as the distance between
the two objects is reduced and finally eliminated as the key enters the lock. This kind
of attending applies to the use of any kind of tool: using a shovel to dig a hole, using
paint to change the colour of an object, or using a rock to crack nuts (as practiced by
chimpanzees; Bril et al., 2009). And many of the actions we perform are already ac-
tions on relations between other people and external structure: spoon-feeding a baby,
throwing a frisbee to another person, or pointing to an object. Notice that some of
these actions involve physically manipulating an object (a spoon or a frisbee), others
leave the object undisturbed (pointing). But all can be understood as actions controlled
with reference to a relation between an object in the actor’s environment and a second
individual, also in the actor’s environment.
3.3.2 Hearing: acting or being acted upon?
If speaking is acting on relations, what is hearing? Is it a type of perception, as is nor-
mally supposed, or is it a passive process of being acted upon, in which the addressee
has no choice but to be manipulated by the actions of the speaker? In fact, neither of
these statements is adequate to capture the status of the listener. Attending to another
person’s verbal actions is certainly a type of perceiving, but it is also actively engaging
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with structured events and is therefore a type of action. And it is fair to say that a hearer
can be acted upon by a speaker. If speaking is acting on relations then necessarily any
given act of speaking must disturb at least one of the relata: the speaker must directly
effect a change in either the object or the addressee, or both. But it is clearly not the
case that addressees are merely passive non-actors in this process; addressees routinely
refuse to comply with requests, disagree, feign ignorance, and so on. How can all of
this be compatible with the description of speaking as acting on a relational web?
The key to appreciating the addressee’s status is to emphasize that speaking is not
acting on the addressee directly; it is acting on a relation which is connected to the
addressee at one end. This means that while the speaker is acting, the addressee can
simultaneously act on that very same relation. Refusing a request is then an act of
vetoing the speaker’s action. Presumably in a typical conversation a hearer will not
bother to veto much of the speaker’s verbal activity, but in a more hostile conversation
the veto will be used more often. The addressee can also skillfully act to interpret
the speaker’s action for their own purposes, as happens when someone who is asked a
question responds as if they have been asked a different question. And the conception
of speakers’ actions as actions on relations also provides a plausible means of account-
ing for what goes on in instances of misunderstanding. An addressee can perceive that
a verbal action has been attempted, and can also see that it has failed (because their
attention has not been directed anywhere in particular). This provides the addressee
with a motivation to further explore their own relational web, or to act in turn to elicit
further informative actions from the speaker (through the use of a clarification request,
say).
Hearing, then, is an active process. It is a type of perception-action: a hearer acts
in order to perceive structure in their environment, and perceives in order to act. And
a cooperative addressee is not simply acted upon, but is allowing themself to be acted
upon, and actively participating in this process by attempting at each stage to attend to
the appropriate parts of their own web. Speaking requires simultaneous engagement
with structure in the world by at least two perceiving-acting individuals.
It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the relationship between speak-
ing and hearing is the same as the relationship between acting and perceiving. An
individual is a perceiver-actor, but not a ‘speaker-hearer’ (this phrase has nevertheless
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appeared in the ecological literature; Hodges, 2009). In fact, speaking is itself a type of
perception-action. And so is hearing. Speaking is acting on a relational field, but it is
also attending to the consequence of that action. Hearing is actively attending to verbal
structure: the hearer must actively attend to the actions being carried out on their own
relational web if they are to be able to respond in an appropriate way.7
The fact that a speaker’s verbal actions directly affect the behaviour of others
echoes something that is already well appreciated within the study of animal com-
munication. This can be seen in the assessment/management perspective, as proposed
by Owings and Morton (1998). This combines two ideas: that animals produce signals
in order to change the behaviour of other animals to their own advantage (manage-
ment) and that at the same time they monitor their environment for opportunities to
act and for threats from rivals and predators, and so on, looking out for the signals
that are most likely to be reliable (assessment). Owings and Morton’s innovation is
to suggest that animals are able to manage the behaviour of other individuals pre-
cisely by exploiting the assessment activity of those animals. That is, assessment
and management are two different kinds of activity, but they are codependent; one
cannot function properly without the other. The assessment/management framework,
like the present account of speaking, is presented as an alternative to the information-
transmission or information-sharing model. Assessment is exploratory monitoring of
the environment’s affordances, whereas management is the set of actions directed at
arranging those affordances for personal ends.
3.4 An outline of a theory of language learning
The proposal is that verbal actions are actions upon the relational field. Clearly, this
raises a number of important questions. If these relations have to exist externally, how
is it that we can talk about fictional objects, or tell stories? What are we acting upon
when we produce a piece of writing, or when we talk to ourselves in our heads? How
is it possible to speak to multiple people at the same time: does this not mean that
7Note that this is not a process of interpreting or of reconciling conventional meaning with context;
the hearer is in effect seeking to answer the question: Which part of my relational web is being acted
upon? Or equivalently, What is my attention being directed to? (Although of course the hearer is not
actually asking themself this question.)
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the speaker must be performing a separate action on the individual relational field sur-
rounding each addressee? If speaking is acting on an individual’s relational web, why
do all of our separate webs end up resembling one another, such that we all speak
basically the same language as the people around us? How is it that we can produce
metaphors, indirect speech acts, deliberately ambiguous statements, and deceptive ut-
terances?
These are all good questions, and I believe they all admit of plausible answers,
although I will not attempt to address them all here. The key to answering all of them
will be to insist that skilled speaking is something that can only be understood with
reference to the individual’s development. One’s ability to speak a particular language
is entirely dependent on one’s history (‘speaking a language’ is to be understood here in
a narrow sense, as denoting the ability to produce verbal structures that are compatible
with at least some of the relations surrounding other speakers, and excluding such
things as pointing gestures and laughter).
Above I brought up the example of an anthropologist and an informant with no
language in common. It was suggested that what is lacking in this encounter is the
ability, on the part of either participant, to direct the other’s attention to objects in
the world in an efficient way. I now propose that what is lacking is the ability to act
upon the other’s relational web directly using verbal actions. When verbal actions are
ineffective, individuals can still direct one another’s attention to things, but in a more
laborious way: by pointing, gesturing, pantomiming, and so on. And by doing these
things, the individuals are able to learn the verbal actions that will work as effective
attention-directing devices. That is, we are able to learn the ‘names’ of things by
exploratory action with an engaged addressee. The name of an object is perceived
by acting on or attending to a relation between another speaker and that object. It is
important to note that the ‘name’ is not a property of the object. The object affords
naming not because of anything intrinsic to the object but because of a correspondence
between the name and a relation: ‘naming an object’ is really directing someone’s
attention to an object by acting on the relation between the object and the addressee.
The anthropologist–informant encounter represents one type of language learning:
second language learning, carried out by mature adults who already possess the basic
skills for speaking. Clearly learning of a more fundamental sort must happen much
Chapter 3. An ecological realist guide to speaking 53
earlier on, in infancy and early childhood. The pre-verbal infant finds itself situated
in a richly structured field of relations and events. It must learn the meaning of this
ecosystem through exploration. What must the infant first attend to, in the earliest
stages, if it is ultimately to acquire the ability to speak?
An important characteristic of the new realist ecosystems view is that it posits
that the environment is structured in a nested manner. There are objects, then there
are relations between objects, then there are relations between relations, and so on.
Logically, then, one would expect that the infant must learn the meaning of the kinds
of structure encountered at the lower levels before moving on to explore the structure
in the levels higher up. The earliest stage of infant exploration should therefore be
characterized by attention to the structure of events and of objects (or surfaces). After
the infant has attained a certain competency at this level, there will be a shift to the next
level up, and the child will begin to attend to how certain actions cause certain other
events. In other words, there will be a shift from attending to things, to attending to
relations between things. One important class of events that the child must explore is
the set of verbal actions, which can themselves cause further physical events, although
the exact nature of these causal relationships can only be approached through continued
exploration: a given utterance made by the infant may at one time elicit a certain
response from a caregiver, while at another time a seemingly very similar utterance
may elicit a very different response, or no response at all.
An important milestone in infant language learning is the shift from making sounds
to ‘naming objects’ (this shift happens around the age of nine months and has thus been
dubbed the ‘nine month revolution’ by Tomasello, 1999). On the present proposal, this
may be better characterized as a shift from attending to event structure at the lowest
level (to what it sounds like when different mouth movements are made) to attending
to what verbal actions can be used to do. The proposal is that a child at the one-word
stage is not simply naming objects, but is acting on, or exploring, the structure of
the relational field. A child producing the word ‘apple’ is not deliberately sending a
message to a caregiver (to be translated as ‘you give me the apple’, or some such), but is
actively trying to bring about a change in its environment. The child may be attempting
to bring the apple closer, or else may simply be attempting to disrupt the system in
some way, to see what happens when the word ‘apple’ is produced. The message-
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like nature of the utterance is really an artifact of the standard description scheme (to
reiterate: the proposal is that speaking is always acting directly on relations; what
is being claimed here is not that young infants lack an awareness that what they are
doing is sending messages, but rather, that speaking is never sending messages, insofar
as messages are objects sent through a conduit). If producing one-word utterances is
acting on relations between objects and other people, and is not just producing the
name of a thing for its own sake, then a prediction that follows is that children should
produce more one-word utterances when there are other people around compared to
when they are alone. Or at any rate the utterances that they do produce should be
behaviourally distinguishable in the two situations.
In essence, the present proposal conceives of speaking as a kind of technique for
pointing to things. At the one-word stage, the things being pointed to are objects.
There should follow a developmental trajectory: first, the child points to objects, then
to relations between objects, then to relations that are not immediately visible, then
to entirely fictional relations that are created by the very act of pointing. Each transi-
tion can be conceived as a change in the state of the animal-environment system; the
later states cannot simply be accessed from the beginning—the states must be passed
through in sequence (learning is of course to be viewed as change in accordance with
the doctrine of the new ball, not as the addition of symbols to a slate).8
The idea that relations can point to non-present or fictional objects is one that im-
mediately demands further explanation. The suggestion, for now, will be that the solu-
tion to this problem lies in the developmental trajectory of the individual child. At the
earliest stages, in order for a child to be able to learn a new ‘object name’ (i.e. a new
verbal action), it will be necessary that both the object and the addressee are present at
the point of learning. Later on, through exploratory use of the newly acquired action,
8In fact, there is some evidence in the cognitive developmental literature that learning does indeed
follow something like the trajectory outlined. Christie and Gentner (2010) report results from a set of
relational match-to-sample studies carried out with 3-year-olds. In these studies, children are shown
picture sets AA (two tortoises) and BB (two cows), and asked to choose between two possible matches:
CC (two rhinoceroses) and AB (one tortoise, one cow). The children in the study routinely picked AB as
the matching pair (matching objects), unless they were given a name to refer to the higher-order relation
(sameness), in which case 57% of children reportedly picked CC as the match (matching relation).
Gentner (2010) uses these and other results to propose that children’s learning about relations involves a
bootstrapping process: children learn terms for relations at a lower level of organization, and this gives
them access to higher-level structures, which they can then refer to and reason about before moving up
to still-higher levels.
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the child will learn that the relation exists even when the object itself is no longer visi-
ble (e.g. uttering the word ‘ball’ will sometimes result in an adult leaving the room and
returning with ball in hand). As the child’s verbal repertoire expands, the actions the
child is able to carry out will be less and less confined to the immediate surroundings;
the child will gradually learn that what is important for carrying out successful verbal
actions is not that the referent object is immediately visible but that the addressee is
present and is responding in an appropriate way to the verbal actions being produced.
At this point, the child is already in a state where they should in principle be capable
of referring to non-existent entities. In short, it is possible to talk about things that are
not there only as a consequence of being able to talk about things that are there.9
There is an important distinction in all of this that has so far been left implicit in
what has been said about learning: it is the distinction between learning to speak and
learning to be spoken to. This distinction is a source of minor embarrassment for advo-
cates of the cognitivist view of language as an internal system (Hendriks and Koster,
2010). There can only be one internal system of language, it is assumed. What an
individual speaker can comprehend and what they can produce should therefore be
identical, and if any discrepancy between the two is observed in reality, then this is
a problem that requires an explanation. If there is precisely one system of language
in each individual’s brain, then certain aspects of children’s verbal behaviour are puz-
zling. For instance, children over-generalize morphosyntactic inflections, effectively
inventing words that no-one else around them has ever spoken (‘I goed’ instead of
‘I went’; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986), and they show clear signs that they un-
derstand more words than they themselves produce (Benedict, 1979; Goldin-Meadow
9This description is consistent with Holt’s (1915)’s notion of the ‘recession of the stimulus’, as
described in chapter 2. Vygotsky (1962) outlined a similar process. In particular, Vygotsky spoke of the
child’s learning a language, and specifically learning to use private speech, as a process of ‘internalizing’
a behaviour first learned in interaction with others. Speech is said by Vygotsky to emerge first as public
behaviour: the child learns to respond vocally to goings-on in its surroundings. Later, the child learns to
use words as tools to control his own ongoing tasks. For example, the child might first learn to count by
simply repeating a sequence of sounds. Later, continuing to say the numbers out loud, the child might
use this sequence in another activity—perhaps while drawing, as a tool for keeping track of whether he
has used all of his coloured pens yet. Later still, it becomes unnecessary for the child to actually vocalize
the numbers. The speech is still there, but it has become ‘private’, or ‘inner’. It should be clear that the
notion of ‘internalization’ here does not necessarily have to be understood in terms of the formation of
a mental representation. What is internalized need not be some abstract symbol, but the concrete act of
using a piece of structured behaviour to maintain control of an ongoing activity.
Chapter 3. An ecological realist guide to speaking 56
et al., 1976). Cognitivists’ explanations for these behaviours appeal to such things as
processing demands on language performance, or to competing systems of rules and
representations (dual-route models and the like), or to social factors outside the scope
of a mechanistic explanation.
For the theory currently being proposed, these phenomena do not present a prob-
lem. If it looks like there is a difference, in observed behavioural data, between lan-
guage production and language comprehension, that is because there really is a differ-
ence. In Owings and Morton’s (1998) terms, one is management, the other is assess-
ment. Language is not conceived as a system in the head; rather ‘language’ is a label
applied from the outside to describe a set of behaviours that take place in a populated
environment. In terms of behaviour, acting on someone else’s relational web really is
a different kind of thing from having your own web acted upon. This is the case even
though we can classify the actions that are used in acting and in being acted upon as
being instances of the same words or structures. The difference is the same as that
between watching someone else playing a violin with some level of skill and trying to
play the violin oneself: it is not enough just to observe a set of actions; to become a
competent language-user or violin-player one must practice those actions at first hand.
But if language production and language comprehension are two different skills,
this might appear to leave unexplained why it is that we end up speaking roughly the
same language as the people around us. Why do we not just make up our own language
for acting upon other people’s relational webs? The answer is fairly straightforward.
We could not just invent our own language. None of our addressees would be able
to respond to it, because they would lack the necessary reflexes and skills to be able
to perceive what it is that their attention is being directed to. In reality, a learner will
continue to produce the verbal actions that are effective while abandoning or refining
those that do not seem to elicit a satisfactory response. In short, the reason we end
up speaking the same language as the people around us is the one given by Pickering
and Garrod (2004): language use in its most basic form occurs not in internal thought
but in interaction with others. Or to put this in the terms introduced in chapter 1: the
ecosystem in which the child finds itself is a niche that has been constructed through
the activities of previous generations. And part of the structure of this system is con-
stituted by the (adult) individuals themselves, who have become adapted to respond
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to particular verbal actions. The child may in time alter the structure of this niche in
some ways (it may invent new words or names for objects, which adults may learn to
respond to), but the verbal niche is, in the most important sense, pre-constructed, and
it is to this existing structure that the child must learn to adapt.
3.5 Putting the relational field model of language to
work
There is much that remains to be worked out about the present theory if it is to provide
a useful means of describing actual verbal behaviour. And of course there would be
little point in attempting to re-conceptualize language as a conduit-free activity unless
the new description can be put to some practical use. The broader aim of this thesis is to
bring collaborative activities inside the purview of a sound nonrepresentational theory
of psychology. A major advantage of the present proposal may be that it provides a
means for making sense of the verbal actions that are used in collaborative situations.
It provides a means of avoiding the problem that arises for conduit-based models of
language: how do the language systems of individual speakers come to entrain with
one another in practice, in a dynamic environment? On the present proposal there is no
need to invoke an internal language system in the first place: utterances are conceived
as verbal actions controlled with reference to relations in the speaker’s environment,
with the function of directing another person’s attention in a useful way. Verbal actions
are part of the activity, not parallel to it.
In order to assess whether this is a viable description scheme, it will be necessary
to test it against empirical data. Part 2 aims to define an empirical methodology that
will be suitable for analyzing collaborative activities in a manner consistent with the
tenets of the ecological realist approach.
3.6 Postscript: Columbus crosses the ocean
I have been challenged to give an account of what happens when one hears a sentence
such as ‘Columbus crossed the ocean in 1492.’ (This particular sentence was invoked
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by Bertrand Russell in his A History of Western Philosophy, 1945, in the chapter on
Dewey; Russell cites it as an example of a ‘true’ sentence.)
The first point to note is that this sentence does not mean anything except to some-
one who has already learned or become sensitive to the particular sound structures
involved here. Sensitivity here means that the listener, upon hearing the given sound
structure, experiences what the words are ‘about’, in some sense, this experience be-
ing invoked either automatically, by the immediate response of the listener’s nervous
system, or with some effort on the part of the listener to discover the meaning of the
structure being heard.
The second point is that to be able to make use of this sentence the listener must
already have a good deal of social and historical knowledge. The listener must be
familiar with metric time—the invented system for counting days, years, etc., within
which ‘1492’ is known to refer to a year in the past. The listener must have previously
learned the historical fact that America was discovered, by a man named Columbus,
who sailed there from Europe across the Atlantic. Without these particular pieces of
knowledge, the listener could only experience a vague sense of somebody crossing
something; in this case, the listener might well conjure up on the spot a quite fanciful
understanding of who ‘Columbus’ is and what he was doing (as children will when
exposed to words that are not anchored to some existing concrete experience).
The third point is that the listener must have become sensitive to grammatical prop-
erties of the sentence, such as that the past tense inflexion is related to things that hap-
pened in the past, that crossing an ocean means sailing in a boat from one land mass
to another, that the order of the words means that Columbus moved, while the ocean
stayed where it was.
All of this is structure that is ‘out there’ and has to be discriminated, attuned to,
by the learner. It is all very well saying that this is a true sentence and that it has
grammatical structure, but we also have to acknowledge that interpreting this sentence
relies on a great deal of learning. To understand this sentence, the hearer must have
gone through a long Vyotskyan or Holtean process of change—of internalization, or
of causing the stimulus to recede.
The final point, then, is that this sentence is not a good model for understanding
what language is or what speaking is in its most basic form. We cannot hope to achieve
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a complete analysis of how this sentence is understood at the individual level, because
to do so we would have to know an awful lot about the history of that individual. This
might be seen as a severe problem were the goal of an ecological science of speaking
to be to produce a complete, internally coherent account that could be used, say, to
programme a robot to speak. But such is not the goal here. The goal is to be able
to understand real-world practical problems in terms that can allow useful solutions.
The question is not, ‘How can we build a robot that can understand this sentence?’,
but, for example, ‘How can we help this child, who is having difficulty understanding
this sentence, to be able to grasp its meaning?’ It is hoped that the focus on basic
interactive processes will serve, as with the dynamic assessment approach to second-
language teaching (e.g., Poehner and Lantolf, 2005), as a useful guide for identifying
the particular source of the problem, and to encourage the child’s development in the
appropriate direction.
Part II




The task-oriented approach in
psychology
Jerry Fodor’s essay The Modularity of Mind (1983) was an attempt to address a major
problem in cognitive psychology: if the aim of the research programme is to come up
with an account of how the brain works, then the problem space is impossibly large:
where does one start?1 What is needed is some means of breaking down the overall
problem into manageable pieces. Fodor believed that the only plausible means we had
of dividing the problem space in a useful way was to endorse some version of faculty
psychology: the old idea that the brain is by nature divided into special-purpose units,
which on Fodor’s proposal are modules—encapsulated computational devices that in-
teract with one another but otherwise behave autonomously. If the brain is organized
into modules this is good news because it means we do not have to study the entire
brain, we can start by studying individual modules in isolation: ‘The condition for
successful science... is that nature should have joints to carve it at: relatively simple
subsystems which can be artificially isolated and which behave, in isolation, in some-
thing like the way that they behave in situ. Modules satisfy this condition...’ Fodor ar-
gued that the best candidates for modular processes are input-analysing systems such
as vision and language, which were held to function inferentially, turning noisy and
impoverished sense data into useful data in a format which can then be fed into central
1A version of this chapter is published in the Proceedings of the 36th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive
Science Society (Baggs, 2014).
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cognitive processes such as thought and memory (which are not themselves modular
in nature).
The ecological realist, by contrast, is not attempting to give an account of how
the brain works. The brain is not the object of inquiry. Rather the ecological realist
project aims to give an account of an animal-environment system: the whole system
comprising the animal in its environment. But a similar problem arises: where to
begin? Again what is needed is a way of breaking down the empirical project into
tractable research problems. The solution that ecological psychologists have settled
upon is not to break down the system into component pieces, but to break down the
things the system does into individual units. The solution is to study individual tasks.
This raises the question: what is a task? It will be argued that there are two quite
different ways of answering this question, which correspond to the two types of psy-
chology just identified. The cognitivist, or brain-oriented psychologist is quite famil-
iar with the task as a research device. These tasks are usually carefully constructed
laboratory-based activities which seek to measure some behavioural response to a set
of stimulus materials. The task is devised as a means of indirectly measuring some
aspect of the brain.
The ecological or task-oriented psychologist, by contrast, aims to study real phe-
nomena: activities that people actually engage in outside the laboratory. A prerequisite
for being able to study a task in this way is that the task itself can be defined in a pre-
cise manner. The phenomena that have been studied most extensively by ecologically-
inclined psychologists are simple action-control phenomena: how does a driver control
steering, how do infants learn to walk, how does a baseball fielder run to the correct
position to intercept a ball in flight? All of these might be considered as tasks in
some sense, although it is not equally clear in each case where we should place the
boundaries separating the task from other background activity. The baseball outfielder
problem is neat in that it has clear start and end points, and a clear criterion for suc-
cessful performance: the catcher consistently ends up in the right place to intercept the
ball. But where does an individual steering task end? And when is the task of learning
to walk complete, if ever?
The present chapter has two aims: 1) to achieve precision about the concept of
a task, around which some ambiguity exists; in particular I will pursue a definition
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of the concept that will allow us to expand the scope of the ecological realist research
programme beyond simple visually-guided phenomena like the outfielder problem, but
without losing the rigour and precision that such activities impose; and 2) to argue that
the task, when defined in an appropriately precise way, is a unit that satisfies the criteria
for a solution to Fodor’s problem: how can the overall research project be broken down
into manageable pieces?
4.1 The task as an epistemological device
The first question we must address concerns what nature of thing a task is: which
category should we place it in? Should the task be considered a part of reality, or a part
of our description of reality? Is the task a thing that resides somewhere in the system,
or is it a tool for describing that system in some way?
Within the rationalist framework, a case could be made for either response. Within
the ecological realist framework however, only the latter response makes sense. This
can be seen if we try to apply the concept of a task to a specific activity, say kicking a
ball. On the traditional, internalist view, one might be tempted to say that the task is
something that resides inside the actor. In order to be able to engage in the activity of
kicking a ball, the actor must on some level be able to categorize what they are doing
as an act of kicking a ball. And further, in order for a particular action to count as an
act of kicking, the actor must initially intend to carry out that particular action. On
this view, the task is perhaps construed as an internal plan or recipe which exists in the
actor’s head prior to the carrying out of the action: it is a part of reality, and not just of
the description.
This rationalist manner of construing the concept of a task is subject to the same
criticism as was made by Gilbert Ryle (1949) in relation to the concept of ‘volitions’.
If a task is an internal entity, how might one go about individuating separate instances?
If tasks are real, discoverable things, then it should be possible to answer such ques-
tions as the following: ‘What was the last task you completed?’ ‘Of the tasks you
have fulfilled today, which took the longest?’ ‘How many tasks must be performed in
preparing a French onion soup?’ And then there is the problem of how a particular task
or plan is selected. If the actor, in performing some task, must first select a particular
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method for performing it, this is an internal act of choosing which appears to constitute
a task in itself, a task which must itself have been selected somehow. The whole thing
is thus threatened by an infinite regress. A possible escape, for the internalist, is to say
that the actor does not choose the task, but merely acts out whatever script is currently
presenting itself. But this implies that the actor must be an automaton—a perennially
unpopular proposition.
Within the ecological realist framework, by contrast, there can be no recourse to
positing internal entities. The system is the animal in its environment. In the ball-
kicking example, the system consists minimally of an actor and a ball and a perception-
action relation linking the two. There is nothing in this system that we can label as the
task. Perhaps the relation itself is the task? This might work for a system with only
two entities and one relation, but now suppose the actor is kicking the ball at a tree.
There are now at least three relations in the system (linking actor and ball, actor and
tree, and ball and tree), none of which we could point to individually and label as the
task.2
We are left with the conclusion that the task does not name some component of the
system but rather identifies a particular way of looking at the system from the outside.
The task is an epistemological device. Some happy consequences follow from adopting
this position. It means that we do not have to worry about how to correctly individuate
particular instances of tasks: there is no correct way because there is not anything out
there to individuate to begin with. Instead, we can define a task in whatever way is
convenient for some purpose.
But as we saw above with the examples of catching a ball and learning to walk,
there is much diversity in the things that can potentially be labelled as tasks. The
problem is how to define the concept of a task in a useful way, in a way that can be
applied quite generally. And in a way which allows us to draw useful conclusions from
the particular phenomenon under investigation.
2I here assume that three-way relations are not possible, or else must be reducible to a set of binary
relations. I take it that if we allow for the existence of higher-order relations then it becomes possible
to define a task at an arbitrary level of complexity (to describe the same activity in an arbitrarily large
number of ways), and it again becomes impossible to identify a single thing that constitutes the task.
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4.2 The acting animal and the task-seeking psychol-
ogist
First, though, it is necessary to add a qualification to the assertion just made. If the task
is defined as an epistemological construct, then it is a thing that is strictly artificial,
invented for the benefit of the researcher. However, it is not the case that a researcher
is justified in labelling just anything as a task. Nature must still possess joints to carve
it at. In order for the analysis to be valid, the researcher’s description of the task must
correspond to what the actor is in fact doing. The task is a third-person device, but it
must recognize that the actor occupies a particular first-person perspective.
Failing to take into account the first-person perspective of an actor is an old problem
which William James named the psychologist’s fallacy. The fallacy is committed when
a researcher assumes the validity of a particular description of what the subject is doing,
even though the subject may have a very different view of things.
This is illustrated by Martin Orne’s 1962 work on research subjects’ behaviour in
hypnosis sessions. A question that arises for hypnotists is: when patients behave as if
they are hypnotized, how does one know if they are really hypnotized? Might they not
be perfectly aware but only simulating hypnosis for some reason (to avoid embarrass-
ment, for example)? To investigate this, Orne tried to trick his subjects: he attempted
to create the impression that the hypnotist had left the room during the session and that
the subject was no longer being observed. A number of the subjects were convinced
by this act and gave up the pretense that they had ever been hypnotized: they began
moving about or even got up and wandered around the room. By doing so, they demon-
strated clearly to an outside observer that they had in fact been simulating all along.
What this demonstrates is that it is not sufficient for a psychologist to merely describe
a situation as it appears from the outside: a third party observer may be inclined to
take at face value any behaviour that looks like behaviour under hypnosis. Only by
considering what the situation looks like from the point of view of the research subject
is it possible to assess whether the third-party description is a valid one.
In what follows I have attempted to reserve the term task for referring to the
researcher-defined unit of study, and to talk of the actor as acting or carrying out ac-
tions.
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4.3 The task as a reconfiguration of resources
The discussion so far has attempted to identify what a task is not: it is not an entity in
an actor’s head, nor is it an arbitrary description drawn directly from a psychologist’s
intuitions. We must now attempt a definition of what a task is.
The solution that ecological psychologists arrive at is to define a task as a particular,
characteristic reconfiguration of resources. That is, the task should have a precisely de-
fined start and end point, and a recognizable mode of transition between the two. This
is important because it provides a means to unite different instances of a single phe-
nomenon as being instances of the same task, and not just a disparate set of individual
things that happened. The word resources here can be defined quite broadly; the pur-
pose is to pick out any component of the animal-environment system that is used as
an instrument in completing the task, or that changes in a characteristic way over the
course of the activity. This might be a change in some object or other structure in the
environment, or might be a change in the animal itself. Thus, a ball-catching task is
any instance of a catcher attempting to locomote from some initial position to a posi-
tion where they can catch a ball which is following a parabolic trajectory through the
air. A steering task is any instance in which a driver must control the motion of a car
around a bend. And the task of learning to walk is characterized by a change in the
infant, from being incapable of ambulating between one standing position and another
to being capable of doing so.
The claim is that if we can characterize a specific reconfiguration that happens
somewhere in the system, then we have defined a task. Subsequently, whenever the
relevant conditions obtain, we are justified in characterizing what is happening as an
instance of that task.
Notice that these task descriptions also specify criteria for successful completion
of the task. The task is completed successfully if the ball is caught, if the car negotiates
the bend without disaster, and if the infant eventually learns to walk. Furthermore, the
fact that the task is defined as a precise reconfiguration of resources means that we also
have a way of assessing whether we can further apply the analysis of the phenomenon
under investigation to some novel phenomenon that has not itself been studied. Thus,
the analysis of ball-catching should apply for catching any projectile that follows a
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parabolic trajectory through the air, but not for catching a frisbee, and not necessarily
for how goalkeepers in soccer move to stop bending free kicks.
It might be unclear whether learning can really be characterized as a task in the
same way as the other activities. In the case of learning to walk, it looks like what
is happening is a local change within the infant. One may be tempted to suggest that
there is no reconfiguration of physical resources here—that the infant already has all of
the necessary resources to be able to walk, and that what is needed is really a change in
mental structure, which cannot be characterized from the outside. This would be quite
wrong, however. It would be wrong partly for the obvious reason that any change in
mental structure must also be a change in physical structure somewhere. But more
importantly, learning to walk is not a process that occurs only inside the infant, but
is one that involves the entire animal-environment system. The infant never exits the
environment to practice in private. The way infants learn to walk is by exhaustive trial
and error: repeatedly trying a few steps before falling down and trying again (Adolph
et al., 2012). The falling down is part of the learning process, and the only way to tell
whether one has fallen down is by attending to information from the environment. If
what is being reconfigured is the animal-environment system and not just the animal,
then the task of learning can in this instance be characterized from the outside after all.
Perhaps there are some activities that people engage in that cannot be character-
ized from the outside, and thus must remain out of reach for a psychology committed
to empirical investigation based on the present definition of the task. An operation
carried out entirely ‘in the head’ may be one such case. An example would be some-
one working through some particular sum without then making the solution ‘external’
in any way. Here the initial sum is being reconfigured into a solution, but there ap-
pears to be no means by which a psychologist could measure the outcome, and thus
no way of charcterizing this from the outside as a task. This is certainly a limitation,
but then again it’s not clear why a psychologist would want to study this kind of thing:
why bother asking people to work on sums if you are not going to check the answer in
some way? Such operations carried out ‘in the head’ must remain elusive for empirical
purposes, but this need not necessarily be a source of great concern.
More likely is that we can identify some phenomenon informally that we would
like to define as a task, but which turns out to be of such complexity that it is unclear
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where to posit a start and end point, or how to characterize what goes on in between.
This presents an important practical limit on current empirical study, but also motivates
the project of developing better tools for characterizing a broader range of tasks.
Wilson and Golonka (2013) outline a four-point procedure for applying the task-
oriented approach to the general case: 1) identify the task: conduct a task analysis
‘which characterizes from a first person perspective the specific task that a perceiving-
acting cognitive agent is faced with’; 2) identify task-relevant resources available to the
agent which can potentially be assembled in the carrying out of the task; 3) ‘identify
how the agent can assemble these resources into a system capable of solving the prob-
lem at hand’; and 4) recruit research subjects and have them perform the activity in
order to test whether they do in fact carry it out in the fashion identified in (3). Clearly
step (1) is crucial: it is necessary to define the task in a precise way at the outset if
steps (2)-(4) are to be possible. We are presently concerned with what is presupposed
by the first step: what does it take for something to count as a task? The suggestion is
that the things we can characterize as tasks, and therefore the things we can study, are
the things where we can identify a characteristic reconfiguration of resources with a
clearly identifiable start and end point. If this formulation of the task is a good one, we
can hope to be able to use it to extend the scope of the task-oriented approach beyond
phenomena of the ball-catching type to encompass more complex activities.
4.4 Acting with other actors
A particularly acute test of the methodology will be how well it can be applied to ac-
tivities involving more than one actor. This presents a notorious set of difficulties for
psychologists working in the brain-oriented tradition: if action is the output of mental
processes, how can it be that some actions appear to be carried out by multiple ac-
tors? Cognitivists have attempted to resolve this by appealing to various mechanisms,
including internal prediction processes, mirror mechanisms that are held to transmit
mental content by contagion, and group minds (Sebanz et al., 2006).
The task-oriented approach does not encounter this difficulty, because it does not
posit that behaviour is the result of operations in a distinct mental realm. But there
remains some ambiguity to be resolved. If a task is a third-person device for describing
Chapter 4. The task-oriented approach in psychology 69
a first-person activity, what then are we to make of actions that are carried out by
multiple individuals? If two people are rowing a boat together, how many tasks are
there? Well, since the task on the present definition is a descriptive device rather than
an aspect of reality to be discovered, the question is ill-formed: there is not any pre-
existing number of tasks to be untangled. The number of tasks there are depends on
how we choose to define what constitutes a task.
Might it be useful to define a task as a thing carried out by the pair: the pair is the
actor, and the task is what this pair does? This does not seem plausible. An individual
is an experiencing perceiver-actor, an organism that goes about perceiving invariant
structure in order to control action. A group of people is not an experiencing unit, and
does not appear to possess any means of controlling its own actions, except through
the actions of the individuals that make up the group.
In the rowing example, then, there must be two tasks. That is, we can define what
is going on as two individuals each carrying out their own task. For one rower the task
might be to set the pace and to carry out equally-spaced strokes with their oar, while
for the other rower the task may be to match the first stroke-for-stroke, applying equal
force on the opposite side of the boat. In this example, the pair will either succeed or
not depending on whether or not the two rowers are able to coordinate their respective
activities. But the apparent success of the pair is really a consequence of individual
success on the part of the second rower. Of course, in reality things may not be so
simple: the first rower may actively coordinate with the second, instead of merely
setting the pace and letting the second do all the work of maintaining coordination.
But the point is that as long as the individual tasks are defined in an appropriate way,
there is no need to appeal to any additional process at the group level. The group level
activity should already be defined in the individual tasks.
And to reiterate, the individual tasks are not private processes going on in the heads
of the actors, but processes that span the animal-environment system. The distinguish-
ing feature of a task that is carried out with others is that the environment happens to
contain other animals who are also producing structure that is relevant to the task at
hand.
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4.5 Rationale for the task-oriented approach
Psychology has in recent history been defined as the science of mind, brain, and be-
haviour, or some combination of those three things. In any case, the unit of analysis
is routinely taken to be the individual organism. Tasks have thus been understood as
things that psychologists get subjects to do merely as a proximate source of data about
the real phenomena hidden in the head. What reason could there be to give up on this
formulation and to instead carve up the problem space into individual tasks, making
the task the main unit of analysis?
An important rationale for the task-oriented approach comes from work on learn-
ing. Learning in infancy is shown to be thoroughly context-dependent, the child’s
general abilities arising out of immediate experience with local problems (Thelen and
Smith, 1994). This context-dependency applies across a wide array of different activ-
ities, and at different points of development. One example comes from how infants
learn to negotiate slopes when they are crawling versus when they have begun to walk.
Crawling infants initially attempt to descend a slope head-first, even if the slope is too
steep to negotiate. Through further exploration these children gradually learn to adapt
their approach to slopes and will become increasingly cautious when faced with a steep
descent. This cautiousness does not, however, transfer straightaway to the new task of
walking: infants who have newly begun to walk are once again unable to perceive that
a slope does not afford walking down and will attempt to descend when encouraged by
an experimenter. This happens even though the same infants are perfectly capable of
perceiving that the slope does not afford descent if they are placed in a crawling posi-
tion at the top of the same slope (Adolph et al., 1993). In a sense, the transition from
crawling to walking means that the infant has to learn what its environment means all
over again.
Thelen and Smith (1994) cite further examples of context-specific learning, includ-
ing work on the ‘shape bias’ in children’s object-naming, which is a phenomenon that
emerges when children are specifically asked to name objects but not when they are
merely asked to match objects with ‘similar’ targets; that is, the shape bias is dependent
on the context of the experimenter’s demands (Smith et al., 1996). A similar context-
dependent process is observed in normal language learning, in which children appear
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to initially use any given verb in only a handful of specific syntactic structures—the
so-called ‘verb island’. Only later do they begin to generalize, using novel verbs in
syntactic structures where they have not previously been used (Tomasello, 2000).
And this task-specificity in learning does not appear to be unique to young chil-
dren. Evidence for similar context-specificity in later life learning comes from studies
of brain training products which claim to promote improvement in general cognitive
abilities. These studies have shown that although users of these products improve at
the specific tasks that they have to perform as part of the ‘training’, there is no evidence
that this learning transfers to novel tasks (Owen et al., 2010).
So learning is context-specific, and thus one rationale for doing psychology one
task at a time is that this does in fact appear to correspond to how we learn things. But
does this not suggest that tasks are, after all, genuine components of the system, and
not merely analyst-defined units? Tasks are the things we learn to do? No. This is just
another confusion of description and reality. Contexts, like tasks, are not naturally dis-
tinct from one another. It is only when we look in from the outside that we can divide
things up in this way. From the perspective of the learner, there is no thing which con-
stitutes the context of the present, there is only the present, which is continuous with
everything else the learner does. The point is only that the task-oriented description
scheme may better correspond to reality than the brain-oriented scheme.
A further rationale comes from empirical success. The task-oriented approach has
in fact been shown to produce hypotheses that better correspond to reality than those
generated by the alternative general problem-solving approach. To return to the ball-
catching example, the task-oriented approach here treats this as a problem to be solved
by the catcher in a simple way: the catcher maintains visual attention upon the ball in
flight in such a way that the ball appears to follow a linear path up and down (McBeath
et al., 1995). This predicts that the catcher will run in a curved line to intercept the ball,
in contrast to the general problem solving approach which predicts that the catcher
will perform an internal calculation in order to work out the optimal place to run to
and will run to that spot in a straight line. In fact, catchers do follow a curved path
before catching the ball, lending empirical support to the task-oriented hypothesis and
indicating that the internal-calculation hypothesis is false (Wilson and Golonka, 2013).
A final rationale here is a rationale from usefulness. Applied fields exist to solve
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practical problems. Take speech and language therapy as an example. This field is not
organized around the question of how speech is organized in the brain but around what
can be done in practice to improve patients’ speech in a measurable way. Treating chil-
dren with articulation disorders is, for the speech therapist, a two-part task consisting
of firstly improving the child’s articulation of specific sounds, and secondly improving
the child’s systematic use of those sounds so that the child’s improved pronunciation
can be generalized to novel words and not just to the words they have already prac-
ticed (Gierut, 1998). This particular treatment technique uses precisely a task-oriented
approach, on the present definition. Treating an articulation problem as a task to be
solved is useful, and even a necessary pre-requisite for devising an effective treatment
methodology.
4.6 Final definition: what is a task?
The discussion in the preceding sections allows us to state the following as a definition
of a task.
A task is an analyst-defined unit that corresponds to a recognizable recon-
figuration of resources in an animal-environment system, which:
1. is meaningful from a first person perspective; it presents opportuni-
ties to act and constrains possible solutions,
2. can be defined precisely, has a start and end point, and a transition
between them, that can all be directly observed,
3. specifies criteria for successful completion,
4. specifies conditions under which conclusions can be generalized to
similar tasks.
I will here address a couple of possible objections to the task-oriented approach.
Firstly, if the objective is to study individual tasks one at a time, is this not just mas-
sive modularity by another name? No. Massive modularity, like Fodor’s non-massive
version, still appeals to modules in the brain that are not directly observable. The task-
oriented approach by contrast, is concerned with disruptions of physical resources that
can in principle be measured directly: the physical resources are the task; they are not
measured as a proxy for investigating a hypothetical construct in the brain.
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Secondly, if the task-oriented approach is all about coming up with useful char-
acterizations of specific, circumscribed phenomena, that is all well and good, but it
can never lead to a complete picture, either of how the brain works or of how the
animal-environment system works. I think this objection is perfectly valid, except that
it characterizes as a limitation what could equally be seen as a strength. The strength is
that the task-oriented approach leads to immediately useful conclusions. By contrast,
suppose we had a perfect model of the brain, assuming such a thing to be possible.
That model would be a monumental scientific achievement, but it would still only be
useful for solving particular questions we might ask it—that is, for addressing specific
tasks. The task-oriented approach is a means of not having to wait for that model to
be finished, it is a tool for solving practical problems in the present. In fact, this is a
similar conclusion to the one Fodor (1983) arrived at. Modularity, it was hoped, might
work as a methodological tool for studying peripheral input systems such as language
and vision, but it cannot give an account of central cognition or thinking: ‘The ghost
has been chased further back into the machine, but it has not been exorcised’.
I will make one final point. A current debate in cognitive science opposes a tradi-
tional symbol-manipulating disembodied view of cognition with various purportedly
embodied alternatives (Wilson, 2002; Shapiro, 2011). Or more exotically, the view
of the mind as an internal property of an organism is opposed to the ‘extended mind’
which is said to span brain, body, and environment (Menary, 2010). These debates pit
two apparently incompatible sets of ontological claims against one another: the claim
that minds are properties of individuals versus the claim that minds cross the bound-
aries of skull and skin. This has lead to fairly fruitless discussions on the question
of what we should call ‘cognitive’: can external symbols constitute mental content or
must mental content be confined to the head? In the present chapter I have empha-
sized a different kind of dichotomy, on methodological rather than ontological lines,
between a brain-oriented and a task-oriented approach to doing empirical psychology.
I suggest that this difference in methodology is real and unambiguous, and that the
dichotomy is a useful one. Making the dichotomy on methodological lines allows us
to concentrate not on what our ultimate model should look like, but on how to make
empirical progress towards it by investigating real phenomena that we are interested
in.
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The case in favour of the task-oriented approach ultimately rests on its usefulness.
The approach may serve as a useful general framework for psychological study, if the
concept of a task can be defined in a precise way. The present discussion suggests that it
can be, and further proposes that the task is a viable solution to Fodor’s problem of how
psychological research can be organized. The challenge that arises is the following. If
we want to study psychology in a tractable way, we have a choice between two options:
there are modules, and there are tasks.
Chapter 5
A relational field–based account of
referential communication games
Psycholinguistic research on dialogue recruits a standard empirical device: the refer-
ential communication game.1 These games take a variety of different forms, but the
structure is basically the same across all instances (Yule, 1997). What happens is that
an experimenter invites a pair of research volunteers into a laboratory and gives them
a problem to solve together. We will call these volunteer subjects S1 and S2 (in prac-
tice one of these is often an experimental confederate). Typically, S1 is given a set
of experimental materials and S2 is given a somewhat different set of materials, and
there will be a physical barrier separating S1 and S2 such that each can see their own
materials but not those given to their partner. The problem that they are asked to solve
requires that at least one member of the pair somehow communicates something about
the structure of their own materials to their partner who does not have direct visual
access to that structure.
The format of these games was initially developed for addressing a set of research
questions about feedback between speakers and addressees in communication (Krauss
and Weinheimer, 1966). The earliest studies were explicitly carried out within the
framework of information theory (or communication theory), which posits that lan-
guage use should be understood by analogy with how signals are sent between two
1These are also commonly called ‘referential communication tasks’; however, since I have already
assigned a specific technical meaning to the term task, I will avoid re-using it here. I will refer to all of
the laboratory-based activities discussed in this chapter as ‘games’.
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telephones. The conduit-based model of speaking was presupposed, and the format of
the referential communication game was built upon this presupposition.2 The game
format seems to be an attempt to reconcile two things: 1) all communication (by hy-
pothesis) is sending messages back and forth through a conduit, but 2) communication
in a normal environment is noisy and full of feedback loops—and it is therefore diffi-
cult to characterize what is going on from the outside. Since what was desired was a
means of studying communication empirically it was thought necessary that the com-
plexity of normal communication should be reduced, or controlled for. The solution
was to create a simplified communicative set-up, one that maintains the conduit while
removing the feedback loops that were not deemed by the researcher to be of inter-
est. Thus, in the game set-up, access to shared visual structure is denied and the only
things that may be exchanged between research subjects are words (and potentially
other gestures). But what this means, in effect, is that these early researchers justified
their model of communication as a telephone by creating a game format which can
itself be played over a telephone line. In short, the format that these games take is
strongly influenced by the theory that guided their development.
Because of this, I do not believe that referential communication games are a suit-
able tool for developing the relational field model of communication in a practical
direction. The problem is that these games are artifcial. They are artificial in at least
two ways. Firstly, they impose artificial constraints on the actions available to S1
and S2. This is not such a problem; such constraints are necessary in a great deal of
empirical enquiry. The problem is the second type of artificiality: the problems that
subjects are expected to solve—the task that an individual is faced with—does not ap-
pear to correspond to anything outside the laboratory. The discussion of the task in the
previous chapter asserted that the aim of our empirical research should be to identify
2Although the game setup has remained broadly constant over the years, the interpretation of the
participants’ behaviour has evolved considerably. Krauss and Fussell (1996, p. 661) provide a useful
discussion of this. They note that, ‘The Encoder/Decoder model, and at least the indirect influence of
information theory, can be seen in the terminology of early studies of verbal communication.’ They
maintain that while this has had a lasting influence on the rhetoric used by human communication re-
searchers, it has not particularly constrained how researchers interpret their own results (Krauss and
Fussell, 1996, p. 661): ‘information theory has not contributed importantly to the study of human com-
munication. The aspect of the theory that has had greatest scientific impact is its ability to characterize
information in an abstract, quantitative way. And a major impediment in using the theory to describe
human communication is that, for a particular message transmitted at a particular time to a particular
receiver, more often than not we are at a loss to specify just what uncertainty (if any) has been reduced.’
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precise mechanisms by which particular tasks are completed. Conclusions drawn from
research on some particular task can then be generalized to other situations where the
same mechanism is employed. In the case of referential communication games, the
task to be completed by an individual does not appear to resemble anything much that
is encountered in day-to-day speaking. As such, the conclusions that can be drawn
from studying these games may not be generalizable to anything except other referen-
tial communication games (and perhaps certain conversations held over the phone).
So why discuss these games here at all? The answer is that these games have
been studied quite extensively and have produced a fairly rich set of data. We can
take this data and try to make sense of it within the framework of the field model of
speaking. The point is not to apply the framework to the data for its own sake, but
to use the data as a means of exploring what the framework can do, and what it will
be useful for. In particular this chapter will have two aims. Firstly, I will again try
to drive a wedge between two different approaches: the conduit-model of speaking
and the relational field model outlined in chapter 3. The first part of this chapter will
demonstrate how these two approaches lead to two entirely different analyses of the
general structure of referential communication games, and therefore two genuinely
different ways of thinking about what is going on when we speak. Secondly, I will
look at some of the best-established findings drawn from the study of these games and
I will attempt to re-analyze these findings within the relational field framework. The
aim will be to test the limits of what the framework can be used for. Although there
may be no practical upshot from analyzing these artificial games, nevertheless, these
games are widely employed by researchers studying dialogue and interaction. For the
field model to prove its worth, it must be able to provide an analysis of these games.
Moreover, since it is generally taken for granted that these games can only by analyzed
within a conduit-based description scheme, it will count as a major achievement for
the relational field model if it is able to provide a plausible re-analysis that invokes no
conduit at all.
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5.1 The structure of referential communication games
The field model proposes that speaking should be understood as a kind of action that is
inherently bound up with local circumstances. There is nothing novel or controversial
about this; indeed, to point out that speaking must be understood in context is to state an
almost perfect platitude. Herb Clark (1996) identifies a broad school of thought within
language research which he calls the ‘language-as-action’ tradition. Roughly, this is
the set of research programmes that are built around precisely the idea that language
use should be understood in context. This is set up in contrast to the ‘language-as-
product’ tradition, which attempts to understand language as a formal system in its
own right, which Clark identifies with work by Chomsky and followers.
Historically, however, research in the language-as-action tradition has routinely as-
sumed a conduit model of information exchange. The desire to understand speaking in
context inevitably comes into conflict with the use of the conduit model as a descrip-
tive tool. The conflict is that the conduit itself does not appear to be context-specific.
Contexts can change, but the conduit itself and the content that passes through it must
always exist in a separate, de-contextualized form, to be interpreted at either end with
reality as perceived by the current addressee. As a consequence, researchers working
in this tradition face a dilemma. There arise two distinct types of research programme
that can be pursued. The first insists on a firm commitment to the importance of con-
text, and thus tries to describe in great detail what is going on in a handful of very
specific scenarios. This can produce useful descriptions of the particular scenario un-
der study, although such descriptions have not tended to provide generalizable insights
about the mechanisms involved. The second programme, by contrast, quickly loses
sight of context; the goal instead is to explain the nature of the conduit itself, and the
nature of how speakers use the conduit. It is in pursuit of this goal that researchers
have developed the referential communication game.
That the second programme is quick to forget about context is best seen in the way
it constructs its theories of communication. These theories are often accompanied by
some variant of the diagram in Fig. 5.1 (or else, the diagram is implicitly assumed).
In the diagram, there are minimally two speakers and a conduit. This is presented as
a generalized abstraction that can later be applied to any given context. The theory is
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S1 S2
Figure 5.1: The conduit model of speaking: speakers transmit information to
one another encoded in sound waves.
then built around this basic diagram. The specific theories that result appear to express
a quite diverse range of concerns. Clark (1996) devises a ‘ladder’ of collaborative
actions which he says allows speakers to infer the present content of mutual knowl-
edge; Tomasello et al. (2005) emphasize how mutual knowledge is actively managed
by speakers through the initiation of episodes of joint attention; Pickering and Garrod
(2004) posit that each speaker is in possession of an automatic processing module that
keeps track of the current situation on the speaker’s behalf; Sperber and Wilson (1995)
place the burden of adjusting for context upon the speaker, who is said to take the
present circumstances into account before producing an utterance. What all of these
have in common is that they assume that the difficult part of the problem is in how
precisely the conduit is used. The reasoning appears to be that, since a) there is only
one conduit, and since b) this conduit is present in all of the contexts that we’d want
to generalize to, therefore c) an adequate theory of language-use will follow if only
we can devise an appropriate theory of the conduit. In effect, the proposals mentioned
above are all theories of conduit-use.
5.1.1 The extended conduit model
It is instructive to try to apply the diagram in Fig. 5.1 to the set-up of the referential
communication game in its general form. We will start with a task analysis of a basic
game. Some structure on one side of the barrier, visible only to S1, has to be duplicated
on the other side of the barrier. S2 must reconstruct the target structure using a set of
disassembled materials. This general format is depicted in Fig. 5.2. In order to solve
this overall problem, both S1 and S2 must engage with structure in the environment




Figure 5.2: Schematic analysis of the structure of a typical referential commu-
nication game: structure in the experimental materials M1, visible only to the
first subject, informs actions to be performed on materials M2, visible only to
the second subject.
somehow. The question is, how?
Taking the conduit model and superimposing it upon a bird’s eye view of the game
set-up, we get the diagram in Fig. 5.3(a): S1 and S2 are connected to one another via
a communicative conduit, and each has a perspective view over a particular subset of
the experimental materials, M1 and M2. The arrows pointing from S1 to M1 and from
S2 to M2 represent the subjects’ attending to the external materials. Fig. 5.3(a) thus
represents the state of affairs just after S1 and S2 have entered the laboratory (and after
they have been given whatever instructions the experimenter gives). Now the subjects
must set about trying to solve the task. Typically, the subject who has been assigned
the director role, S1 say, will start by consulting their materials, constructing a verbal
instruction and uttering it out loud. This verbal instruction is depicted in the Fig. 5.3(a)
as the arrow pointing from S1 to S2—this is one of the two arrows that make up the
speech conduit. Next, S2 interprets this instruction and attempts to reconcile it with an
action they can perform upon M2. Once S2 is satisfied that this is the correct action,
they will carry this action out, effecting a change in the structure of M2. This action is
depicted in Fig. 5.3(a) in the arrow pointing from S2 to M2.



















Figure 5.3: The game understood according to the conduit model: (a) the ini-
tial set-up consists of a truncated conduit (S1–S2) plus structure in the world;
(b) feedback creates an extended conduit; (c) information flow through the ex-
tended conduit
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But now suppose that S2 has attempted to reconcile the instruction from S1 with
structure in M2 and has been unable to select a suitable action. In effect, S2 has probed
the structure in M2, and this act of probing has created or revealed information for S2
to the effect that no suitable action is available (we will assume that the information
here is Shannon information). This is represented in the arrow in Fig. 5.3(b) pointing
from M2 to S2. S2 needs more information. S2 will therefore send a message back
down the conduit to S1, requesting further instructions. Next, S1 must consult M1
again: attending to the structure, collecting further information about that structure
(arrow M1 to S1 in Fig. 5.3(b)). S1 is now equipped to produce a refined instruction,
which will again be sent down the conduit. The interaction continues in this cycling
fashion until the subjects are satisfied that they have reached a point of termination.
Fig. 5.3(b) is a static diagram which appears to have a fairly simple structure.
There are just six arrows connecting everything together. Looking at Fig. 5.3(b), it is
tempting to think that any one of these arrows can easily be pulled out of the whole
and examined in isolation. However, the diagram is only useful if it can capture how
things work in motion. These games, after all, are activities that exist in time as well
as space. The description in the last two paragraphs of the perfectly routine way in
which these games are completed suggests that Fig. 5.3(b) is misleading: there are
not really six distinct arrows that can be isolated from one another. Instead, the whole
system works as a kind of extended conduit or circuit. Information can be seen flowing
from M1 to S1, then to S2, M2, then back again as an ambiguity arises and further
information is requested. The information flowing through any one arrow at any one
time is contingent on the structure of the entire circuit.
A less misleading depiction of the structure of these tasks is shown in Fig. 5.3(c):
there are no distinct arrows; it is recognized that the entire system forms a continuous
circuit around which information flows. But notice that this raises a problem if the
aim is to use the referential communication game format as a means of studying the
nature of the speech conduit, or the nature of interaction, or the nature of the cogni-
tive system of S1, or of any other individual component of the circuit. Typically, an
experimenter will put a set of materials into a laboratory environment, and will then
invite in S1 and S2 and have them solve a problem with those materials. Some form of
behavioural measurement will be taken, and the resulting measurements will later be
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used as a source of data for addressing some research question about some component
of the system. But if the game format allows continuous flow of information through
a distributed system, as in 3(c), then the experimenter may not in fact be justified in
attributing any particular aspect of the measured behaviour to a particular component
in the set-up. Any given action or utterance made by S1 may be a behavioural response
to information that originated within the cognitive system of S1, or it may equally be a
response to information that ultimately originated in M1, or in S2’s cognitive system,
or anywhere else in the circuit. Because every component in the set-up is connected
in one continuous informational loop, it is not possible, in practice, to identify any
single component within this system as the definitive cause of a given measurement
outcome.3
All of this is important because it relates to the issue of representative design: to
what extent are conclusions drawn from the study of these games generalizable outside
the laboratory? The fact that the extended conduit is causally opaque is not in itself
a reason to reject the model. The problem is that it is not known to what extent the
behaviour observed in these games corresponds to behaviour in the kinds of natural,
everyday dialogues that are supposedly being modelled. The diagram in Fig. 5.3(c)
aims to illustrate clearly that the materials that are placed in the laboratory by the
experimenter must be playing a causal role in the behaviour that is ultimately observed.
But the nature of the causal role played by these materials is unknown. Is the game
set-up really a simplification of what happens in all dialogue, or is it rather an invented
scenario that produces its own distinctive patterns of behaviour? This is a problem
that is ubiquitous in psychological methodology; it was identified notably by Egon
Brunswik (1956) in his work on vision. One way to address it is to insist, as Brunswik
did, that the design of psychological experiments should be ‘representative’; that is,
investigators should sample over not only different items and different individuals, but
also different situations (Hammond and Stewart, 2001b; Dhami et al., 2004).4 Thus,
3This critique of the format of referential communication games parallels John Dewey’s (1896)
critique of the ‘reflex arc concept’ in psychological research.
4Historical note: the term ‘representative design’ was introduced by Brunswik in opposition to con-
ventional or factorial design, which had initially been developed for use in agriculture rather than psy-
chology. Subsequent writers have adopted the concept of representative design, but have given it the
name that Brunswik coined for a different concept, ‘ecological validity’ (e.g., Orne, 1969; Neisser,
1976). For Brunswik, ecological validity was a property of the cues available in the proximal stimulus
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results from referential communication games would only be relevant to a psychology
of dialogue if their conclusions are additionally shown to generalize to other situations
with different task characteristics. The ecological realist solution, as outlined in chapter
4, is to make narrowly-defined tasks the object of inquiry instead of broadly defined
phenomena such as ‘dialogue’. It is at any rate an open question exactly how what
goes on in a referential communication game relates to what goes on in dialogue in
general. The conduit-based research programme has partly addressed this issue: the
use of communication games as a research tool is supplemented by analyses of more
naturalistic speech corpora, for instance (Schober, 2006). However, the issue is one
that is yet to be fully addressed.
The fact that information must flow continuously around an extended system that
includes subjects and materials is obvious when the game is depicted as in Fig. 5.3(a–
c). Yet the referential communication game format is widely used without mention of
this problem. Why is it this issue appears to have gone unaddressed? I think the answer
lies in Fig. 5.3(a). I have drawn the arrows pointing outwards from the subjects to the
materials, to represent a process of active attending. Actually, a more traditional con-
ception of these games implicitly places the arrows pointing in the opposite direction,
from material to subject, to represent the materials’ role as sensory input to S1 and S2’s
cognitive systems. On this input-based scheme, all of the discussion that takes place in
the carrying out of the game is local to the subsystem consisting of the speech conduit
and of the two cognitive systems belonging to S1 and S2, each of which is held to con-
tain a mental model of the situation. We will call this the truncated conduit model. In
effect, the game set-up is understood to consist of a subsystem where language occurs,
and a physical environment where actions occur. There are only two types of interac-
tion between the language subsystem and the physical environment: one-way input of
sensory data from environment to cognitive systems, and one-way output of behaviour
from cognitive systems to environment. This notably overlooks the possibility that
individuals do not maintain a complete mental copy of the entire scene as perceived,
i.e. the possibility that the environment is used as a store of external representations
to be consulted as necessary. This input-based scheme is committed to a complete di-
chotomy between language and environment. I suspect that this way of conceiving of
(light) for judging the presence of a distal object (see Hammond and Stewart, 2001a).
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how the game works is inevitable if the two-heads model depicted in Fig. 5.1 is taken
as a true depiction of how communication works.5
5.1.2 The field model
Now, how would an account of this game look if it were based on the relational field
model? First of all, there are no arrows pointing in only one direction, from an ob-
ject to a perceiver, say. The arrows in the relational field point in both directions:
from a visually exploring perceiver-actor to an object, and simultaneously, via light,
from the object to the perceiver-actor. These two-way arrows are relations. So the
first thing to observe is that, at the beginning of the game session, S1 and S2 stand
in a perception-action relation to M1 and M2, respectively. These perception-action
relations are depicted in Fig. 5.4(a) by two bidirectional arrows, R1 and R2. S1 has
direct perceptual access to M1 and S2 has direct perceptual access to M2, but of course
the Ss do not have direct perceptual access to the M on the other side of the barrier.
However, note that in the ecological realist framework, relations themselves are held
to be directly perceivable. What this means is that each of the subjects also stands
in a perception-action relation to their partner’s perception-action activity; that is, S1
can directly perceive R2, and S2 can directly perceive R1. And further, according to
the proposed model, each subject can also act upon their partner’s perception-action
relation. Notice, also, that there is no arrow pointing between S1 and S2 directly, as
there is in the conduit model in Fig. 5.3(a–c). Of course, S1 and S2 can see each other,
but the arrows are left out of the diagrams in Fig. 5.4, because they are not relevant.
What is relevant is not that S1 can see S2 per se, but that S1 can see what S2 is doing
relative to some other structure.
Since there are two subjects in this game, and therefore two first-person perspec-
tives, there must also be at least two different tasks. At this point it will be useful to
5Perhaps there does exist some way to eliminate this dualism whilst maintaining the conduit. It is
conceivable that a different description scheme could be built on the principles of distributed cognition,
appealing to the concept of external representations. Input-output psychology recognizes only internal
representations. The distributed scheme is essentially what is depicted in Fig. 5.3(a–c). In order to turn
this distributed description scheme into an empirical research programme, the description would have to
be accompanied by a practical methodology that could draw useful conclusions about the functioning of
the extended system. How such a methodology could be developed is a problem that need not concern
us here.





















Figure 5.4: The game understood according to the relational field model, show-
ing incremental learning by S1: (a) S1 gives the first instruction; (b) by attending
to S2’s behaviour, S1 comes to discriminate structure in S2’s relational web; (c)
this also generates information about the structure of the materials. (A similar
diagram could be produced for S2.)
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pause to examine what the task is for each subject. The following is a first approx-
imation. For S1 the task is to use the structure in M1 as a resource for altering the
structure in M2; to do this, S1 must use M1 to assemble instructions, and must direct
these instructions at S2’s relational web. For S2 the task is to use the materials that
constitute M2 in order to assemble something that matches M1; in order to do this S2
must gather information about M1 via S1’s relational web. Both of these tasks will
terminate at the same time, when both S1 and S2 are satisfied that the structure in M2
has been made to match the target structure in M1 (this is the end of the task regardless
of whether or not the structures actually do match).
The rest of this section should be read as a tentative effort to take what is so far
a sketchy outline of a relational-field based account of speaking and to apply it to a
particular type of verbal exchange, filling in some of the details along the way. Many
of these details may have to be revised later.
Fig. 5.4(a) can be read as S1 (the instruction-giver) producing the first instruction
in the game, which is to be understood as S1 acting on R2. Next, S2 must respond to
this action. But how? I suggest that it will be useful to think of S1’s instruction as an
event that can have two possible outcomes. First, S2’s relational web may already be
appropriately calibrated to respond to S1’s instruction; that is, S2 has already attended
to certain structure in the environment and is now in a state of readiness to respond
to certain actions that refer to that structure. In this case, S1’s action directly orients
S2 towards some aspect of M2. To say that S2 is directly oriented to this structure is
to say that S2’s attention is directed there by necessity; it is as though S1 had picked
up S2’s hand and placed it on the target object—S2 has no choice but to attend to that
object. So the suggestion is that the instruction, by itself, orients S2’s attention. But the
instruction does not, by itself, put S2’s limbs into motion in response. What it does is
it effects a change in S2. S2 is turned into a particular kind of structure-seeking device.
For S2, the first instruction is perceived as an event that is in some way informative
about a change to be effected in M2. This event may be sufficiently informative that S2
is confident that they have enough information to act. Or else, S2’s search for relevant
structure will fail, at which point S2 may act in turn on R1, seeking further information.
The second possible outcome of S1’s initial instruction is that S2’s relational web
will turn out not be appropriately calibrated. In this case, the instruction—that is, the
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action on R1—will fail to direct S2’s attention to anything in particular. S2 is not
turned into a structure-seeking device in the same way. S2 perceives that an action
has occurred, but does not perceive the meaning of that action. Instead, S2 can only
respond by seeking further information. There are many ways S2 can do this: pausing
and waiting for further instructions, stating that the instruction is insufficiently infor-
mative, or asking a question in return. All of these might be understood as instances of
S2 acting on R1 (including pausing: failing to respond may itself be a kind of action).
Let us suppose that S2 apprehends the first instruction, and tries to carry out an
appropriate action in response. This attempt is itself informative, for S1, about the
nature of R2. If S2 looks at something, this act of looking tells S1 that the particular
‘something’ referred to is in fact there in the environment (in M2). It also constitutes
information for S1 about S2’s awareness of that something.
But the instructions in these games are not just about individual objects. They are
about how to assemble a set of objects into a larger whole. This means that it is not
adequate to picture R2 as a straight line connecting S2 and M2. M2 is not one thing,
but a set of things. R2 is really a web. It is the web of relations that connects S2
to everything in the environment which S2 is currently aware of, or attuned to. S2’s
behaviour in response to S1’s instructions is informative not just about one relation,
but about a set of relations. S2’s behaviour is informative about the structure of S2’s
web. This is depicted in simplified form in Fig. 5.4(b).6
Now notice that R2 does not exist in isolation from the rest of the environment.
R2 is really a sub-component of a larger relational web which includes R2 and R1 and
includes all of the other relations that abound between entities. This means that any
disruption in the structure of R2 may potential be informative about other, connected
parts of the web. In particular, it must be the case that S2’s behaviour is informative
about the relationship between M1 and M2. S1’s instruction is itself an attempt to
alter this relationship, and to bring about a relation of sameness between the two set
of materials. S1’s perceiving of this M1–M2 relation is depicted in Fig. 5.4(c). In a
6The static diagram in Fig. 5.4(b) appears to suggest that S1 is acting on two relations at once. Is
this necessary? I think not. Perhaps in practice it is better to stipulate that S1 can act on two relations
in sequence, or else can on a higher-order relation which itself connects two more basic relations. For
example, in the instruction to ‘Put the book on the chair’, S2 is directed to a relation between a book
and a chair, and what S1 is acting on is a relation connecting that relation to S2.
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sense, the M1–M2 relation is where the action is in this game. The task, for each of
the Ss, appears, ultimately, to be about altering this relation. There is some work to be
done to clarify how this can be the case.
Fig. 5.4(c) depicts S1 in a state of attunement to a set of relations in the environ-
ment. Does this not require short term memory and therefore internal representation
on S1’s part? It requires at least a temporary change in S1’s dispositions. Presumably
this involves some restructuring at the neural level. But this need not necessarily mean
that something is being stored, like symbols on a slate. All that is entailed is that a
change has occurred. For now, we will assume that this change is consistent with the
doctrine of the new ball: S1’s learning, or attuning to parts of the environment, is a
temporary change in how S1 is disposed to act towards the environment.
What has been described so far, and what is depicted in Fig. 5.4(a–c), could apply
to a referential communication game in which S1 produces instructions and can see
S2, but S2 is not allowed to ask questions in return. Commonly, however, S2 will be
allowed to freely produce verbal actions of their own. S2’s actions are actions on S1’s
relational web, which are themselves a potential source of information to both S2 and
S1. What this suggests is that there are a great many sources of potential information
for both subjects in these games. It is not the case that the Ss can only learn about
their partner’s materials by extracting meaning encoded in the things that are said, as
the (extended) conduit model supposes. Nor is it the case that linguistic information is
a special kind of information that must be reconciled with a physical context through
a process of inference. When the whole speaker-environment system is considered in
dynamic terms, it is clear that the information that is available is richly structured and
that it is informative about the environment broadly and not just about the partner’s
perspective on that environment.
It must be acknowledged that the field model is no closer to being able to give a
general account of how referential communication games work than is the extended
conduit model. In both cases, the system is complex: dynamic processes mean that
any given component in the system causally interacts with all of the other components.
As a result, the underlying causal structure is opaque. The advantage, for the field
model, is that it escapes the problem of representative design: what causal role is be-
ing played by the structure of the experimental materials? The field model does not
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suffer this problem because the experimental materials are part of the phenomenon to
be explained. The materials are not merely tools recruited by a researcher as a means
of investigating a broader phenomenon (‘dialogue’, or ‘collaboration’), but objects of
empirical study in their own right. The aim of the task-oriented psychologist is pre-
cisely to answer the question: how are these materials being assembled in the carrying
out of this particular task?
5.1.3 A note on roles and repertoires
I have been referring to the volunteer subjects in these games by the labels S1 and
S2. It is more common, however, to refer to the subjects by the names of roles that
have been assigned to them by the experimenter. S1 is referred to as the ‘instruc-
tor’ or ‘instruction-giver’, the ‘director’, or simply the ‘speaker’; S2 is the ‘follower’,
‘matcher’, or ‘addressee’. I have avoided using these labels because they are, I think,
theory-laden in a problematic way. To call S1 the ‘director’ is to imply that S1 has
unquestioningly assumed a particular job-description for themself. This obscures the
exploratory, learning behaviour that subjects must engage in whenever they arrive in
a laboratory for an experimental session: subjects do not simply arrive with an under-
standing of the game as it is understood by the experimenter; they must work out for
themselves, to some extent, what it is that they are expected to do.
Perhaps it is merely pedantic to avoid using these role labels? It might be argued
that these labels are just a convenient shorthand that denotes roughly what the task is
for each subject. Still, a convenient shorthand can cause a lot of trouble. The temp-
tation is to slide from using the role label as a description applied from the outside
to talking about the role as part of the actual, causal machinery that brings the game
to completion. It is tempting to assume that in order to produce instructions, i.e., to
behave like a director, S1 must actually be a director, in some psychologically mean-
ingful sense. But there is little reason to assume that people generally see themselves
as performing some well-defined role (except in institutional settings, such as being
the Speaker in the House of Commons, or being a priest presiding over a wedding cer-
emony). And in any case, the role labels that are typically used in dialogue games are
rarely justified empirically: experimenters simply assign the role labels, without mak-
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ing any attempt to verify or demonstrate that the role really does describe the subject’s
own understanding of what it is that they are expected to do. As a consequence, the lit-
erature on referential communication games generally contains little information about
demand characteristics—about how tasks look from the subject’s point of view. One
means of assessing these task demands is through quasi-experimental control meth-
ods, such as post-session questionnaires; I have also proposed that audio recordings
and session transcripts can themselves be used for this purpose (Baggs, 2013).
A more parsimonious alternative to invoking roles as causal mechanisms is to say
that people build up a repertoire of actions and dispositions (Rogoff et al., 2006). On
the present scheme, an animal’s repertoire might be understood as the set of affordance
relations an animal has established between itself and its environment.
5.2 Accommodating established findings
The literature on referential communication games is characterized by an entrenched
set of disagreements about how, generally, to go about interpreting the data. There are
broadly two camps: mentalizers (e.g. Clark, 1996) and automatizers (e.g., Pickering
and Garrod, 2004). For present purposes, it will not be useful to get into the details
of the disagreement. Mentalizers and automatizers all agree that speaking should be
understood as a phenomenon involving mental content. The disagreement is over how
that content gets there and how it is used. These are questions which do not make sense
for the relational field model. In this section, I propose to examine a set of findings
that are said to be ‘robust’ across different games studied by different researchers; I
will examine four ‘basic findings’ identified by Schober and Brennan (2003), plus a
fifth which I have added (clarification requests; Purver et al., 2003).7
1. With repetition, referring expressions become shorter and more definite, and
articulation is reduced.
2. Speaking in dialogue is different from speaking in monologue.
7Actually, Schober and Brennan identify five phenomena themselves, but I have collapsed their items
(1) and (2) into the present item (1).
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3. Speakers appear to design at least some of their utterances for the needs of a
specific audience.
4. Overhearers to a referential communication game are at a disadvantage relative
to the two participants proper.
5. Speakers produce clarification requests.
I will outline how each of these phenomena can be understood as activities in the
relational field.
5.2.1 The reduction of referring expressions
The first robust finding is that, where Ss in a game must refer to the same objects
repeatedly, the length of the referring expression tends to decrease. Thus, in Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs’s (1986) game, which used a set of tangrams (peculiarly-shaped shadow
figures) printed on cards, S1 on the first turn might refer to ‘the one that looks like a
monk praying’, then on subsequent turns the expression is reduced until it eventually
becomes simply ‘the monk’.
This phenomenon can perhaps be quite easily incorporated into the relational scheme.
Presumably, it does not make sense to define a task whose first-person aim is to pro-
duce a referring expression per se. Rather, these expressions are only recruited as
instruments in a larger task (that is, a first-person activity directed at bringing about
a particular change in the environment). As such, there’s no reason to continue pro-
ducing the long referring expression—that is not the point. The point is to get the
other person’s cards in the right order (or to get to the end of the session as quickly as
possible, or whatever).
But why, precisely, do the expressions become shorter? Perhaps it is more pertinent
to ask why it is that the earlier expressions are so long. This question is one that can,
I think, be answered. In producing the first instruction, S1 is acting on R2, but this
action is partly exploratory. The materials that the subjects have been presented with
are novel, and these items have been deliberately selected as things that do not already
have names. What this means is that there is at the beginning no efficient, one- or two-
word action that S1 can perform on R2 that will unambiguously direct S2’s attention
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to the appropriate card. The best that S1 can do is to direct S2’s attention to some
feature of the target figure that disambiguates it from the other figures. S1 thus has to
direct S2’s attention to structure in M2 in a particular way. In the example above, S1
is highlighting a resemblance between a particular card and ‘a monk praying’. Notice
that this also affords S2 an opportunity to learn: S2 will now be disposed to perceive
the card as a monk as well (even though S2 may not have noted the resemblance prior
to the action from S1). This means that on the next occasion when the subjects need to
refer to this card, their dispositions have been shaped by the previous action. Assuming
that the Ss’ disposition to see this card (and no other) as a monk has not decayed in the
intervening time, there is now no ambiguity in referring to ‘the monk’. An affordance
has been created for efficiently referring to a unique item.8
A similar phenomenon is observed at the level of articulation of individual words:
the first utterance of a given word will tend to be longer and more clearly pronounced
than subsequent instances (Fowler and Housum, 1987). Also, S1’s articulation is gen-
erally shorter when S2 is present than when S1 is asked to speak into a tape recorder
for the benefit of an absent S2 (McAllister et al., 1994). The explanation for this short-
ening of articulation must follow roughly the same lines as the one for the shortening
of syntactically-structured referring expressions above. In the normal version of the
game, subjects are probably not trying to produce a series of perfectly articulated pat-
terns in sound waves for the benefit of the experimenter’s tape recorder, rather they are
trying to get a task completed.
But there is a difference between the explanation at the articulation level and at
the syntactic level. It is not the case that an individual word has to be created. At the
articulation level, there is no need to create a new affordance from scratch. When S1
produces the sound pattern ‘monk’ or ‘ice skater’, S2’s relational web already contains
structure that can be acted on by these sound patterns—the affordance is already there.
However, there’s probably nothing in the immediate situation that the term ‘ice skater’
points to specifically. That is, the relational web (R2, and also R1) has to be calibrated
8Incidentally, this explanation also makes sense of the finding that, when S1 receives no feedback
about S2’s behaviour, the referring expressions do not become shorter with repetition (Krauss and Wein-
heimer, 1966; Hupet and Chantraine, 1992; Garrod et al., 2007). The reason for this is that, under these
conditions, S1 has no means of perceiving that an affordance for efficient attention-directing has been
created. In the standard version of the game, S1 cannot perceive changes in M2. In the no-feedback
condition, S1 cannot perceive changes in R2 either.
Chapter 5. Referential communication games 94
to the local environment.9 Perhaps there need be no particular psychological-level
for the reduction in length of articulation. The initial articulation of ‘ice skater’ is
embedded in a larger process of calibration. It may be that the initial utterance is
longer as an unintended consequence of this higher-level calibration process. The first
instance of ‘ice skater’ is an action that is performing two jobs: it is directing S2 to
something in M2, but it is also calibrating R2 relative to a particular piece of action
structure: the sound pattern. For R2 to be calibrated, S2 must engage in a process of
effortful learning: S2 must discriminate the particular object that is being referred to
as ‘the ice skater’ from all of the other possible candidates. Perhaps there are several
figures that could plausibly be the ice skater, and additional information is initially
required to pick out a single figure. This also means that S1’s initial instructions must
be assembled with some care. In an example included in Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs’s
(1986) report, the first utterance in fact does provide additional (syntactic) structure
that is presumably helpful for guiding S2’s discrimination activity: ‘All right, the next
one looks like a person who’s ice skating, except they’re sticking two arms out in front’.
Prior to this initial utterance, R2 has not been calibrated, and thus S2 is unlikely to be
able to respond efficiently to the term ‘ice skater’. After the first utterance, things are
more efficient: subsequent utterances do not need to do the double work of calibrating
and referring at the same time. The first instance of ‘the ice skater’ is an act of creating
a name; subsequent instances are acts of using a name. And the first requires more
effort because there is a greater degree of ambiguity when referring for the first time.
The suggested explanation for reduction at the phonological level is that the utterance
is embedded in a larger, effortful activity of name-creation, which is another way to say
that a relational web is being calibrated. Admittedly the phonological-level explanation
is quite speculative, but it points towards a potentially useful way of thinking about the
multiple-level dynamics involved here.
9Another way to phrase this would be to say that the verbal action has to be ‘grounded’ in the local
circumstances. Of course there’s a difference between this kind of grounding and grounding in Clark
and Brennan’s (1991) sense. Grounding here is attaching structure in the relational web to something in
the environment. Grounding for Clark and Brennan is building up a shared store of mental content.
Chapter 5. Referential communication games 95
5.2.2 The difficulty of monologue
One item in Schober and Brennan’s (2003) list of fundamental findings is the claim
that speaking in monologue differs from speaking in dialogue. This appears to be
motivated, for these authors, by some results already mentioned above, showing that
referring expressions (in a referential communication game) do not become reduced in
the same way if a partner is present compared to if no partner is present. But the claim
that monologue is different is really a weaker version of a more interesting claim: that
monologue is difficult because it is a special case of dialogue that requires additional
skills (Pickering and Garrod, 2004). ‘Monologue’ here denotes the production of lin-
guistic structure intended for an audience that is not currently present, or that cannot
interject. It includes such things as delivering a sermon, writing a letter, and leaving
a message on an answering machine. It is readily apparent that all of these activities
require special practice: an ability to converse fluently with others does not entail an
ability to write coherently or to deliver an engaging lecture. Can the relational field
model account for this?
Perhaps the main reason why monologue is difficult is that it is a form of acting
in which the perception-action link is broken. Speaking is acting on relations, but in
monologue it is not possible to perceive the consequences of these actions: perception
is delayed or denied. Or rather, a particular kind of perception is denied: perception of
the behaviour of others in response to the action. The speaker in monologue must com-
pensate for this partial decoupling of perception and action by employing a different
kind of strategy.
An analogy can be made here with carrying out an individual activity under con-
ditions of perturbation. For example, suppose you wanted to compose a hand-written
letter in the dark. Here, again, is an instance of action partially decoupled from per-
ception. The task is different from writing under normal conditions, in a well-lit en-
vironment. In the dark, the writer still receives haptic feedback from the pen making
contact with the page, but visual control of movement is not possible. As it happens,
it is surprisingly easy to write a line of text without looking. The difficulty is keeping
the line straight, and then moving on to a new line and starting at the right place. The
new line is especially tricky. One way to consistently move down to a new line suc-
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cessfully is to mark the start of the previous line with one’s non-writing hand. This
finger-marking technique is a special skill that can be employed to compensate for the
lack of visual feedback. The suggestion is that for the speaker in monologue such spe-
cial skills must be called upon—skills that are not routinely employed in more typical
dialogue circumstances.
What precisely are the equivalents of the finger-marking technique for speaking in
monologue? Clearly there are a great many skills to be learned; this is what makes
monologue difficult. Specific devices that are used include formulaic or rote verbal
structure—think about the kinds of messages people leave on answering machines.
External aids such as scripts or notes are used by sermonizers, but rarely by people
in dialogue. Writers must pay close attention to the structure that connects sentences
together. In particular, new structure has to be anchored as it is introduced in the writ-
ing. In dialogue, there is no particular constraint preventing a speaker from abruptly
changing the topic of conversation: the addressee will either follow or will be confused
and will respond with a clarification request (see below); in this way, any difficulty is
quickly resolved. A writer does not have this fallback, and so must carefully structure
the verbal actions (the words and sentences) so that the reader will be able to follow.
An ecological description of writing might go like this: writing is plotting a journey
through the relational field; written words are stored actions; for these actions to be
effective, the writing must be structured so that each step in the journey is a move from
one anchored piece of structure to another. How it is that we are able to do all of this
is clearly a matter open to substantial investigation.
5.2.3 ‘Audience design’
A source of some rancour within the literature is the question of the extent to which
speakers take into account the needs of their conversational partner when performing
an utterance (Brennan and Hanna, 2009). It is claimed that at least some speech is
partner-specific, and that any such partner-specificity is evidence of ‘audience design’.
I put this in scare quotes because I think the way that this is commonly phrased begs an
important question: it assumes that a speaker, in designing a particular verbal action for
some particular individual, must take into account the perspective of that individual.
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Of course, this is another manifestation of the conduit model: if a piece of linguistic
structure is something that an addressee must reconcile with a context, then the speaker
must design the linguistic structure in such a way that it is sufficiently informative
about how this reconciling should be carried out. ‘Audience design’ implies design for
a listener’s understanding. An alternative account might acknowledge that utterances
are designed, but claim that what the speaker is concerned with is the effect that the
verbal action will have on the behaviour of the person addressed—the person whose
web is being acted upon.10
On the conduit model, it looks like in order to produce an utterance designed for a
specific addressee, the speaker must perform some mental operation to work out how
the current situation appears from where the addressee is standing. For the field model,
this internal operation is not necessary. Speaking is acting on a relational field, and
relational fields are inherently shaped by the presence of addressees. In fact, according
to the field model, speaking in dialogue is always specific to an addressee.11 In the
account of language learning outlined in chapter 3, it was suggested that the earliest
utterances are actions on specific relations between specific addressees and specific
aspects of external structure. But the idea that all speech is partner-specific is obscured
by the fact that our relational fields come to resemble those of other speakers of our
language: for a large number of the verbal actions we make, there will exist many
individuals whose relational webs are calibrated so as to be compatible with that action.
Experimental investigation of audience design uses a variant of the referential com-
munication game set-up in which S1’s conversational partner is switched part-way
through the session (Brennan and Clark, 1996). The standard finding is that S1 will
continue to use a verbal action that has been established or anchored with S2, e.g.
some object will be consistently referred to as ‘the shiny cylinder’, but S1 will switch
smoothly to a different referring expression with S3, assuming S3 speaks first and pro-
duces a different expression, e.g. ‘the silver pipe’ (Metzing and Brennan, 2003). We
10For one such approach, see Thompson’s (1997) natural design perspective. Thompson conceives of
design as an association between two arrays—an array of structures (verbal actions, say, ‘Can you pass
the bread’) and an array of uses (outcomes that the speaker is trying to achieve—to acquire bread). In
the case of communication, the speaker is said to be attempting to cause the addressee to enact a further
design (to cause the addressee to enact the action of bread passing).
11This is not the case in monologue, however, which suggests another reason why monologue is
difficult: in monologue we must attempt to restrict ourselves to actions that are not partner-specific.
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will assume that these results can be taken at face value. The field model has a natural
explanation for the observed phenomenon. What speakers are acting upon is a relation
between S1 and S2. The hypothesis is that S1 can perceive that S2’s web is calibrated
to respond to the first expression, and can equally perceive that S3’s web is not appro-
priately calibrated to respond to it. The information for perceiving these two facts is
manifested in the events that S1 observes: appropriate responding from S2, and the use
of a novel action by S3. (Whether S1 in fact makes use of this particular higher-order
structure is a matter that must itself be established empirically.)
Is this behaviour not precisely an instance of ‘audience design’? That is one way
to describe it. But actually things are more complicated than that: the game set-up
itself is encouraging S1 to attend to higher-order structure in the relational field (to
structure that specifies that S2 is in a state of relation with referring expression X, and
that S3 isn’t). Clearly whether S1 will bother to attend to this kind of structure must
depend to some extent on the precise details of how the game is set up, and of how
S1 apprehends what it is that they are being asked to do. These are details that are not
typically included in published write-ups (Baggs, 2013).
Partner-specific speaking is a phenomenon that is encountered outside the labora-
tory too. An interesting case concerns bilingual speakers who come into contact with
monolingual interlocutors.12 Bilingual children appear to be sensitive to the abilities of
their monolingual addressees from as early as age 3 (Romaine, 1995). The field model
hypothesis says that using different actions with different addressees is just using dif-
ferent actions to act on different relations. If a bilingual speaker does not code-switch
with a monolingual addressee, this need not involve any kind of deliberate perspective-
taking. Rather, the speaker’s actions are a practical response to the way the field is
presently perceived: the web surrounding the monolingual addressee is perceived as
affording a certain set of actions and not others.
5.2.4 The overhearer’s disadvantage
Schober and Brennan’s (2003) final fundamental finding arises from a study by Schober
12Curiously, little research attention appears to have been given to this, despite the fact that code-
switching in bilinguals was one of the motivating concerns in the paper that originally introduced the
term ‘audience design’ (Bell, 1984).
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and Clark (1989). This was a version of the tangram card-sorting game (Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), except in addition to S1 and S2, there was a third participant,
S3, who had the same set of cards to sort as S2 but was not allowed to interact with
either of the other subjects. The finding is that S2 consistently performs better than
S3, even though S3 hears the same exchange. Schober and Clark’s explanation for this
is that, whereas S2 can respond to instructions that they find ambiguous by requesting
further clarification, S3 cannot. When an instruction is ambiguous to S3, and no fur-
ther instruction is forthcoming, all S3 can do is guess which card is being referred to.
Schober and Clark conclude that ‘understanding is part of a collaborative process’, and
that S3’s disadvantage is that they are not really part of the interaction.
A slightly different explanation can be constructed using the field model. We might
think of the overhearer’s disadvantage as arising not from the fact that S3 is not part
of the interaction per se, but from the fact that they cannot actively explore the rela-
tional field and are thus not able to perceive sufficient structure to complete the task.
Perception-action is a first-person phenomenon; it is a tenet of ecological realism that
one must in general act in order to perceive. An overhearer cannot act in the same
way: they cannot act in order to generate further information for themselves about
something that is temporarily ambiguous. In fact, the overhearer’s disadvantage is the
inverse of the problem of the difficulty of monologue: monologue is action partially
decoupled from perception; overhearing is perception partially decoupled from action.
But there is a second reason for the overhearer’s disadvantage: S1 can monitor S2’s
perception-action activity, and can potentially detect miscalibration of S2’s relational
web. Thus, S1 can act to correct mistakes made by S2, but not to correct mistakes
made by S3.
There is some a priori reason to prefer the field-based explanation here. The major
point in its favour is that it is framed entirely in terms of the perception-action activ-
ity of individuals. S2’s advantage arises from two sources: S2’s control of their own
exploration activity, and S1’s ability to act to correct miscalibration in S2’s web. (In
principle it should be possible to separate these two processes empirically.) Schober
and Clark’s conclusion, by contrast, appears to rest on the idea that there is something
special about collaboration itself. They appeal to the idea that S1 and S2 are constantly
monitoring one another’s understanding. But this kind of claim invariably raises the
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spectre of infinite regress: how do I know that you’ve successfully monitored my un-
derstanding? The field model does not require constant other-monitoring. What is
monitored is whether actions lead to successful outcomes. When a mistake is detected,
S1 and S2 can engage in further exploratory action, through which their relational webs
are recalibrated. It is this calibration activity that is doing the explanatory work. The
difference between S2 and S3 is that miscalibration in S2’s web can be corrected by
further action by S1 or S2, while miscalibration in S3’s web can only be corrected by
S3 on the basis of information already available via S3’s perceptual systems.
5.2.5 Clarification requests
The final item I will discuss here is not included in Schober and Brennan’s (2003) list,
but I include it here because it poses an interesting challenge for the field model. When
we are unable to respond to someone’s verbal action, we often act in turn seeking
clarification about what that person meant. These clarification requests take various
forms: some are formulaic actions that can be recognized as clarification requests
even when lifted from the supporting context (‘what did you say?’), others appear to
depend more on the immediately preceding utterance (‘Can I have some toast please?’
/ ‘Some? / ‘Toast’; see Purver et al., 2003).
The problem, for the field model, is that these clarification-seeking actions appear
to reach back in time: they appear to refer to an immediately-preceding action which
has now passed. If the field model aims to provide an anti-representational account
of speaking, this is something it must account for. If verbal actions are actions on
relations, what are clarification requests? Are they actions upon actions? How can
this be? A representational account of speaking can appeal to structure stored in active
memory: what a clarification request refers to is this temporarily stored structure. The
field model, it would appear, cannot.
But perhaps this is a false problem. Perhaps it is created by the description of time
as something that comes in discrete slices, like frames in a motion picture. This is
a description of time that has been inherited from Newtonian physics. It has already
been claimed, in chapter 1, that perceiving at the psychological level is a temporally
extended activity. And if perception can be temporally extended, then action must
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extend in time as well: perception and action are, after all, two ways of looking at a
single phenomenon.
But then again, this is exactly what is meant by ‘working memory’: working mem-
ory is a device for enabling perception and action to extend across time. There is a
deeper issue here which ecological psychologists have yet to properly address: how
can the functions of working memory be incorporated into a non-representational psy-
chology? James Gibson offered some vague metaphorical language which is relevant
here—specifically, the suggestion that perceptual systems ‘resonate’ to information
Gibson (1966). Presumably resonating is a process that can extend in time. In his
later work on visual perception, Gibson also discussed how partially occluded objects
could be perceived as whole. The proposal was that perceiving the whole object does
not require filling in the occluded part from memory, as had been assumed. This fill-
ing in process is not necessary because there is enough information in optic flow for
the whole object to be perceived directly: partial occlusion entails that something is
being occluded (Gibson, 1979). A more recent suggestion, from Pan et al. (2013), is
that temporally extended perception, or what they call ‘embodied memory’, is possible
because events that have occurred and were perceived have calibrated the perceiver’s
perceptual system to see the remaining structure in a particular way. The authors give
the example of a child peeking while playing hide and seek: the child sees all of the
other children disappear behind occluding surfaces, and can now see only those sur-
faces; but the child’s visual system is now calibrated to see those surfaces as ones that
are hiding other children.
Clearly there is much to be worked out here if the aim is to provide an ecological
realist account of temporally extended perception. I suspect that the ultimate solution
will depend on an assertion that working memory is not ‘memory’—it is not a thing
stored on a slate. Instead, we should talk about two processes: ‘remembering’, for the
act of reconstructing a past event, and ‘resonating’, for the temporally extended aspect
of active perceiving. This second is what is usually referred to as working memory.
An account of how to accommodate clarification requests into the ecological realist
framework might then go as follows. If S1 produces an utterance, then for as long
as S2’s auditory perceptual system is resonating to that utterance, the utterance still
exists for S2, and exists as a relation that can itself be acted upon. If S2’s clarification-
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seeking action succeeds, it must be the case that S1’s perceptual system was also still
resonating to the target utterance. This also accounts for why some clarification re-
quests themselves fail (Clark, 1996): if S2 seeks to clarify something which is no
longer resonating for S1, then S1 will be confused in turn, and may seek to clarify the
clarification request.
5.3 Summary
This chapter has consisted of a further critique of the conduit model, and of an attempt
to develop the field model in such a way as to incorporate the main findings that have
arisen from the study of referential communication games. It was claimed that the
traditional conduit model account of these games—the truncated conduit account—is
inadequate because it is based on unrealistic input–output assumptions. A modified,
extended conduit account, meanwhile, leads to causal opacity: information flows con-
stantly around an extended system. This raises a methodological problem: it is not
clear to what extent the behaviour observed in these studies should be attributed to en-
dogenous properties of subjects’ cognitive systems, and to what extent it is ultimately
a reflection of structure in the materials placed in the environment by the investiga-
tor. It was suggested that the field model does not suffer this problem because the
experimental materials are taken at the outset to be part of the the phenomenon to be
explained.
The field model aims to eradicate language-environment dualism. It aims to pro-
vide a basis for a non-inferential account of speaking. The analysis of the structure
of referential communication games hinted that there may be a rich enough supply of
information in the relational web such that inference is not necessary. This is some
work to be done to develop this account into a useful set of practical tools.
Most usefully, the discussion in this chapter has forced us to develop some new
ideas about how the field model might be made to work. Affordances can be created
through dialogue; this is necessary whenever an object is given a new name. Individu-
als’ relational webs must be calibrated for a given situation. This is achieved through
exploration and interaction. Partner-specificity is primary; partner non-specifity is
derived. Speaking in monologue is also a derived phenomenon; monologue can be
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achieved through the use of special compensatory skills such as practiced, formulaic
verbal actions or through the use of special external resources such as written notes.
And it appears to be necessary that speaking is phenomenologically extended in time;
this has to be so to explain why we can refer to utterances that have already happened.
Chapter 6
The ecosystem of vervet monkey
alarm calls
The discussion up to this point has been quite general in nature. It has been preoccupied
with the question of what kind of metatheoretical assumptions are necessary if we
wish to build a non-representational programme for studying a set of complex social
phenomena—collaborating, speaking, learning to act with others. The present chapter
will aim to develop this programme in more detail, through the use of a case study of
a particular phenomenon. The aim here is to construct an analysis in ecological realist
terms of a relatively simple behavioural system: vervet monkey alarm calls. Chapter
7 will attempt to extend this analysis to a human activity. We will look at monkeys
first, however. Doing so will help us to avoid invoking propositional content as part
of the explanation; we are less inclined to imagine that other species think in terms of
sentences and truth conditions.
Vervet monkeys in the wild are observed to emit vocal signals in response to the
arrival of a potential predator, such as a leopard or an eagle. These calls have the effect
of warning other monkeys of the potential danger. Monkeys that hear the signal will
take appropriate evasive action: a leopard alarm call causes monkeys to scatter up trees,
an eagle alarm call promts them to seek shelter. Vervets are one of many species that
exhibit alarm calling behaviour; many bird species also make alarm calls, as do ground
squirrels, as well as other species of monkey (Owings and Morton, 1998). There is no
particular reason, for present purposes, to focus on vervet monkeys rather than any of
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these other species. It will, however, be useful to examine the behaviour of a single
species in some detail. Different species’ alarm call systems may be very different
from one another, in terms of both evolutionary history and developmental origins.
This chapter will focus narrowly on vervet behaviour. The aim will be to provide a
plausible account of the known facts, using the ecological realist tools introduced in
previous chapters. How does this behaviour work? How does it develop? Can it be
understood as a system of actions on a relational field?
I will stress at the outset that I make no argument about whether, or to what extent,
monkey alarm calls are analogous to human speech. The alarm call system is examined
here as an interesting phenomenon in its own right. A reasonable amount is known
about alarm calling behaviour in vervets. This is data that we can usefully attempt to
fit into the relational field framework. I will comment at the end of the chapter about
the extent to which the study of animal signalling is relevant or can inform the study
of infant vocalizing and human speaking in general.
6.1 Some facts about vervet alarm calls
Vervet monkey alarm calls have been studied in some detail, notably by Dorothy Ch-
eney and Robert Seyfarth. Their findings from field research conducted over the course
of 11 years are presented in their book How Monkeys See the World (1990). Their
research seeks to address questions about much of what goes on in vervet monkey so-
cial life—questions about in-group and out-group behaviour, about differences in be-
haviour among individuals in a social hierarchy, about deliberate deception, and about
the evolution of social behaviour in general. I will focus narrowly on their data on the
use of predator alarm calls, and on how young vervets learn to use these calls.
The first fact to consider is that different calls result in different behaviour. Vervets
produce a variety of different calls (Struhsaker, 1967). The three main types identified
by Cheney and Seyfarth are the leopard call, the eagle call, and the snake call (Seyfarth
et al., 1980). These correspond to vervets’ three main predators. (Further types of
call are made on the sighting of baboons, of humans, and of other mammals that do
not typically attack vervets.) Leopards constitute a threat to monkeys that are on the
ground in open territory. When the leopard call is made, monkeys that are on the
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ground will run up a tree. The tree affords safety from leopards because vervets are
small and can easily and quickly move about between the branches. Eagles, however,
can attack vervets in trees as well as on the ground. The eagle alarm call prompts
vervets to look up, and causes those that are already on the ground to seek shelter in
a bush. It also causes some vervets that are up in the trees to scramble down and run
for the bushes. Snakes appear to be the least dangerous of the three predators. Vervets
do not seek shelter from snakes, but stand bipedally upright and monitor the snake’s
movement through the grass. A group of vervets will often mob the snake, ‘repeatedly
giving snake alarm calls from a safe distance’ (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, p. 103).
Second, there’s a developmental trajectory in the way that infant vervet monkeys
make calls. Young vervets produce a full range of adult-like sounds from quite early
on—from one month of age. But while adult vervets appear to make the three main
types of alarm call almost exclusively in response to a sighting of a specific type of
predator (the leopard call follows the sighting of a leopard, and so on), younger vervets
appear to respond to a high proportion of false positives. For instance, adults make the
eagle alarm call in response to only the two types of eagle that prey on vervets (the
crowned eagle and the martial eagle), but infant and juvenile vervets are observed mak-
ing the eagle call in response to non-predator eagles, and also in response to other air-
borne animals—geese, herons, bustards (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, p. 131). Adult-
like alarm calling behaviour emerges gradually over the course of the first two years of
development.
Third, there appears to be a dissociation between the way that young vervets re-
spond to calls made by adults and the way that they themselves produce calls. This
was tested in a playback study in which adult calls associated with the three different
predators types were played over a loudspeaker to pairs of mothers and their infants
(Seyfarth and Cheney, 1986). Young infants—younger than four months—tended to
respond (in more than half of observations) by running to their mother. Slightly older
infants were less likely to run to their mother, but also less likely to respond appropri-
ately (e.g. they sometimes responded to a leopard call appropriately by running up a
tree, but sometimes responded in a maladaptive way, by running into a bush—a shel-
ter which does not afford safety from leopards). Vervets aged between six and seven
months, however, responded in an adult-like fashion in over 80% of observed trials. In
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effect, young vervets learn to respond to alarm calls in an adult-like way by the age of
six months, although they themselves continue to produce false positives until around
age two: ‘In vervet vocal communication, as in [human] language, comprehension
precedes production,’ (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, p. 137).
Finally, in addition to responding to alarm calls made by conspecifics, vervets also
respond to alarm calls made by another species—the superb starling. This starling
lives in the same area as the vervets Cheney and Seyfarth observed (Amboseli National
Park in Kenya). It produces two types of alarm call of its own: one for aerial predators
and one for terrestrial predators. The set of predators for vervets is not the same as
the starling’s set of potential predators. Vervets are themselves among the starling’s
terrestrial predators, and they elicit the starling’s terrestrial predator call. The starling’s
aerial predator call, meanwhile, is made ‘in response to at least eight species of hawks
and eagles, only one of which preys on vervets,’ (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, p.159).
Nevertheless, there is some overlap in predators, which means that the bird’s call is a
potentially useful source of information for vervets. And indeed, vervets are observed
to respond adaptively to the two types of starling alarm call. In a playback experiment
in which starling’s calls were played to groups of vervets on the ground, the starling’s
terrestrial predator alarm call caused over half of the vervets to run for trees (but not
look up), while the aerial predator call caused over 75% of the vervets to look up (but
not run for trees; Cheney and Seyfarth, 1985a).1
6.2 Alarm calls as actions in the relational field
The four phenomena identified above will serve as useful target material for an attempt
to understand vervet alarm calling behaviour using the relational field model. Can these
phenomena be explained in terms of actions on the relational field, and if so, how does
the relational field explanation compare to Cheney and Seyfarth’s own interpretation
of their data?
1(Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, p. 160) note that this initial study was carried out on groups containing
several juveniles, who are apparently more dramatic in their responses compared to adults. In a subse-
quent study in which all of the subjects were mature adults the playbacks caused less running for trees;
the adult sample were more likely ‘to remain seated and simply scan the area around them’ (Cheney and
Seyfarth, 1988).
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A major difference to note at the outset is that whereas the relational field model
requires that vocalizations be understood universally as actions, Cheney and Seyfarth
are inclined instead to treat alarm calls as labels with distinct referents, analogous to
the view of human language as a formal system. Young vervets, they write, ‘behave
as if predisposed to divide the events in the world around them into broad categories
that require a grunt, a scream, an alarm call, or no vocalization at all. Over time,
pronunciation improves and infants sharpen the relation between a call and the objects
to which it refers or the context in which it is used’ (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, p.
138). Thus, from the assumption that alarm calls are labels, it follows that vervets
must have an internal category to represent distinct types of predator. The category
is necessary as an explanation of how monkeys are able to respond appropriately to
distinct threat types.
Whether or not vervets divide the world into categories is relevant to an explanation
of the first phenomenon: how do vervets respond appropriately to different calls? The
ecological realist explanation, of course, cannot appeal to an internal category. Instead,
the assumption will be that there is in fact no need for an internal category: the business
of engaging in alarm calling behaviour is not about forming and using categories; it is
about animals perceiving and acting on affordances.
An outline of an explanation of this behaviour in realist terms might go as follows.
What a vervet perceives when it perceives a predator is a particular relation—a particu-
lar correspondence between itself and a piece of structure in the world (a leopard, say).
The presence of the predator is inherently meaningful to a vervet, because predators
are things that are disposed to attack monkeys. An adult vervet has learned to attend to
the correspondence between itself and the predator. And since this correspondence is
always present whenever a predator alarm call has to be made, there is no need to in-
voke a category: the call is made simply in response to the perceiving of the affordance.
When a vervet makes an alarm call, then, it is acting on this very affordance—the im-
mediate threat. How do other vervets respond to this call? Perhaps fellow vervets are
themselves acted upon quite directly. Hearing the call induces an emotional state in the
hearer, which puts the hearer in a certain relation with the environment, even though
the hearer has yet to directly perceive the predator. The hearer’s response behaviour is
then affected by the way that their relation with the environment has been reconfigured
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by the caller’s action.
A question that arises is this: when callers call, are they acting on a specific re-
lation? And if so, are they acting on a relation between themself and the predator
(because calling somehow functions to make them less vulnerable to the predator),
or are they acting on a relation between other monkeys and the predator—effectively
shooing others monkeys to safety? Or perhaps the calls are instead not directed at any-
thing in particular; the calls simply arise as part of a monkey’s striving to escape from
a particular predator?
Cheney and Seyfarth (1990, p. 145) cite some anecdotal evidence that says that
whether or not an individual makes a call is influenced by whether or not other mon-
keys are present: male vervets apparently do not call when they are alone, out of
earshot of the rest of the group, and find themselves ambushed by a predator. This
suggests that the calling behaviour is at least sensitive to the present structure of the
relational field, although it remains unclear precisely what is being acted on when a
call is made.
An interesting case is the snake alarm call. Recall that adult vervets respond to
snakes by standing upright and attacking the snake as a group. It looks as though the
snake call might be a tool for instigating a type of collaborative activity—collaborative
shooing away of the snake. Cheney and Seyfarth speculate about whether this might
invalidate their description of calls as straightforward labels: ‘as yet, we cannot tell
whether a vervet’s call should be glossed as a word (simply, snake) or as a proposition
(Snake! Let’s approach and mob it!)’ (1990, p. 174). It should also be emphasized that
alarm calls are made not just once, on the first sighting of a predator, say, but are made
repeatedly. Vervets continue to call even when all individuals have become aware of
the threat. In the case of snake-mobbing behaviour, it is possible that these repeated
calls serve as a coordinating device: the calls function to recruit fellows to collaborate
in attacking the snake, and they facilitate the act of attacking itself because the repeated
calls function to keep track of where the snake is.
However, these repeated calls are made not just for snakes, but also for other preda-
tors such as leopards, from which vervets ‘simply flee’ (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, p.
219). Cheney and Seyfarth are perplexed by this, since if calls are simply informative
labels, there appears to be no reason to keep repeating them after they have produced
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their intended effect. A plausible alternative explanation is provided by Owings (1994),
who suggests that vervets’ and other species alarm calls are not best understood sim-
ply as labels that alert other to the presence of a predator. Rather, the calls also serve
a ‘tonic’ communicative function (Schleidt, 1973), that is, they provoke a temporary
change in the emotional state of individual animals, with the effect of making others
more alert to their surroundings. The suggestion is that repeated calls function to main-
tain a heightened state of vigilance in others. The caller benefits from this because any
of its fellow vervets who happen to be around to hear the call are in effect recruited into
and become part of an ‘early warning system’ that in turn alerts the caller of further
threats (Owings, 1994).
On Owings’s view, vervet alarm calling behaviour is understood, in effect, as a
kind of functional action carried out by an individual engaged in regulating its own
relationship with its environment. This view is quite consistent with the idea that
discrete responses to discrete threats can be explained without positing an internal
category in the vervet’s mind. Instead, the category-like nature of responses emerges
as an accidental by-product, one that is observable only by a certain kind of third-party
individual, namely a human who has a set of linguistic tools for delineating categories
of things. For the vervet, there are simply structures and events in the environment that
arise and that it must respond to. It perceives how to respond by discriminating the
properties of these events.
Clearly, to be able to make and react to alarm calls appropriately, individual vervets
must either learn to fear things that are likely to cause them harm, or else they must
be predisposed to fear such things. To explain how adult vervets come to be dis-
criminating perceivers of discrete threats, it will be necessary to examine the second
phenomenon—the developmental trajectory of alarm calling behaviour. The ecolog-
ical realist explanation for this developmental trajectory must be consistent with the
doctrine of the new ball. A young vervet must be changed, over the course of its
development, such that it responds more selectively to actual threats. The working
assumption must be that there is sufficient information available to the young vervet
as a result of its own exploratory activity that it is able to accurately learn what the
real threats are. There must be structure that a young vervet can attend to that allows
it to learn to discriminate the threats from the other, incidental events going on in its
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environment.
Why might infant vervets call for things that are not real predators? Cheney
and Seyfarth assume that this behaviour is simply a ‘mistake’ (usually with the scare
quotes; 1990, p.129): it occurs because the infant is in possession of a set of not-yet-
fully-refined predator categories. But if calls are actions, and not labels for categories
of predator, then this explanation does not make sense. According to the pragmatist
philosophical tradition, perceptions and actions cannot be true or false—they cannot
be mistaken—because in order to be so classified they would have to exist in the form
of propositions, which they do not (Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 108). A ‘mistake’,
like a ‘category’, is something that can only be identified from the outside, and with
the use of a linguistic description scheme.
Cheney and Seyfarth’s assumption is that young vervets are simply badly-performing
or less-than-fully-competent adults. Owings (1994) again draws this into question.
Owings suggests that it may be a mistake to try to understand infant behaviour in terms
of an adult target. Perhaps the young vervets are not striving to behave like adults, but
are behaving in a way that is appropriate for their specific developmental stage. It is
possible that an infant’s alarm calls, or at least its ‘mistakes’, may be best understood
not as attempts to alert others to a danger, but as exploratory actions carried out by
the infant as it attempts to assess what the environment affords for itself. Cheney and
Seyfarth (1990, p. 133) themselves provide some reason to think that this is the case.
They note that the way that adults respond to infants’ calls is a potentially important
source of information for the infant. If the infant calls in response to a goose, then
there is no real threat; adults will disregard the infant call and go back to what they
were doing. However, if the threat is real—the infant call was caused by a martial
eagle, say—then adults are likely to produce their own call in turn, echoing the infant
and confirming that the call is appropriate. Thus, infants’ calls function in part to elicit
adults responses, which are a potentially useful source of learning. As Owings (1994)
points out, this infant-initiated learning strategy makes sense, because adult vervets do
not appear inclined to deliberately teach their offspring.
If this exploratory learning hypothesis is correct, it provides a mechanism through
which young vervets can come to discriminate structure in energy arrays that specifies
the predators in their environment. Importantly, it constitutes a kind of exploration
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that is not likely to endanger them personally. When a young vervet perceives a flying
object which (to it) is ambiguous, its alarm calling behaviour is a means of generating
further information about what that object affords. The infant’s behaviour is analogous
to the partner’s behaviour in the tangram game, discussed in the previous chapter: non-
speaking overhearers are disadvantaged relative to speaking partners because the part-
ner can generate useful information which an overhearer cannot (Schober and Clark,
1989). A prediction that follows is that young vervets that are somehow prevented
from making their own calls would be impaired in their ability to discriminate threats
in an adult-like way. Perhaps mute vervets are slower to arrive at adult-like behaviour,
or perhaps they never arrive there, but instead continue to be agitated by non-predator
eagles into adulthood.
This explanation may appear to leave unexplained the third phenomenon: why is
there a dissociation between the calls young vervets make (adult-like at 2 years) and
the calls they respond to (adult-like at 6 months)? As mentioned in chapter 3, a similar
phenomenon occurs in human infancy: infants respond appropriately to a greater num-
ber of words than they themselves produce (Benedict, 1979; Goldin-Meadow et al.,
1976). It was suggested that this is not a problem for the relational field model: this
discrepancy becomes a puzzle only if it is assumed that ‘language’ is a single internal
system—a system arranged around an internal lexicon, an internal set of grammatical
rules, and so forth. From the infant’s point of view, however, the verbal actions of oth-
ers are simply a set of structured events, and the things an infant tries to achieve are a
different set of events for which appropriate verbal structures have to be learned at first
hand. The dissociation in vervets is no more a problem than it is in humans. If infant
verbal behaviour can be explained without positing an internal system of language,
then vervet alarm calling behaviour can be explained without invoking an internal sys-
tem of signals. The calls of others are events in the world. Learning the meaning of
these events is not the same as learning to cause similar events.
The dissociation is even less puzzling if we consider the richness of information
available for the two tasks: responding to calls versus emitting calls. Hearing an alarm
call is not an event that occurs in some separate decontextualized realm. The infant is
not typically isolated from the rest of the group; its task does not consist of interpreting
the meaning of a call from an impoverished set of cues. Alarm calls are heard in an
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environment populated by other members of the group. These other group members
themselves respond actively by fleeing and further monitoring the environment. The
infant’s responding to the call is therefore also an act of responding to the behaviour of
others. A very young infant, in fact, does not necessarily need to interpret the meaning
of the call itself—the infant can respond to any call by fleeing to its mother. It will
learn to respond appropriately simply by following the mother and observing what
she does. Slightly older vervets, furthermore, can assess how to react to a given call by
first looking at how an adult is responding. Cheney and Seyfarth (1990, p. 136) present
data suggesting that this is a strategy that young vervets use: those that look to an adult
before acting nearly always respond appropriately to a given call; those that do not
look to an adult are more likely to respond in an inappropriate way—running to hide
in a bush in response to a leopard call, say. In short, there is rich information available
to an infant about how to respond to a call. Contrast this with the information that is
available about an ambiguous flying object that an infant has seen but that no other
vervet has yet called for. Information about the flying object is not simply available,
but has to be self-generated through the infant’s exploratory calling action.
An even clearer demonstration of the discrepancy between responding to and pro-
ducing alarm calls is provided by the fourth phenomenon: vervets’ use of the preda-
tory alarm calls of starlings. Here, vervets make use of (they ‘comprehend’) a piece
of structure that they themselves will never produce. Vervets never become compe-
tent producers of starling vocal signals, and nor do they strive to be. Responding to
and producing alarm calls are two distinct activities; in Owings and Morton’s (1998)
terms, the first is assessing the environment or monitoring it for threats and opportu-
nities, the second is managing the environment—attempting to change the structure of
what the environment affords in the caller’s self-interest.
For Cheney and Seyfarth, vervets’ use of starling alarm calls requires a substantial
degree of inference-making on the vervet’s part: ‘For a monkey to learn to respond
appropriately to the starling’s alarm calls, she must first learn which of the starling’s
vocalizations function as alarm signals. She must then learn to distinguish between
the two types of alarm calls and recognize which predator species evoke the calls.’
(Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, p. 159). On the relational field model, this is simply not
necessary. From the perspective a given vervet, the starling’s predator call is simply
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a part of an extended event. The starling’s call sometimes precedes or accompanies
the appearance of one of the vervet’s predators (but not always: the starling may be
calling in response to an animal that is only a threat to starlings). The occurrence of
the starling’s call is perhaps similar to a change in the background music on a film:
film directors often include portentous music as a way of foreshadowing a dramatic
event, or of suggesting the possibility of such an event. It is plausible that the starling’s
vocalizations might have a similar effect on vervets. Unlike someone watching a film,
a vervet can respond to this change in background music by engaging in exploratory
activity: assessing the sky or the ground for potential threats. Young vervets may be
particularly stimulated by this change in music because they have learned that this
change sometimes accompanies danger, but they have not yet learned to respond to it
in a discriminating way.
6.3 Monkey alarm calls and human speaking
The examination of monkey alarm calls undertaken in this chapter has made no com-
mitment on the nature of the relationship between this behaviour in monkeys and the
evolutionary origins of speaking in humans. I do not intend to speculate about any
such relationship here. It will, however, be useful to make some comments about the
parallels between the two in terms of their underlying machinery, as a means of judg-
ing the extent to which it is appropriate to generalize conclusions drawn from the study
of one system to an understanding of the other.
This comparative project is, indeed, a major motivation for Cheney and Seyfarth’s
work. They open their book with the suggestion that studying ‘almost minds’—things
like monkeys, computer programmes, and human infants (p. 3)—is a useful means of
studying adult human cognition. In their concluding comments, they discuss what it is
that makes monkeys and humans different. The main difference, they conclude, is that
humans have a capacity to attribute mental states to others—a capacity that monkeys
lack (p. 312; emphasis in original):
The inability to examine one’s own mental states or to attribute men-
tality to others severely constrains the ability of monkeys to transmit infor-
mation, deceive, or feel empathy with one another. It also limits the extent
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to which monkey vocalizations can be called semantic. True, calls func-
tion to denote objects and events in the environment and, like words, are
caused by the mental states of those who use them. Unlike our language,
however, the vocalizations of monkeys are not given with an intent to mod-
ify the mental states of others. Though monkeys are skilled observers of
each other’s behavior, they seem to be far less astute observers of each
others’ minds, and they seldom seem to proceed beyond other animal’s
actions to analyze the motives underlying their behavior. We attribute mo-
tives, plans, and strategies to the animals, but they, for the most part, do
not.
Evidently, this passage makes an important assumption that is rejected by the rela-
tional field model: that human speaking is primarily about altering the mental states of
others. On the field model, speaking is instead understood as acting on relations; it is
about regulating or managing the behaviour of others relative to the rest of the environ-
ment. But the concept of acting on relations serves the same function as Cheney and
Seyfarth’s concept of manipulating others’ minds: both are attempts to explain how a
speaker directs another individual’s attention to a specific piece of external structure.
We are assuming that human speaking is acting on a relation. The question that
follows is one that was raised above: is vervet alarm calling behaviour also acting on
a relation, or is it something else entirely? Is it a deliberate attempt by an individual to
reduce the threat that a predator poses to its fellows, say? In this case, a call would be
an action on the relation between other vervets and the predator. Or is the alarm call
more like human infant crying, which, it has been suggested, may be better understood
as a means by which an infant regulates its own needs (Thompson et al., 1996; Owings
and Zeifman, 2004)? In this second case, the call is not an action targeted at a specific
relation between another individual and some structure in the environment, but is part
of an attempt to deal with a specific, personal threat. In other words, it is an action on
a relation between the caller and the threat.
There is reason to believe that this second view is correct. For instance, vervets
are apparently most likely to call to predators from which they themselves are most at
risk (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990, p. 219). If calling was simply about alerting others,
we might expect that calls would be equally likely whenever a predator is present,
or would be most likely when others are most at risk and therefore most in need of
being alerted. Actually, it’s possible that there’s a functional, group-level reason why
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the monkey calling most loudly is the one closest to the threat. This might serve as
a means of localizing the threat for others: it relieves others of the burden of having
to look around and scan their entire environment in response to the call. Instead, they
can simply look in the direction where the noise is coming from, and the predator will
likely be close to the source of the noise. But there are other reasons to think that alarm
calling is self-regulation. Infant vervets are vulnerable to attack by baboons, but adult
vervets do not appear to increase their production of baboon alarm calls when there
are infants present, even though this would presumably benefit their offspring (p. 219).
Adults also make no special attempt to correct infants’ ‘mistakes’; they do not reward
appropriate calls, and are no more likely to echo an appropriate call by an infant than
they are to echo a call by another adult, even though this echoing may be especially
informative to the infant (p. 225).
Perhaps the crucial test case is how adults respond to snakes: how do vervets co-
ordinate an act of snake-mobbing? This, more than any of the other vervet behaviours
that have been reported, looks, on its face, like a clear instance of a collaborative phe-
nomenon. It looks like an adult vervet’s emitting of a snake call is partly a means of
initiating a collaborative mobbing episode. More data is required to assess whether this
is truly the case. What’s needed is data about how adult vervets respond to the appear-
ance of a snake in different conditions: when there are no other individuals around;
when there are only infants around (presumably infants are not yet capable of joining
in in mobbing the snake); when only one other adult is present; and when multiple
adults are present. If the snake call is really an action on a relation between the snake
and another individual, then one would expect that adults should only attempt to initi-
ate a mobbing episode when an appropriate team can be assembled. Granted, engaging
others in mobbing the snake is also a type of self-regulation: it is a way of dealing with
a personal threat. But it is also an activity that requires the monkey to attend to the
kind of triadic structure that—it was suggested in chapter 1—is characteristic of the
things we think of as collaborative activities.
In the end, it remains unclear whether vervet alarm calling is essentially a means
of self-regulation, or whether it is ever a case of acting on others’ relational webs, and
thus analogous to human speaking. That is, we can conclude that it is plausible to de-
scribe alarm calling behaviour in terms of actions on the relational field, but it remains
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an open question whether the calls are directed at first-order relations (at regulating the
affordances between the calling individual and environmental threats), or at second-
order relations (at relations between entities in the environment). The extent to which
the study of alarm calling is directly relevant to an understanding of the development
of speaking in human infancy depends on the validity of the analogy here. In terms of
methodology, however, we can take the discussion in this chapter as a proof of concept
that it is possible to study in non-mentalistic terms behaviour that looks ‘communica-
tive’, and that is engaged in by groups of primates who in some ways appear to be like
ourselves.
6.4 Summary
The analysis of vervet monkey alarm calling behaviour developed in this chapter con-
trasts clearly in some respects from the analysis developed by Cheney and Seyfarth
(1990). An important conclusion is that the ecological realist approach can deal with
an activity that apparently involves categorization, and can do so without positing an
internal category. Affordances are correspondences between animals and structure in
the world; perceiving these correspondences means perceiving meaning directly, with-
out having to consult any kind of internal store.
Next, there is further reason to think that animal communication cannot be under-
stood simply in terms of information exchange. Dealing with problems is a temporally
extended biological activity. Escaping predators requires not that animals simply re-
spond once to a given stimulus source; instead, the animals must actively regulate
themselves and others in a fashion that allows them to continue monitoring the en-
vironment until the danger has passed. Owings (1994) suggests that repeated alarm
calls should be understood as tonic communication which regulates monkeys’ emo-
tional states with the function of maintaining vigilance; vocal repetition is not simply
redundant echoing of information.
Young vervets’ production of alarm calls in contexts that do not elicit such calls
from adults was taken as further evidence that learning is an exploratory process (Gib-
son, 1988). The dissociation between how animals respond to calls and how they
themselves produce calls is explained by the fact that learning to act on the relational
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field is different from learning to respond to changes in the structure of the field. Fi-
nally, while vervet alarm calling can be understood as acting on relations, it is not
clear whether alarm calling is ever acting on others’ relational webs as such, or if it
is self-regulation. Nevertheless, the relational field model provides a useful guide for
constructing relevant research questions.
Chapter 7
Action perturbation in a
collaborative assembly game
We have just looked at a behavioural system observed in monkeys, and have attempted
to analyse this behaviour in terms of actions carried out on the relational field. It might
be argued, in response, that such an analysis does not provide a very strong reason to
take the relational field model seriously. ‘It’s all well and good to describe monkey be-
haviour without invoking mental content,’ a hostile observer might say, ‘but what about
actual speaking behaviour carried out by cognitively sophisticated humans? Can the
relational field model provide a novel understanding of some particular collaborative
activity carried out by people?’
This chapter is an initial attempt to address this challenge. It will examine col-
laborative behaviour in a referential communication game: the joint construction task
(JCT; Carletta et al., 2010; Bard et al., 2014). The data discussed here are drawn from
a pre-existing corpus. This task differs from the standard referential communication
game format discussed in chapter 5. In the JCT, there is no barrier; that is, the two
subjects are not prevented from seeing one another’s materials. Instead, both subjects
see exactly the same set of materials throughout the session. The subjects are each
sat in front of their own computer monitor, but the same objects are displayed on both
monitors simultaneously, and both subjects can freely rearrange these objects in real
time. Experimental manipulation in the JCT consists of alterations that are made to
the set of tools the subjects have at their disposal for interacting with the objects dis-
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played on their screen. Different experimental conditions manipulate whether or not
the subjects can speak to one another, whether or not they can see one another’s mouse
cursor, and whether or not they can see their partner’s gaze cursor, which is captured
via a head-mounted eye-tracker.
It was argued in chapter 5 that the standard referential communication game for-
mat, complete with the barrier, is not a suitable tool for an empirical programme that
conceives of speaking as acting on a relational field. The typical referential communi-
cation game is constructed on the presumption that speaking is transmitting or sharing
information through a conduit. The JCT is built on a similar presumption, but it is nev-
ertheless a more interesting activity for present purposes. Because there is no barrier, it
is not the case here that an artificial conduit is created by the format of the game itself.
However, the game is presented to subjects deliberately as a novel activity. Because of
this, it will be necessary to exercise some caution about what the task in fact is, from
the first-person perspective. This will be discussed in more detail below.
A game trial in the JCT is set up as follows. A pre-assembled target model is
displayed in the top-right corner of the screen (see Fig. 7.1). Underneath, a set of
pieces are laid out. Subjects are instructed to use these to reconstruct the target figure.
The game software is programmed in such a way that the figure can only built if the
subjects collaborate in certain ways:
• Both subjects can freely move pieces around the workspace, by clicking and
dragging them with the mouse. Each subject controls a single mouse cursor.
• In order to join two pieces together, each subject must click and hold one of the
pieces as the two are brought into contact. The resulting larger piece can then
only be moved around as a single unit.
• If both subjects click on the same piece at the same time, the piece breaks (it
disintegrates on the screen and immediately appears again in regenerated form
in a special area at the bottom of the screen).
• A piece will also break if a subject brings it into contact with the edge of another
shape that is not currently being held by their partner.
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Figure 7.1: A screen capture from JCTE2. The target figure is displayed in the
top right corner; the number at the top left is the count of breaks made in the
current trial, the timer at the top is reset at the beginning of each trial. This
screen capture shows both subjects engaged in mouse-actions; the dots are
the gaze cursors. (Images are Creative Commons licensed, cc-by-sa-nc.)
Notice that the way the game is set up means that some of the actions that sub-
jects can carry out are both directly visible to their partner and inherently meaningful
in that the action carried out immediately alters what the game environment affords
to the partner. Most obviously, being able to see the other person’s mouse cursor is
potentially a useful source of information about what actions are currently afforded in
the game. When S1 clicks on a piece, that piece now affords breaking by S2. It also
affords joining another piece on. A piece that has not been clicked on by the partner,
meanwhile, affords being clicked on and dragged around the screen.
There is thus reason to expect that whether or not the partner’s mouse cursor is
visible will impact on how well dyads are able to perform. It is less clear what we
should expect regarding the other factors that are manipulated. Consider the partner’s
gaze cursor. This is not inherently meaningful in the same way as the mouse cursor.
Suppose that S1 can see that S2 is looking at a particular piece. This does not in
itself specify to S1 anything about what actions that piece currently affords. Pieces
break when they are clicked on by each subject, but not when they are merely looked
Chapter 7. Action perturbation in a collaborative assembly game 122
at. In addition, the gaze cursor jumps around the screen in step with the partner’s eye-
movement saccades. This is an alien kind of movement that we do not encounter except
when viewing videos produced using eye-tracking equipment; it is a kind of movement
that initially looks very odd. So while the gaze cursor is certainly a potential source
of information for a subject in the JCT, it is one that they will likely find is difficult to
make use of.
The third factor that is manipulated is whether or not the dyad can speak. Speaking
is not an essential part of being able to assemble the figures, as it is in the card-sorting
games where the partner’s cards are hidden behind a barrier. It is not, therefore, imme-
diately clear what role speech might play here, or whether being able to speak to each
other will necessarily lead to improved performance. In the experiments in the JCT
corpus, each of these sources of potential information is manipulated systematically in
various ways. These manipulations are summarized in Table 7.1.
As can be seen in the table, the experimental manipulations of interest to us here
were all presented within- rather than between-dyads. This means that each dyad had
to complete a series of 16 trials under a set of conditions that varied as the session pro-
gressed. And each set of conditions was presented in a block, of four trials in length (in
JCTEs 1 and 3), or of two trials (in JCTE2). The JCT was set up in part, like many of
the studies discussed in chapter 5, in order to investigate how people make use of refer-
ring expressions in dialogue: how subjects form ‘conceptual pacts’ with their partner,
whether they take into account their partner’s perspective, and so on. The trial-order
was counterbalanced between subjects in order to mitigate possible confounding ef-
fects of order. As will be seen, however, this shuffling of the conditions within each
experimental session created some interesting patterns in the data. A number of dif-
ferent measures that we can look at in the data show evidence that dyads are learning
as the session progresses. And when we look specifically at the points in the session
at which a new set of conditions is introduced, we can clearly see that this disrupts the
general learning trend (e.g. the first trial under a new set of conditions exhibits a slower
completion time relative to the previous trial); that is, changing the environment per-
turbs the dyad’s action pattern. In the present chapter, I will examine the JCT corpus
data as if the game had been set up to investigate these perturbation effects in learning.
It will be useful, first, to elaborate slightly on the concept of perturbation.
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JCTE1 JCTE2 JCTE3
4 conditions; each presented
in a block of 4 trials
8 conditions, presented in 2-
trial blocks
4 conditions, in 4-trial
blocks
Target figures composed of
7 pieces all of different
colours
Target figures made of 11
pieces, some of which are
duplicated
7-piece target figures; 5
pieces are each a different
shade of green
Pieces provided: the same 7
pieces as in the target figure
13 pieces provided, two of
which are not needed for
the target figure; there are
6 pairs of duplicates and 1
unique piece
Pieces provided as in the tar-
get figure
Speech manipulated: dyads
can speak in only trials 1–8
or in only trials 9–16
Speech manipulated as in
JCTE1
Subjects can speak through-
out the session
Gaze manipulated: dyads
can see each other’s gaze
cursor in 8 of 16 trials
Gaze manipulated as in
JCTE1
Gaze not manipulated;
dyads do not see each
other’s gaze cursor
Mouse cursor not ma-
nipulated; dyads can see
each other’s mouse cursor
throughout
Mouse manipulated: dyads
can see each other’s mouse
in 8 of 16 trials
Mouse manipulated: sub-
jects can see each other’s
mouse in 4 trials, cannot
see each other’s mouse
in another 4 trials; and
the remaining 8 trials are
asymmetric—one subject
can see their partner’s cursor
but the partner cannot see
theirs
Table 7.1: Differences between JCT experiment corpora 1, 2, and 3
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7.1 Learning and perturbation
By now perhaps the standard example of perturbation in learning is provided by Esther
Thelen and Linda Smith’s work on the so-called A-not-B error in human infants (The-
len et al., 2001; Thelen and Smith, 1994; Smith et al., 1999). This is a phenomenon
originally identified by Piaget which is observable in young children, around 10–12
months of age. The basic apparatus for this experiment consists of a toy, and a board
on which are placed two containers in which the toy can be hidden. The toy is first
visually presented to the child. The experimenter then hides the toy in container A,
and pushes the board towards the child, whereupon the child is allowed to retrieve the
toy and play with it. This procedure is repeated a few times, and then there is a crucial
trial in which the hiding place for the toy is switched, and the experimenter now places
the toy in container B. This hiding event is followed (crucially) by a delay of a few
seconds. Then the board is again pushed within reach of the child. The ‘error’ is that
the child will now reach ‘perseveratively’ for container A once again, even though the
child has observed the toy being hidden only seconds before at the new location, B.
Piaget took this error as evidence that children lack a fully-developed concept of
objects as things that, once hidden, remain in the same place. Subsequent studies,
however, revealed that the likelihood that a child will commit the error is sensitive to
a great range of contextual factors, such as how many containers there are, whether
these are transparent or opaque, how long the delay is in the test trial, whether the tar-
get object is a toy or a piece of food, whether the test is conducted at the child’s home
or in a laboratory, and on and on (Thelen et al., 2001). Clearly, Piaget’s explanation
is inadequate to account for all of these effects. Subsequent attempts to explain the
phenomenon have appealed to such things as processing demands, or to a conflict be-
tween egocentric and allocentric representations, or to infants’ underdeveloped brains
as possessing a reduced ability to inhibit the motor response causing them to reach to
A. Each of these failed in some way to account for the full range of observed effects.
Thelen and Smith’s solution conceives of the child as a dynamic system, whose
behaviour is shaped by its past experience. They reject all talk of an object concept
(which is a kind of internal content; it is symbols on a slate) in favour of a view of the
child as a system that changes over time (i.e., learning-as-change, or the doctrine of the
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new ball). In the jargon of dynamic systems theory, repeated behaviour by an organism
is said to lead to the formation of an attractor, or basin of attraction. This rests on a
metaphor that pictures the set of possible behaviours available to the child as forming a
landscape with various peaks and troughs (or basins). The child’s actual behaviour can
then be represented as a ball which rolls around this landscape. When the child is put
into a familiar-looking situation, the child’s behaviour naturally ‘falls into’, or is ‘chan-
nelled’ by the existing attractor basins. If the child’s previous reaching experience has
formed a strong basin of attraction for reaching-to-the-left-in-response-to-this-specific-
apparatus, then the A-not-B ‘error’ will naturally arise whenever conditions are such
that no other, stronger, attractor interferes with this response.
The shift of the hiding location to B is a perturbation of the infant-environment sys-
tem. A specific response has been established within this system through the practice
trials: reaching to A. The perturbation means that this already-established response no
longer corresponds to the facts about where the object is hidden. In order for the child
to overcome this switch, the system must be re-organized in some way. The point, for
present purposes, is that these perturbation effects are informative about the way the
system has come to be arranged. If we can interfere with the environment in some way,
and this has an effect on behaviour, this constitutes evidence that the thing interfered
with was instrumental in how the task was being carried out. If, by contrast, we inter-
fere with something and the behaviour carries on as before, this suggests that the thing
interfered with was incidental to the task.
To put this in terms of the relational field: learning consists of attending to some
particular part of the environment. Perturbation occurs when that affordance relation
is made inaccessible, through, in the case just described, an alteration that happens
to the environment (the toy moving to B). Note, also, that a perturbation may equally
occur through a change to the animal which affects its ability to act relative to the envi-
ronment, such as through brain injury, or through a temporary change in the animal’s
capabilities (e.g. when a person is carrying a large box), or simply through learning
(recall the discussion of the transition from crawling to walking in chapter 4).




































Figure 7.2: Mean trial duration, plotted over the course of the session for each of
the experiment corpora
7.2 Perturbation in the JCT
Perturbation effects, so defined, are readily observable in the JCT corpus data. We can
break the data down by trial number and look at what happens to various performance
measures as the session progresses. See the graphs showing a sample of these mea-
sures: the overall length of the trial in seconds (Fig. 7.2), the total number of words
spoken by the dyad during a given trial (including only trials where the dyad were al-
lowed to speak; Fig. 7.3), and the number of mouse-actions carried out in assembling
the target figure (Fig. 7.4). There are two things to remark about these: 1) perfor-
mance steadily improves as the session progresses, although 2) at each point in the
session where the game conditions are shuffled, performance tends to worsen slightly
relative to the immediately preceding trial (in JCTE1 and JCTE2, this happens after
every four trials, while in JCTE2 it happens after every two trials; this is because there








































Figure 7.3: Mean number of words spoken per trial. In JCTE1 and JCTE2, pairs
could only speak in 8 out of the 16 trials, either trials 1–8 (‘speak first’) or trials 9–16
(‘silent first’); in JCTE3, all pairs were allowed to speak throughout the session
are twice as many sets of conditions in JCTE2, as detailed in Table 7.1).
The claim here is that these results can be explained in terms of perturbation of
the perception-action relations between the subjects and the materials. In the first trial
in a new block, the tools that are available to the subjects (mouse, gaze, speech) have
been shuffled relative to previous trials. This means that the pair must adjust to these
new conditions. By contrast, in the second trial in that block (and also in the third and
fourth trials in a block, in JCTEs 1 and 3), the conditions are held constant with the
immediately preceding trial. This means that in the later trials in a block, the pairs have
had the opportunity to settle into or establish an appropriate pattern of action. We can
clearly see this perturbation effect in Fig. 7.5, which shows how the learning effect that
is observed over the course of the experimental session (in JCTE2) is distributed in an
uneven but systematic way. The ‘baseline’ figure is the mean increase in speed over the




























Figure 7.4: Mean number of mouse actions performed per trial
course of the entire session, calculated as the difference between the durations of trial
1 and trial 16, divided by 15 (for the 15 steps between trials). Trial-to-trial learning
effects are then calculated for trials 2 through 16, as the increase in speed relative to
the immediately preceding trial. Fig. 7.5 compares this learning effect in the first trial
in a new block relative to the second trial in a block. Clearly, pairs are slowed down
considerably in the first trial in a new block, and show a considerable increment in
speed in the second trial.
However, Fig. 7.5 does not show the reason for this pattern. What is it about the
first trial in a block that slows the dyad down? Are they slowed down by the mere
fact that the conditions have changed, or is there some particular manipulation that
is driving this pattern? Here, the existing data set for the JCT is not able to provide
clear answers. One way to assess the relative effects of the different manipulations
would be to look specifically at the very first trials where a given tool (mouse cursor,
gaze cursor, or speech) is either introduced or removed, for a given dyad. However,




































Figure 7.5: Trial-to-trial change in completion time in JCTE2; baseline = mean
change across the whole session; ‘new condition’ trials are the odd numbered
trials (excluding trial 1), ‘old condition’ are the even numbered
because of the way the experiment was set up, these manipulations are all confounded
with one another. And in order to compare individual manipulations within a given
corpus (e.g., to compare trials in which the gaze-cursor is added for the first time with
trials where it is removed for the first time), it would be necessary to divide the corpus
into two groups of 16. But there are substantial individual differences between dyads
which means that with an N of 16 the noise-to-signal ratio is too high to allow us to be
confident about drawing any reliable conclusions from the data set.
Nevertheless, it is clear from the figures, and especially Fig. 7.2, that the perturba-
tion effect is real, and that it reliably occurs, across all three corpora, whenever dyads
transition from an old block to a new block with a new set of conditions.
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7.3 What is the task in the JCT?
I have argued elsewhere that in order to study a task empirically, it is necessary to know
what the activity looks like from the first-person perspective of the person carrying
it out (chapter 4; Baggs, 2013). While we can be fairly confident about what the
individual is trying to do in certain well-practiced tasks such as ball-catching, things
are less clear for novel tasks such as in the JCT, where subjects are deliberately asked to
carry out an activity with a set of materials that they have not previously encountered.
It will be useful to ask the following questions about the JCT. What is the task, from
the point of view of the subjects? And of the measures: are they measuring what we
think they are measuring?
We will consider first the measures already mentioned above. Fig. 7.2 displays
mean trial duration across the session. Are dyads really trying to minimize the time it
takes to assemble a figure? There is evidence in the corpora which suggests that, for
at least some of the subjects, minimizing the completion time is in fact not something
they are particularly concerned about. For instance, one pair (dyad 31 in JCTE2),
in a trial quite late on in the session (trial 14), spend over four minutes building a
figure which they then decide is not accurate enough. One subject is heard saying:
‘Oh that’s awful... you know something, I don’t like it’; he then scraps the assembled
construction and the pair start building it again from scratch. Clearly, for this pair,
minimizing completion time is at best a secondary concern; they are more interested
in maximizing their accuracy score. And in fact, this kind of behaviour is explicitly
encouraged in the instruction sheet that was given to the subjects at the beginning of the
session: ‘Remember that the success of each joint construction project will be judged
on overall efficiency. Efficient trials are fast and, more importantly, accurate; they are
low on mistakes that cost breakages, replacement parts and extra building time.’ So we
might worry that, if the subjects themselves are not trying to reduce their completion
time, then it is not clear what the trial duration measure is measuring. In response to
this, I will simply appeal to Fig. 7.2 again. Clearly, the completion times consistently
decrease as the session progresses (although of course there are substantial differences
between dyads for any given trial), and this itself suggests that subjects are indeed, in
general, trying to complete the figures quickly.
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Fig. 7.3 displays a count of the words uttered during a given trial. Subjects are
probably not deliberately attempting to minimize this number. They were not in-
structed to pay attention to the number of words they were using. In general, the
number of words spoken appears to correlate quite closely with the length of the trial,
as one might expect (compare the lines for JCTE3 in Figs. 7.2 and 7.3). An interesting
feature of the data here is in the comparison between the two sub-groups in JCTE1
and JCTE2: those that were allowed to speak only in the first eight trials and those
that could speak only in trials 9–16. The number of words spoken by the latter group
in a given trial is always lower than the number of words spoken by the former group
even in their least talkative trial. A naïve prediction might have expected the latter
group’s word count in trial 9 to be similar to the former’s in trial 1, because the first
trial with speech is the one in which dyads first try to establish a set of referring ex-
pressions, and so on. That this is not the case is further evidence that the language used
is inseparable from the actions being performed. That is, it is another reason to reject
language-environment dualism.
Fig. 7.4 displays a count of the mouse actions performed in a given trial. Again,
this is probably not something that the subjects were deliberately trying to minimize.
And in fact, efficiency in terms of completion time may not equate to a minimal number
of mouse actions. For instance, it may be quicker to move all the pieces into roughly
the right position first before joining them all together, even though this involves a
greater number of mouse-clicks relative to simply dragging the pieces directly out of
the starting area and immediately joining them to other pieces. For this reason, I will
not make any strong claim about the meaning of Fig. 7.4. Qualitatively, the figure
appears to show that there is a perturbation effect on the number of actions performed
in JCTE2 (the line tends to go up to the odd trials and down to the even trials), but
no such effect is apparent for the other two corpora. Perhaps in JCTEs 1 and 3 the
target figures are sufficiently simple that no learning is necessary, mouse-action-wise,
or perhaps there is a learning effect but it is being masked by something else.
What about the task? What is it that subjects are in fact doing as they work through
a session of this game? The instruction sheet includes the following: ‘Your job is to
replicate the model as accurately as possible whilst simultaneously minimising waste
both of time and of component parts.’ On the face of it, the project of assembling
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Figure 7.6: Screenshot from JCTE3 (dyad 7, trial 14)
these figures seems entirely meaningless. Yet the data suggest that subjects remained
motivated and engaged throughout. At the end of each trial, the software computed
an accuracy score for the assembled figure, based on the number of pixels that would
overlap if the assembled figure were to be superimposed on the target figure. This
score was also displayed to the subjects. I have not included a graph of these scores
here because the graph would not be very informative—the range of scores is in fact
very narrow across the sessions. In JCTE2, the mean accuracy score in trial 1 90.6%,
and in trial 16 it is 92.4%. This suggests that dyads were performing close to ceiling
throughout, and that they did not lose interest as the session progressed; indeed, if
anything, they were trying to increase their score, as evidenced by the dyad mentioned
above that deliberately discarded a slightly imperfect figure late in the session.
It is worth considering what exactly ‘accuracy’ is, in this game. Accuracy is not
an aggregate property of the component pieces. It is a measure of how faithfully the
component pieces have been put together relative to one another, and relative to the
target. Accuracy is, in fact, a relational property. And we can also say something about
what causes deviation from perfect accuracy. The reason scores do not reach 100% is
presumably because, in assembling the figure, some of the component pieces have to
be rotated before they can be put in place. Slight deviations from the target angle will
cause slight discrepancies from the target figure, which can be seen in small gaps, of a
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few pixels, between component shapes. Such discrepancies are probably impossible to
avoid, since our visual systems are not set up to measure things in pixels, and neither
is our mouse-control trained for such fine-grained work. Another potential source
of discrepancy arises whenever judgement is required in where, exactly, two shapes
should be stuck together. For instance, in Fig. 7.6, the pink square has to be glued
onto the triangle above it somewhere along its bottom edge, but there is no definite
point to anchor it to. By contrast, other target figures (such as the target assemblage in
Fig. 7.1) can in principle be reconstructed simply by attaching pieces together at the
corners—by attaching the corner of one piece to the corner of another piece.
This, I think, provides an important insight into what the task is, psychologically,
from the point of view of someone carrying it out. The task is not about placing
individual component parts in the position that is appropriate to that particular part.
Instead, it is about attending to relations between parts. And this includes the gaps: the
gaps are part of the task, and not merely part of the the background space in which the
task takes place.
If the task is about constructing relations, then this would appear to problematize
the use of this game as a tool for investigating the use of referring expressions (Bard
et al., 2014). Or rather, it casts doubt on the assumption that what is being referred to
is the set of component pieces. In fact, there are plenty of instances in the transcripts
of things that look like referring expressions, but which do not refer to any particular
shape. A few examples will suffice here, taken from dyad 7 in JCTE3. This dyad were
quite economical in their use of spoken words. The following utterances appear to be
actions aimed at coordinating a whole series of joins for the entire figure. They are
uttered at the point in the trial after the pair have arranged all of the component parts
separately into roughly the right places on the screen. From trial 7: ‘Shall we start from
the top down?’. Trial 8: ‘Bottom up? Shall I start with the pink?’. Then in trial 11,
the first utterance is, ‘Two big pieces?’ (another expression that does not refer to any
one part). This is followed by: ‘Start at the top and come down?’ There are few ‘refer-
ring expressions’ here, of the type typically studied, yet these utterances are perfectly
sensible. There’s no real need to refer to the individual parts: the parts themselves, as
well as the relations between the parts, are directly visible to each subject and there’s
no need to refer to them verbally. What the verbal actions are doing here is they are
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coordinating activity. To assume that the referring expressions that are used must refer
to elements, or objects, is perhaps to distract oneself from the true nature of the task,
or to impose onto it a less-than-ideal description scheme.
Apart from continuing to be engaged with assembling the figures accurately, what
else are the subjects doing? One possibility is that subjects may be taking on a role
for themselves as ‘good subjects’; that is, they recognize that they have volunteered to
participate in the study with the purpose of producing useful data for the experimenter,
and they actively seek to produce useful data (Weber and Cook, 1972). There are some
utterances in the corpus that appear to be directed as much at the experimenter (via the
recording equipment) as at the partner. For instance, dyad 25 in JCTE2 engage in the
following exchange, referring to the gaze cursor: ‘I find that blue thing really distract-
ing actually... don’t know about you.’ / ‘um... the... eye th–... yeah I know’. The first
utterance here sounds as though it may have been directed at the partner only in the
second part after the ellipsis—as an afterthought. We might worry, then, that subjects
are not really cooperating with one another per se, but are primarily cooperating with
the experimenter, via the materials. However, the game is set up in such a way that
subjects do in fact have to directly coordinate with their partner throughout: there’s
no way to assemble the figures except by both members of a dyad engaging with the
materials at the same time. We probably do not need to worry too much about good
subject effects here.
We can therefore make the following conclusions about what the subjects are do-
ing in this game. In general, they are genuinely are trying to be accurate. Probably
secondarily, they are trying to be quick, or at at ant rate they tend to get quicker as
the session goes on. They are collaborating with one another. And what they are col-
laborating on is a project of reassembling a target relational structure in as faithful a
manner as possible.
7.4 Perseverative wiggling
It was suggested above that perturbation effects emerge in the JCT as a consequence
of the way that the shuffling of conditions disrupts the subjects’ already-established
action patterns. This description is quite vague and mysterious. To try to clarify what
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is meant by this, it will be useful to look at a particular instance of an action-pattern
that comes to be established during an experimental session. We will here focus on the
phenomenon of shape-wiggling.
When a subject’s mouse cursor is not projected on the partner’s screen, it becomes
more difficult for the partner to track what the first subject is doing. Not being able to
see my mouse cursor means that you cannot be sure whether I am about to click on
the same shape as you (and thus whether we as a pair are about to break that piece).
And, moreover, it makes it difficult to coordinate a join. In order to know which piece
to pick up, I need to know which piece you are holding. We both have to be holding
complementary pieces for the join to be carried off successfully. One way to initiate a
join, in the absence of the mouse cursor information, is for you to pick up some piece
and to wiggle it about on the screen. I cannot see your mouse cursor, but I can see the
piece moving. You then only need to wait for me to pick up a suitable second piece
and to join it on to the first. This appears to be a standard solution that dyads adopt
when completing a trial without the mouse cursor.
This wiggling action looks like a communicative signal. And of course it is; or, at
least, that is a perfectly reasonable way to describe what is going on from the perspec-
tive of a third-party observer. For a subject engaged in the task, however, it may not
necessarily be the case that the action is understood in these terms. Instead, it may be
that in picking up and wiggling the first shape, you were simply acting on the scene in
the most convenient manner that presented itself, as you attempted to join that piece
to something else. Initiating a join might be conceived as acting on the relation be-
tween one’s partner and the two pieces to be joined. In a with-mouse-cursor trial, this
action can be carried out simply by clicking on one of the pieces (and perhaps waving
the mouse cursor over the two pieces to be joined, or uttering some appropriate ori-
enting expression). In a no-mouse-cursor trial, however, your simply clicking on the
shape is insufficient as a means of acting on me (because I cannot see where you have
clicked). You are forced to attend to relational structure of a higher order—to structure
that specifies what I can see, rather than simply what you can see; the two are no longer
the same thing.
The suggestion is that once you have performed this shape-wiggling action a few
times, an action-pattern has been established. Producing a similar action in the future
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may involve less effort, because you have already learned to attend to this particular
type of structure in a particular way.
All of this is to introduce a phenomenon that is observed in some of the later trials,
when the mouse cursor has been re-introduced. It is here no longer necessary to wiggle
a shape as a means of coordinating a join. Subjects know this: at the beginning of the
trial they are shown a message which indicates whether or not their mouse is being
projected. Nevertheless, it appears to be quite common for subjects to continue to
wiggle the shapes even though this is now redundant.1 In other words, these subjects
are perseverating on an action they have performed previously, much like the infants
observed in the A-not-B studies.
The fact that subjects sometimes continue to perform this action when it is no
longer necessary suggests that the ‘communicative’ interpretation of this wiggling be-
haviour is at best incomplete. Shape-wiggling is the kind of thing that is frequently
labelled as ‘audience design’ (see chapter 5): it appears to require the ‘taking’ of an-
other’s perspective immediately prior to the performing of the action. The existence
of perseverative wiggling, however, suggests that this need not be the case. Here the
subject is producing an action that appears to be ‘designed’, but not for the ‘audience’
in its present state. A dynamic systems interpretation might posit that the subject’s
behaviour has simply been channeled by a pre-established attractor state.
An alternative explanation for this apparently-redundant wiggling behaviour is that
it is in fact performed deliberately. Perhaps an action-pattern that is established during
the no-mouse-cursor trials simply becomes part of an individual’s action repertoire.
This action is subsequently called upon in later trials whenever it seems appropriate.
This may well be the case, at least in some instances of late wiggling. It is, however,
not possible to make definitive distinctions between deliberate and accidental instances
from the video data.
Of course, it is important to try not to read too much into all of this. The present
discussion is informed only by a handful of instances observed in the videos. But we
can make at least one prediction about shape-wiggling based on the relational field
model. We can predict that shape-wiggling is caused by the removal of the mouse-
1Some examples, with approximate time points in the videos: JCTE3, dyad 6, trial 14 (29:00), trial
16 (34:30); dyad 7, trial 9 (14:20).
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cursor. There is no need to wiggle shapes about if the other person’s mouse cursor is
visible. There should therefore be little shape-wiggling in trials in the first block in
which dyads could see each other’s mouse cursor.
The important idea here is that the establishing of an action-pattern is costly in
terms of effort—it requires exploration of the relational field. Subsequent instances
of that action-pattern, by contrast, are cheap: a pre-established behaviour can be in-
voked rapidly or even automatically. To return to the overall pattern of perturbation
across the session, the suggestion is that the costs (in terms of slower trial completion
times, and so on) are a consequence of action-patterns no longer being appropriate
to the circumstances—to the resource layout. The gains, meanwhile, are an index of
increased adaptedness of the subjects’ behaviour patterns as the session progresses.
7.5 Performing by looking
The JCT was set up as an eye-tracking study. Specifically, it is designed as a tool for
studying eye movements during a collaborative activity (Carletta et al., 2010). The
corpus therefore includes a vast amount of looking data, which means it is possible to
examine subjects’ looking behaviour at a quite basic level, in terms of where, specif-
ically, subjects are looking, at any given point in time. This data we cannot as easily
treat in terms of perturbation, but we can again get some ideas about how people make
use of the available visual structure, which will allow us to make further predictions
about what would happen if this structure were to be removed.
Some eye-tracking studies on individual subjects have investigated people’s eye
movements during the carrying out of everyday, routine tasks, such as making a cup
of tea or preparing a peanut butter and jelly sandwich (Land et al., 1999; Hayhoe,
2000). These kinds of tasks are well-learned, to the extent that introspection tells us
that we perform them without really having to pay much attention to what we are doing.
The eye-tracking data, however, reveal that, during the task, the eyes fixate almost
exclusively on the objects that are relevant to the task as a whole, and do not wander
off to examine some other part of the visual scene (even though one might expect that
‘mind wandering’ should be accompanied by ‘eye wandering’). And, moreover, the
particular objects that are fixated at a given time are the objects that are currently being
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acted upon, or are about to be acted upon. In a paper summarizing these findings, Land
and Hayhoe (2001) conclude: ‘our studies lend no support to the idea that the visual
system builds up a detailed model of the surroundings and operates from that. Most
information is obtained from the scene as it is needed.’
If this is so for individual tasks, it might well be true of the JCT as well. We
can get a rough idea about where subjects look during a JCT trial by examining the
graphs in Fig. 7.7. The corpus is coded into distinct temporal phases. The time that a
dyad spends joining two figures together is defined as a ‘dock’ phase. Everything that
precedes a given dock phase is further divided into two equal-length sections. The first
of these is defined as a ‘plan’ phase, and the second as a ‘process’ phase.2 Meanwhile,
looking-direction is coded spatially, in terms of the specific screen region being fixated
at a given point in time. The screen is divided into several regions, the most important
of which are the ‘target figure area’, in the top-right of the screen; the ‘work area’,
where the pair’s figure is assembled; and the ‘initial parts area’, underneath the target
figure, where component parts are found at the beginning of a trial.
The graphs in Fig. 7.7 display the proportion of the total count of ‘looks’ that are
directed to a specified screen region.3 The graphs in these figures are qualitatively
very similar to one another. One feature that is common to all three graphs is that
looks to the target figure occur most frequently in the ‘docking’ or joining phase. This
effect is particularly pronounced in JCTEs 2 and 3. Clearly, this somewhat contradicts
the phase labels themselves: if the first stage were really a ‘planning’ phase, then one
would expect that this is when the target figure should be fixated most. Instead, the data
appear to show that the things people look at are the resources that are relevant to the
current section of the task, much as in Land and Hayhoe’s food-preparation studies.
It does not appear that subjects are memorizing the layout of the target figure and
then building their own figure based on that internal model. Rather, they are building
the model piece-by-piece, making use of perceptual relations between the assembled
figure and the target as they become relevant.
2Two other types of phase are also defined in the corpus, but not considered here: one for the time
spent recovering from a break, and the other for the wrapping-up section at the end of a trial.
3Note that this is not the same as the proportion of overall looking time. A ‘look’ is defined here as
a series of fixations within a single region; the look ends when the eye fixates something outside that
region.




























Figure 7.7: Proportion of looks to specific screen regions during a join (‘dock’),
and during the temporal phase preceding a join, which is split into two halves (a
‘planning’ phase and ‘process’ phase), in a) JCTE1, b) JCTE2, and c) JCTE3
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This looking behaviour is worth noting here because it brings into doubt an as-
sumption that has been mentioned previously: that performing a task collaboratively
requires the sharing of mental content, or the building up of ‘common knowledge’.
Subjects in the JCT, just as in the individual tasks, appear to be using structure in the
environment as a set of resources that are reliably present throughout the task. The
environment is performing at least some of the work that might otherwise be attributed
to a posited store of shared content.
And we can make the following prediction: perturbing visual access to this struc-
ture, say by making the target figure visible only at the start of a trial, should reduce
the dyad’s performance on various measures, including accuracy. Of course, this is not
a very interesting prediction. A traditional cognitivist could make the same prediction,
appealing to working memory capacity instead of perturbed dynamics. A more inter-
esting prediction, then, is that we’d also see a perturbation effect if visual access to the
target figure were denied only at a strategically important moment—in the ‘docking’
phase. One way to implement this would be to mask the target figure whenever both
subjects have moused-down on (two different) component parts. This set-up would
prevent them from consulting the target figure—and, more specifically, the relations
between the target figure and the component pieces—at precisely the moment when
this information appears to be needed. We can predict that this will affect performance,
and that there will be some cost in adjusting to it (in terms of temporarily increased
trial durations, more mouse actions, and so on).
7.6 Some open questions
Clearly, the JCT data set is quite rich and it could potentially be explored in a large vari-
ety of ways. It would not do, however, to lose sight of the fact that the shape-assembly
task here is an artificial one and one that is therefore not inherently informative about
real-world behaviour. To address the data only in terms of questions that are internal
to an understanding of this particular task would be to treat the data set as a tool for
generating research for its own sake. It will perhaps be more productive to use the data
as a means of generating further questions to explore, outside of this data set itself. I
will here briefly discuss two such questions.
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The first question that arises concerns the potential uses of the gaze cursor. It was
suggested above that the kind of event structure that is produced by this cursor is struc-
ture that subjects are likely to find difficult to use, at least within a single experimental
session in which they have other activities to complete. But can a gaze cursor ever
be a useful source of information? The answer to that is that, yes, it can be. A study
by Brennan et al. (2008) presented pairs of subjects with a quite different activity to
complete. Here, the task was to find a letter ‘O’ hidden in a screen filled with ‘Q’s.
Again, two subjects were hooked up to eye-tracking devices, and each subject’s gaze
cursor was projected on their partner’s screen. In contrast to the JCT, however, the
pair were here seated in different rooms. In some trials they were also not allowed to
speak to one another, and the gaze cursor was therefore the only available source of
information about what the other person was doing. The finding from Brennan et al.’s
study was that not only was gaze information useful, but interpersonal coordination
was in fact most efficient in the gaze-only condition (with no speaking). Of course,
the coordination task was quite simple: the easiest way to divide the labour in the vi-
sual search is for each subject to focus their own search behaviour on the side of the
screen where their partner is not looking. And here is the important difference between
gaze information in the visual search task and in the JCT. In the visual search task, the
gaze cursor is inherently meaningful in the task context, because the task itself is about
searching a visual space. By contrast, in the JCT, looking behaviour is at best only
indirectly meaningful. In the JCT, the real business is conducted in the currency of
shape movements, rotations, and mouse clicks. The open question is this: could a gaze
cursor be useful as a tool in coordinating behaviour in more complex activities than the
one devised by Brennan et al., or is it only good for coordinating behaviour in visual
search tasks? And in either case, what applications might this gaze-cursor have outside
the laboratory?
The second question concerns the relationship between perturbation and learning:
does perturbation merely impede learning, or can it drive learning in a useful way?
It has often been observed that interaction appears to enable the emergence of ‘ab-
stract’ solutions to specific problems. For example, dyads outperform individuals in
finding efficient mathematical solutions to practical problems, such as how to multiply
fractions (Shirouzu et al., 2002; Schwartz, 1995). And a finding from a number of
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referential communication games is that ‘abstract’ referring systems emerge reliably
in the course of the interaction. In the maze task, in which one subject describes a
route to another (Garrod and Anderson, 1987), dyads start off by describing salient
features of their mazes, and move on to referring to individual boxes in the maze using
a coordinate scheme (‘a, 1’). One suggestion is that such abstraction results from mis-
understandings that occur during an interaction (Healey, 2008). A problem with this is
that it is not clear that either of these words—‘abstraction’ and ‘misunderstanding’—
has any kind of precise meaning. If these words are not being used precisely, then
they cannot be doing any explanatory work; they are merely being used to describe a
phenomenon of interest.
The relational field model can potentially provide a more precise set of terms here.
The things we are inclined to label as ‘abstract’ simply involve attending to and exploit-
ing higher-order relational structure. And conversely, anything that we are inclined to
think of as ‘non-abstract’ (i.e., ‘figurative’ or ‘iconic’) involves attending to only more
basic relational structure: to objects and to first-order relations between objects, but
not more. Misunderstandings, meanwhile, need not be things that individuals actively
attempt to detect (as suggested by Healey, 2008). Instead, minsunderstandings arise as
barriers to the carrying out of a particular, local action that an individual is attempting.
A misunderstanding acts as a kind of perturbation of the actor as a system. It specifies,
to the actor, that the current action being attempted is not suitable for the purpose it
is intended for. In other words, it provides information to the actor that some sort of
behavioural adjustment is necessary.
There is a particular type of ‘abstraction’ that arises in the JCT, as we have seen:
removing the mouse cursor means that subjects have to compensate by attending to
higher-order relational structure that specifies a difference between the two screens.
One way that they can adjust is by wiggling shapes around on the screen. The wiggling
behaviour appears to emerge as a consequence of a particular type of perturbation, and
the suggestion has been that this learning to wiggle is a consequence of the introduction
of a particular type of difficulty.
If this is true, it is relevant to an idea from educational psychology which says that
learning is more effective in the long-term if ‘desirable difficulty’ is introduced into the
teaching materials (Bjork and Bjork, 2011): the materials are structured so as to require
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the learner to ‘actively’ seek meaning, rather than ‘passively’ observe it; for example,
by making the overall structure less clear. This phrase—‘desirable difficulty’—is an-
other that seems intuitively appealing but that lacks precision.4 And again, perhaps
this idea can be made more definite within the framework of the relational field model.
The basic idea is that learning is more effective, or at least more ‘abstract’, when it in-
volves perturbation followed by adjustment, and followed by attending to higher-order
structure. The question is: can this way of thinking provide a practical way to judge
which types of difficulty are desirable, and which are merely difficult?
7.7 Summary
From this brief examination of the JCT, we have seen that the relational field model,
enhanced with some ideas from dynamic systems theorizing, can serve as a tool for
analysing a human collaborative activity in a potentially novel way. Here, structure in
the environment is seen as part of an entire system which also encompasses the actor.
We have seen that behavioural perturbations occur when the environment changes. In
the JCT these environmental changes are inserted artificially, but elsewhere they may
arise more organically, as people learn to carry out a task. It appears that some of these
perturbations can lead to novel behavioural strategies (as in the adoption of wiggling
following removal of the mouse cursor).
A further finding comes from the eye-tracking data, which suggest that, in carrying
out the task, people make use of persisting structure in the environment; subjects look
at this structure exactly when it is needed. External structure is instrumental in carrying
out the task. This observation further erodes the mystery of ‘common knowledge’:
there is no need to appeal to shared mental content here, because what is shared is
what exists externally: structure in the environment that is readily available for either
subject to perceive. These ways of looking at the data reveal the importance of agent–
environment reciprocity, which, of course, is exactly what the relational field model is
designed to address.
4But note the similarity to Vygotsky’s (1978) notion of the zone of proximal development, as dis-





Lessons learned and prospects for
future research
I hope to have demonstrated in the course of the preceding chapters that it is possible
to study social phenomena on ecological realist principles. Actions carried out in a
populated environment—speaking, collaborating, competing—are conceived as vari-
eties of acting on a field of relations. This puts activities carried out with others on
the same footing as activities carried out by an individual acting alone. An individual
acting upon an inanimate object or exploring a space is also acting on the relational
field. In everything it does, the animal occupies a place in a complexly structured field
of relations, and all actions, social or otherwise, are actions on that field.
This conception of acting with others will prove valuable if 1) it can be further built
into a more complete theoretical approach while maintaining its coherence, and 2) it
can be usefully applied to the solving of practical problems. I will use the second half
of this final chapter to outline some promising directions in which I believe the model
can be developed. In terms of theory, I suggest that the relational field model offers a
useful framework for a general psychology of learning: learning is not conceived as
something that happens exclusively or primarily in childhood, but as a lifelong process
of change that occurs as an individual explores and negotiates the structure of its en-
vironment. In practical terms, meanwhile, the model may be able to generate a useful
set of tools that can be applied in various areas of design, such as the design of public
spaces.
145
Chapter 8. Lessons learned and prospects for future research 146
First, though, it will be worthwhile to try to bring together the main points that
have been raised in the discussion so far. I will not repeat the entire argument that has
been made. A brief summary has been provided at the end of the key chapters; I will
avoid recapitulating that material here. Instead I propose here a list of the lessons that
I have learned in writing the thesis—lessons that have been left implicit in the text, or
else have been mentioned in passing even though they constitute non-trivial ideas that
deserve to be scrutinized in their own right. This list is offered in the spirit of Jacob
Cohen’s (1990) observations on the use of statistics in psychology, which he delivered
in an address to the American Psychological Association under the title ‘Things I have
learned (so far)’.
8.1 Things I have learned about the psychology of
speaking and collaborating
Just because we give something a name, doesn’t mean it’s real.
Psychology as a discipline finds itself in a continuous struggle with its own terminol-
ogy. There are two major sources of troublesome terms. One is everyday speech, the
other is the set of metaphors that psychologists themselves have developed to describe
things. We will consider everyday speech first. The basic problem arises from the
fact that the set of technical concepts that psychologists have constructed overlaps to
a great extent with the set of words we use in everyday practice for describing the be-
haviour of others (Ryle, 1949). There is nothing inherently problematic about using
plain, everyday terms in a technical context. The problem is that some of the words
that are borrowed are unsuitable for the purposes that they are put to. In particular,
everyday speech makes frequent and casual use of nouns to characterize behavioural
phenomena—we speak of people as having ‘a good memory’, of engaging in ‘deep
thought’, of having a good command of ‘language’, and so on. But a noun in every-
day speech need not necessarily correspond to any particular component of the actual
machinery underlying the behaviour being described. Behaviouristically-inclined psy-
chologists in the first half of twentieth century recognized this fact, and scrupulously
avoided nouns in favour of verbs. Verbs function to delineate a phenomenon of inter-
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est, but without implying a particular way in which the underlying machinery must be
arranged. Thus, instead of describing people as possessing a ‘memory’, it is said that
we engage in a process of ‘remembering’; instead of containing ‘thoughts’, people are
said to engage in ‘thinking’ (Bartlett, 1932, 1958). This remains a useful technique for
guarding against the reification of constructs.
Some nouns to be suspicious of in the context of interpersonal behaviour include:
‘group’, ‘common knowledge’, ‘common ground’, ‘collective intention’, ‘belief’ (and
‘false belief’), ‘role’, and the various synonyms for ‘contagion’ (see the glossary for
references to discussion in earlier parts of the text).
The second source of potentially misleading names is the set of metaphors that are
used to make sense of psychological findings. A common approach in psychology has
been to take the individual animal as the unit of analysis, and to model that animal by
analogy with some particular piece of technology; often the most advanced piece of
technology that psychologists feel they are familiar with—telephone exchanges, digital
computers, statistical software packages, and so on (Gigerenzer, 1991; Barrett, 2011).
The names of the parts that make up the particular technological artifact in question can
then simply be borrowed and used as names for the hypothetical parts of the animal’s
psychological machinery. Everybody knows that these names-for-parts are to be used
strictly metaphorically. Still, a theory that is built around a metaphor inevitably comes
to be shaped by that metaphor in important ways. An example is the idea that the
mind is a slate (blank or otherwise), i.e. that the mind is a device for storing symbols.
In chapter 1 it was suggested that the slate metaphor encourages a conceptualization
of learning as passive accretion, and distracts attention from the dynamic nature of
learning as a thing that an animal does. Learning might instead be characterized as
change through active exploration. The doctrine of the new ball was proposed as an
alternative metaphor—one that encourages a view of learning as change. It is important
that we choose our metaphors carefully, and that we occasionally pause to examine
those already in widespread use: we must be wary of the influence of borrowed names.
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The fact that we don’t have a name for something does not mean it is fic-
tional.
The ecological realist approach does not seek to model the individual per se, but seeks
instead to explain the workings of a broader animal-environment system. The machin-
ery of this system requires its own set of names: energy arrays, invariant structure,
surfaces, transformations, and so on. It has been argued that the animal-environment
system consists of a set of physical entities held together by a complex network of
relations. A difficulty is that relations are not things that we typically give names to
(at least not in the English language, which is the language employed in nearly all aca-
demic discourse). We describe one object as being bigger than another, but we do not
talk of an object having ‘bigness’ over anything. There are words that could be thought
of as names for relations: ‘congruity’, ‘mismatch’, ‘discrepancy’, ‘equality’, ‘ambigu-
ity’, ‘disdain’. But we tend to think of these as ‘abstract concepts’—as things that are
not really out there in the world, but are merely a way of describing and comparing
things we have perceived: they are thought of as ways of comparing mental objects
or percepts. The word ‘affordance’ is a name for a type of relation; it is a name that
had to be invented (Gibson, 1966, 1979).1 Relational thinking is hard to sustain simply
because our natural language does not recognize the existence of relations as perceiv-
able entities. The present thesis has been concerned with applying ecological realist
principles to an understanding of interpersonal phenomena such as speaking and col-
laborating. The claim is that in order to make this project work it must be recognized
that relations are real—that they are a part of the world that is perceived and acted upon
and not merely a property of a mental description of that world. Relations constitute a
crucial part of the explanatory machinery of an ecological approach to social activity.
This is true whether or not it accords with our everyday descriptions. Clearly, it will
be necessary to invent some novel technical terminology: ‘relational fields’, ‘relational
webs’, ‘calibration’. This terminology will have to be developed carefully, and with
due attention given to the fact that simply giving a name to a phenomenon is not the
same as explaining that phenomenon (Dunnette, 1966).2
1Again, it is by no means universally agreed-upon that ‘affordance’ does label a relation (Chemero,
2009); I assume for present purposes that it does.
2It is also not the case that new terms can straightforwardly be invented from whole cloth, or imported
from other fields. If we are to make sense of them, the terms we use must be rooted somehow in existing
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Don’t be afraid to treat people like animals.
In the course of the thesis, I have attempted to draw on a broad range of examples of
collective activity. In particular I have been careful to consider activities carried out
by groups of non-human animals: pack-hunting in chimpanzees and wolves, and the
alarm calling behaviour of vervet monkeys and other species. These are fascinating
phenomena in their own right. They also serve as demonstrations that collective activ-
ity need not necessarily depend on the workings of complex linguistic apparatus in the
head. We are not inclined to attribute elaborate propositional mental states to animals.
This is a healthy attitude: it encourages us to search for causal structure in the animal’s
environment, and discourages us from jumping to the conclusion that the important
business of coordinating action must be occurring in a not-directly-observable inner
world (for further examples of collective activity in ants and robots, see Barrett, 2011).
The same methodological approach can profitably be applied to human collective ac-
tivity.
Certainly, any approach to collaborative activity that cannot accommodate the col-
lective behaviours of animals is an approach that is limited in an important way. Such
an approach has probably over-intellectualized its answer to the question of what it is
to collaborate. It appears to be commonly assumed that in order to engage in some ac-
tivity with others, the individual must be in possession of some internal propositional
statement which represents to the individual the fact that this is indeed a collaborative
situation. It should be stressed that to question that collaborating always involves ma-
nipulating such internal content is not to deny that language ever has a role to play.
Clearly a great many of the collective activities engaged in by humans involve the use
of verbal actions. But it’s easy to over-emphasize the role of language in coordinating
the activity as a whole. One way to guard against this is to develop an approach that
deals equally with animal and human collective activities. The present approach says
that collective activities are activities carried out in a relational field. Verbal actions,
like physical actions, are simply actions on that field. Viewing speaking in this way has
the further advantage of eliminating language-environment dualism—the implicit as-
usage, in psychology or in everyday speech. Cutting (1982) states an evocative case against careless
borrowings: ‘borrowed terms are deracinated; they are cut off from the roots of their own disciplinary
matrix. At worst they shrivel and die; at best they grow to be something different than they were.’
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sumption that language is a special kind of substance that interacts with the substance
of the environment but is not itself part of that environment (more on which below).
Don’t confuse your own perspective with that of your subject matter.
I have already mentioned the problem of the psychologist’s fallacy. This occurs when
investigators mistake their own third-party description of some phenomenon for a de-
scription of the causal machinery underlying that same phenomenon. This problem
is not unique to psychologists; a similar fallacy can be committed by investigators in
any of the sciences concerned with animate beings. Call this the fallacy of the ana-
lyst’s perspective. Thus, vervet monkeys are said to ‘make excellent primatologists’,
on the grounds that they behave as if they recognize the social dominance hierarchy of
their group, and as if they recognize others as out-group members, and so on (Cheney
and Seyfarth, 1985b). But monkeys were engaging in these behaviours long before
any primatologist came along and described them. If anything, primatologists should
instead be concerned with whether or not they themselves are doing a good a job of
being monkeys.
In developmental psychology, it sometimes appears to be standard practice to con-
flate the researcher’s perspective and the subject matter: the metaphor of the child
as scientist is often taken as a basic working assumption (for criticism, see Kuhn,
1989, 1992; Donaldson, 1978). Children are said to be ‘intuitive scientists’—Kuhnian
problem-solvers rather than Popperian falsificationists (Karmiloff-Smith, 1988). What
this metaphor presupposes is that the world is imperfectly perceived and that the child
is engaged in a project of trying to learn about how things work: the child is trying to
build up an internal model of the world. But there is an alternative view, which I have
adopted, and which I alluded to above with the doctrine of the new ball. The alterna-
tive view says that children simply engage in activities, and by doing so they change
themselves. The change happens gradually as a consequence of the child’s practice and
experience of acting and attempting to act (Thelen and Smith, 1994).
There are versions of the psychologist’s fallacy that are specific to the study of
collaborative phenomena. Commonly, the analyst attempts to explain what is going on
at the dyad or group level. From the analyst’s perspective it appears quite reasonable
to describe the group as engaging in a joint activity, or as possessing common ground,
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or as exhibiting desires or beliefs. But these labels refer to properties of the group as
an entity that has been artificially delineated from its surroundings by a third party.
There is no reason to assume that these labels correspond to any part of the causal
machinery itself. The fallacy of the analyst’s perspective, operating in research at the
group level, has created some deep confusions: that there is such a thing as a genuine
joint activity (which exists as a natural kind); that the group should be seen as a kind
of agent (Allport, 1924); or that acting with others involves a special kind of ‘shared
intentionality’. The relational field model avoids these perspectival confusions. On this
model, what the subject sees is what the analyst sees: a richly structured environment
filled with relational structure. The problem, for the analyst, is to identify the particular
components of this structure that are instrumental in the carrying out of some task
under investigation.
Point your regresses outwards.
A major aim of the present thesis has been to outline an account of the psychological
machinery that must be necessary to explain the fact that people are able to engage in
collaborative activities. It is customary, when proposing such an account, to worry that
the set of assumptions being put forth might in fact entail some sort of infinite regress
that, after all, makes the entire proposal unworkable. Indeed, for a representational
account, this is a real possibility. Suppose that I engage you in some collaborative
activity: How do I know that you know what actions to carry out? And how do I know
that you know that I know what I am doing? And so on, ad infinitum. The problem
here is that an infinite set of such calculations presumably cannot be carried out by a
single, finite brain. The regress is pointing inwards, and an inwards-facing regress is a
runaway process. By contrast, the non-representational account put forward in the re-
lational field model does not face this problem. Collaborative activity is coordinated, it
is proposed, via relational structure that exists in a shared environment. This relational
structure may itself be infinitely complex: there can be relations between two objects,
relations between an object and and a relation, between a relation and another relation,
and so on. But this outward-facing regress places no inherent burden on the internal
workings of a given animal. An outward-facing regress is instead a feature of the world
that an animal can exploit. It is an example of the kind of convexity that is character-
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istic of natural systems, and that makes such systems ‘antifragile’ (Taleb, 2012). A
self-contained computer system is fragile in that it is liable to crash whenever it is set
to work on an infinitely recurring calculation. Collaborative activity is the opposite: it
is a way of exploiting the infinite ‘processing capacity’ of the relational structure of the
world. Human language is also a tool that functions to act on this structure. Language
appears to be a tool uniquely suited for exploiting an infinitely structured world that is
filled with relations.
Make assumptions; but try to be aware of them.
Research on dialogue that is carried out in the tradition of communication theory main-
tains a strict language-environment dualism. As we have seen, this encourages re-
searchers to focus their attention upon a certain kind of communicative phenomenon,
such as communication games that can be carried out over a telephone line. The re-
lational field model seeks to avoid this dualism, and as a consequence it must reject
the metaphor of speaking as information-exchange or information-sharing. In reject-
ing this metaphor, however, the field model necessarily adopts new assumptions of its
own: speaking is acting on relations; speakers and addressees must actively calibrate
their relational webs to fit the present circumstances; and so on. Having a set of as-
sumptions is no bad thing. On the contrary; without making assumptions at some level
it would be impossible to make any kind of empirical claim about anything at all. An
aim of the present thesis (as mentioned in the preface) has been to demonstrate that it
is important to make explicit the assumptions that we do make. This is necessary if we
wish to be able to properly evaluate the claims being made.
What we cannot claim is that one set of assumptions is necessarily better than
another—that the relational field metaphor is inherently better than the information-
sharing metaphor, say. There is no way to determine, a priori, which of these metathe-
ories is most likely to lead to empirical success, or to practical outcomes. This fact
alone is a persuasive reason to accept methodological pluralism (Chemero, 2009). An-
other reason to favour pluralism is that maintaining multiple metatheories can make
any given theory stronger: partisans of a given theory must engage with competing
programmes, and must work to accommodate those programmes’ findings. This last
idea has been called the method of multiple working hypotheses (Platt, 1964). It is a
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principle that appears to be seldom adopted by psychologists (Reed, 1996a).
Don’t try to answer all the questions at once.
A good metatheory is one that generates research findings that build cumulatively, each
finding allowing researchers to ask further questions, or to better make sense of what
has already been established. However, in the study of dialogue and interpersonal ac-
tivity, it has been common for effort to be directed at the project of building grand
theories that try to explain everything at once. These theories seek to posit a handful
of basic principles that can explain all possible facts about acting with others: collab-
orating is said to be at heart a form of mind-reading, or it is said to rely fundamentally
on processes of interpersonal contagion, or whatever. The temptation, then, is to argue
about which of these grand theories gets closest to the truth. Consequently, research
effort is directed at attempts to construct some laboratory-based activity whose results
will neatly adjudicate between the competing grand theories (notice that this project
is in stark contrast to the spirit of the method of multiple working hypotheses). The
concept of the task, as defined in chapter 4, is a response to this urge. The task is a
methodological device that directs research attention towards specific, well-delineated
problems, and away from intertheoretical disagreement. The ecological approach in
psychology has proved successful precisely because it has taken well-defined tasks
as its unit of study. The concept of the task enables a genuinely cumulative research
programme. Another of the main arguments of the present thesis has been that this
concept of the task-as-unit-of-analysis can usefully be applied to the study of activi-
ties involving multiple individuals—speaking, collaborating, competing; in short, all
of the activities engaged in by animals who find themselves living in an environment
populated by other actors. The concept of the task motivates a practical empirical pro-
gramme. The previous two chapters have attempted to establish that the relational field
model is of potential use for guiding research to be carried out within this programme.
In the section below I will briefly outline some specific research areas where I believe
the field model can be applied in a productive manner.
Chapter 8. Lessons learned and prospects for future research 154
8.2 Prospects for future research
In the present thesis the relational field model has been developed specifically as a way
of describing social phenomena while avoiding some untenable dualisms: between
language and the environment, and between the environment and other actors. How-
ever, a major reason to adopt the relational field model may be that it provides a way of
unifying the study of psychological activities that have come to be treated as separate
phenomena: developmental, social, clinical, organizational, cognitive.
Of course, there is a reason why the different parts of psychology have come to
be treated as separate, specialized subfields. The reason is that the individual was
taken as the unit of analysis, and it was recognized that to study the entire individual
all at once was too difficult a project. Research specialization arose, no doubt, as a
natural consequence of different researchers pursuing seemingly different goals, and
gradually losing contact with one another as their own subfields expanded to occupy
the majority of their time and resources. A formal justification for this state of affairs
was the suggestion that the mind is divided into modules, and that those modules can
be studied in relative isolation from one another (Fodor, 1983). The modular view of
the mind justifies a modular approach to research, and in turn it necessitates such a
divided approach.
The modular view of the mind does not, however, appear to provide a suitable
foundation for the study of collaborative activities. A collaborative activity does not
occur in the brain, or at least, it does not occur in any single brain, but is distributed be-
tween multiple individuals and across space and time. Collaborative activity demands
a broader conception of the subject matter of psychology: what is to be studied is the
set of events that occur in an animal-environment ecosystem.
The ecosystems view of acting has proven useful for studying fairly simple perception-
action phenomena in individuals (Warren, 2006; Wilson and Golonka, 2013). The re-
lational field model encompasses these activities of individuals and expands the range
of enquiry to include social activities as well. I have restricted myself to discussing ac-
tivities carried out by small groups of mostly co-present actors. But there is no reason
in principle why this ecosystems perspective cannot also be applied to phenomena that
are the traditional concern of sociologists and economists. In economics, as in psychol-
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ogy, standard practice privileges the individual as the unit of analysis. The assumption
is that individuals are rational maximizers of their own utility—that is, it is assumed
that people are driven by a desire to accumulate personal wealth. In reaction to this,
a number of economists have advocated precisely an ecosystems view of economic
activity. This is motivated by the conviction that the standard individualistic view has
proven destructive at the level of the wider environment (Costanza, 1989; Arrow et al.,
1995). The relational field model provides a plausible psychological foundation for
an economics concerned less with individual accumulation and more with maintaining
the broader environmental system of which the individual is a part. On the individu-
alistic view, a given transaction is understood in terms of personal costs and benefits
for the parties immediately involved. Environmental consequences are referred to as
‘externalities’ (which appears, in effect, to mean ‘somebody else’s problem’). On the
ecosystems view, the environmental costs cannot simply be ignored, but have to be
recognized as an inevitable part of a specific way of going about business. Transac-
tions do not occur in some realm separate from the environment, but take place in the
environment. Harmful, polluting effects are therefore things that an economic agent
chooses to inflict on the environment in choosing to carry out a particular transaction,
and are to be recognized as such: ‘externalities’ are things that economic agents are to
be taxed and held accountable for.
I mention the above to illustrate that the relational field model is flexible and can
provide a coherent framework for studying a range of phenomena that are typically
studied in isolation from one another, and are compartmentalized into different re-
search fields: psychology, economics, human geography. I will here focus on one par-
ticular question that is internal to psychology: if the relational field model is adopted,
what implications does that have for the status of the psychology of learning?
8.2.1 Learning
Learning has a curious status in modern psychology. It is given a high degree of promi-
nence and is the subject of a substantial amount of research. Yet it remains somehow
separate from the kind of experimental psychology that typically studies adults. A
clear expression of this arises in Cheney and Seyfarth’s (1990) comment that children
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(and vervet monkeys) are to be studied as ‘almost minds’. Learning is thus seen as
something that children have to do in order to become fully-fledged actors. But it is
not considered an important part of the activity of adults carrying out routine tasks.3
One area where adult learning is taken into consideration is in the study of the ac-
quisition of expert performance. The particular skills that are traditionally studied here
are chess, sporting activities, and playing a musical instrument (Ericsson and Charness,
1994; Ericsson et al., 1993). That these are the activities that are studied perhaps gives
the impression that adult learning is a luxury that adults can engage in if they hap-
pen to have some spare time on their hands. But the study of the acquisition of adult
expertise appears to be based on an important assumption which is also made in the
study of child learning. In both of these areas, there is an implication that learning is
something that has to happen first, and only after this learning has been completed can
performance proper begin. Thus, Ericsson et al. (1993) set out to explain expert per-
formance ‘as the end result of individuals’ prolonged efforts to improve performance
while negotiating motivational and external constraints.’
In ecological psychology, too, learning is typically studied separately from the ba-
sic study of perception-action tasks. There is a historical reason for this. In the early
1960s James and Eleanor Gibson decided to split their research activities, respectively
into the study of the senses and the study of perceptual learning (Gibson, 1966, p.
viii). This appears to have worked quite successfully: James Gibson’s account of the
structure that exists in the environment to be perceived fed in to his wife’s work on
how infants learn to discriminate that structure (Gibson and Pick, 2000). However,
in the cases of acting collaboratively and speaking, this split is less sustainable. Ac-
tions that are carried out with others are not simply out there in the environment to
be perceived and explored, like staircases and puddles are. Rather, collaborative ac-
tions are created in the very act of exploration. On the account of language learning
outlined in chapter 3, learning to speak relies on the child’s attempting to speak. If
this is correct, then to understand what speaking is, it is not sufficient to characterize
the ‘input’ (the ambient verbal activity that a child is exposed to); it must be recog-
nized that the child is partly responsible for creating that input. The special character
3Actually, in many laboratory studies carried out with adult subjects, learning is taken into consider-
ation, but it is considered as a confound to be controlled for: a ‘learning effect’.
Chapter 8. Lessons learned and prospects for future research 157
of learning to collaborate with others is that the objects one learns to collaborate with
are themselves animate perceiver-actors who themselves learn—that is, other people
re-calibrate their own personal relational web in response to actions carried out by the
child. A populated environment is an environment that acts back.
On the account that has been outlined, learning is not something that happens be-
fore performance can begin. From the first-person perspective of a perceiver-actor,
there is of course no point-of-transition that is reached at which the learning phase ends
and the performance stage beings. Rather, learning is a lifelong process of change that
simply happens as the animal engages with its environment, and as it attempts repeat-
edly to manage that environment for its own needs. A similar conclusion was reached
by E. B. Holt, one of the original new realists. Holt further argued that a person’s
ethical conduct towards others emerges as a consequence of the individual’s ongoing
engagement with the facts presented by the populated environment, and of their evolv-
ing capacity to discriminate those facts (1915, p.197): ‘This matter of the unthwarted
lifelong progress of behavior integration [learning] is of profound importance, for it
is the transition from behavior to conduct, and to moral conduct.’ On present terms,
the learning that occurs across childhood or over extended periods of practice at some
activity is simply the same thing as an individual’s calibrating to its immediate sur-
roundings. The difference is just that these are observed at different scales. Learning
is calibration observed over a longer sample of time.
And if learning in general is lifelong, it will be necessary to think of language-
learning, in particular, as something that never stops, during the lifespan of an indi-
vidual. Chapter 5, which discussed the structure of referential communication games,
concluded that speaking in interaction is a constant process of calibrating one’s re-
lational web to local circumstances. Chapter 7 used an analysis of behaviour in the
JCT to make the case that learning to speak in a particular, novel way is a natural
part of learning to engage in a novel activity. If we view this kind of calibration to
local circumstances as a kind of language learning, then it is not the case that there’s
any kind of essential separation between the behaviour of children and adults—with
children learning a language and adults merely using a language that has already been
acquired. Instead, there is a continuous process of developmental change. This process
of change does, however, make adult behaviour more flexible than child behaviour: the
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adult is able to attend to more complex forms of relational structure as a result of past
experience. As a result, the calibration process becomes increasingly efficient as the
individual develops. It is, however, not the case that because adult learning is efficient
it can be taken for granted. Chapter 7 aimed to show that when a learning perspective
is applied at the level of a single experimental session, in which a game is carried out
by adults, it is possible to see learning taking place as the session unfolds. This kind of
analysis allows us to investigate how the construction of an environment interacts with
the dispositions of actors and allows us to identify the specific environmental resources
that are instrumental in actors’ ability to complete the tasks they wish to complete.
Even if we accept that language learning never stops, however, we can still maintain
a particular interest in how children learn to speak at the earliest stages. If we adopt the
relational field perspective on infant language learning, a number of questions follow.
Is it the case, as was suggested in chapter 3, that children have to learn that they can
produce the same sound in the presence of different adults and it will have the same
meaning? If so, how is this achieved? And how do children in bilingual settings learn
to differentiate their verbal actions into two types? Is the account outlined chapter 3 a
useful one? And is it possible to intervene in the child’s learning of relational structure?
Is there some manipulation that can be performed to encourage children to explore,
say, second-order relations, at an earlier stage than is typical?4 To fully address these
questions it will be necessary to develop novel experimental techniques. But of course
there already exists a great deal of published data about children’s language learning,
and there are many corpora of children’s early vocal productions. Some of this data
will be relevant to these questions. Is there, for instance, corpus evidence that young
infants produce specific sounds only in the presence of specific caregivers? There is
much to investigate here.
4A neat intervention paradigm has been used to investigate how infants learn to interact with objects;
that is, with first-order relations. In these studies, a pair of ‘sticky mittens’ is placed on the infant’s hands.
These mittens have velcro attached, which allows the infant to pick up and interact with block objects
that have also been covered in velcro. The child can learn to pick up objects simply by swiping their
arms around. The infants in the study are three months olds; at this age, they have not yet learned to grip
things precisely. The crucial finding is that, when the mittens are subsequently removed, the infants who
have had experience with the mittens spend more time exploring and manipulating objects relative to
a control group who have not experienced the mittens: experience with the mittens appears to advance
the infant’s ‘knowing’ of objects (Needham et al., 2002). This study is itself evidence that infants learn
about object affordances, or first-order relations, through active exploration of the environment.
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8.2.2 Design
An area where the relational field model might be put to more immediate practical use
is in the design of objects and places. It may be possible to generate a useful set of
conceptual tools by thinking of design in terms of relations between objects and users
of those objects.
Donald Norman, in his book The Psychology of Everyday Things (1988), talks of a
design principle which he calls ‘natural mapping’. This refers to a relationship between
a piece of technology and the set of controls for operating it: gas knobs on a stove are
easier to use if they are layed out in the same configuration as the burners that they
control, rather than arranged in a straight line (see Fig. 8.1); similarly, light switches
are easier to use if the layout of the switches corresponds to the layout of the actual light
fittings in the room. Norman suggests that this design principle works because in using
natural mapping, designers are ‘taking advantage of physical analogies and cultural
standards’ (p. 23). It is unclear exactly what Norman wants to suggest about the
nature of this analogy: is a ‘physical analogy’ a directly perceivable relation between
two things in the world, or is it a relation between the mental representations of those
two things? Norman may have intended the latter, but the description is consistent
with the former, and is therefore amenable to an explanation in terms of the relational
field model. On the field model, there exists a set of perceivable relations between
the controls and the thing being controlled. Gas knobs that are laid out in the same
configuration as the burners are related to those burners by a geometric transformation
(an affine transformation). It is unsurprising that this makes the meaning of the controls
easy to apprehend: such transformations are the kind of thing that our visual system
deals with all the time, as we walk around objects (Michaels and Carello, 1981). The
straight line of knobs, by contrast, is an impoverished layout because it destroys (or
fails to make visible) the structure that specifies how the controls are transformed to fit
the burners.
Another of Norman’s design principles instructs designers to ‘make things visible’.
This can now be refined into a more specific directive: make relations visible. Partic-
ularly, make visible the relations that are relevant to a perceiver-actor seeking to get
something done. And this applies not only to designing objects like light switches,
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(a) (b)
Figure 8.1: If gas knobs are arranged in a line as in (a), it is not clear which
knob operates which burner; in (b), the layout of the knobs is related to the
layout of the burners through a simple geometric transformation—the relations
are made visible through the use of ‘natural mapping’ (images from Wikimedia
Commons)
but also to designing spaces where multiple individuals interact, such as public spaces
in cities. Relational design principles would emphasize how individuals can be given
perceptual access to the structure that they need to guide their movement around a built
environment.
One potential domain of application is in urban design. Consider one school of
thought that has arisen among urban designers: the ‘shared space’ approach (Hamilton-
Baillie, 2008). This says that traffic signs and pavement clutter are generally to be dis-
couraged on the grounds that they prevent informative direct interaction between road
users. Among the things to be avoided are pedestrian crossings that display red and
green ‘walk’ signals. A pedestrian looking at a green ‘walk’ signal cannot simultane-
ously monitor the road itself for actual dangers. Like the gas knobs arranged in a line,
the green man signal is an impoverished structure. It distracts attention from the rich,
meaningful set of transformations that specify objects moving relative to the pedes-
trian (objects which, significantly, afford injury to the pedestrian) and directs attention
instead to a binary instruction: ‘go’/‘don’t go’. And the same applies to drivers: the
need to attend to signals apparently undermines the driver’s responsibility to monitor
the actual environment. Removing these signals forces direct interaction between road
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users, perhaps through eye-contact or other gestures.
This way of thinking about urban design has become popular in the United King-
dom in recent years. There are, however, some serious issues with many of resulting
road schemes (Moody and Melia, 2014). An obvious problem with shared space is
that it relies on visual perception and therefore potentially renders the space unusable
by blind people (Thomas, 2011). Blind people rely on a physical separation between
pedestrians and traffic for their safety, and they make use of kerb edges as a source
of proprioceptive information about where they are in space (they make use of haptic
structure in the same way that sighted people make use of visual structure that specifies
the pavement edge). Haptic exploration of the kerb edge is instrumental in how blind
people use the space. If the shared space design philosophy advocates the removal of
kerb edges (because kerbs are deemed to be ‘clutter’), it must replace this structure
with an alternative resource that is equally informative for blind users of the space.
This may not be an insurmountable problem for designers. A possible solution might
be to use drainage channels set into the ground in place of kerbs raised from the road
(Childs et al., 2010). These could serve to inform the blind pedestrians of where the
road edge is. However, some other innovation would still be necessary to allow blind
people to cross in the absence of light signals.
A fundamental objection to the concept of ‘shared space’ is that it makes no al-
lowance for the fact that different groups of road users are fundamentally unequal.
There is a hierarchy of menace among road users. A moving car or truck affords serious
injury to a cyclist or pedestrian, but the opposite is not true: a fast-moving pedestrian
affords no particular threat to the truck-driver’s safety. This inequality means that, for
road with high traffic volume, the space is never likely to be shared, and such schemes
are unlikely to encourage the uptake of cycling, as advocates of shared spaces claim
they will (Hamilton-Baillie, 2008).
Urban design is not normally described in terms of relations between actors and
environmental structure. The concept of shared space, indeed, is largely based on de-
signers’ intuitions about what works. What is lacking is a firm grounding in a coherent
psychology of perception.
The relational field model may be able to provide the necessary framework. Con-
sider again the task of crossing a road. Whether it is safe to cross a road becomes
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Figure 8.2: The black circles here represent pedestrians attempting to cross
the road. The difficulty of the perceptual decision task increases in proportion
to the time it is going to take for the pedestrian to cross the road. In (a), a
slow-moving pedestrian, for whom the crossing will take 15 seconds, must be
attentive to the possibility of vehicles approaching from 200 metres down the
road. In (b), a faster pedestrian crossing the same road, but able to do so in
one third of the time, need only be attentive to vehicles within a much narrower
cone.
increasingly harder to judge as the distance to be crossed increases (see Fig. 8.2). One
thing that makes things difficult is that it takes time to cross, and the pedestrian needs to
be able to see whether there are any cars moving on the road that are on a path such that
the pedestrian’s path and the car’s path will collide at some point. This judgement need
not involve internal calculation about future events. There is information that specifies
how much time the pedestrian has to cross in front of vehicles that are moving and
visible. The problem is that it will not necessarily be the case that all potentially haz-
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ardous vehicles are visible to the pedestrian from their starting point. A target vehicle
may be presently occluded behind other objects, because of traffic, or because the road
bends, say. The further the end point is from the start point, the more uncertainty there
is. This uncertainty will also be specified in the optic array: a pedestrian, in learning
to cross roads, must learn to attend to relations between points along the prospective
path and vehicles on a course to cross through those points. A straightforward prop-
erty of these relations is that vehicles travelling on the far side relative to the pedestrian
can travel from further away and intercept the pedestrian’s path, compared to vehicles
on the near side travelling at the same speed. In effect, there exists a cone of potential
hazards from the pedestrian’s point of view: there is information that specifies possible
dangers relative to the prospective path.
Some straightforward design principles follow. At any point in a road at which a
pedestrian may wish to cross, the distance to be crossed should be made short enough
such that the pedestrian’s cone of potential hazards extends only into visible space. The
cone should not encompass possible vehicles in locations that, from the starting point,
are occluded behind other permanent surfaces. In general, crossing distances should
be made as short as possible, through the use of traffic islands or central dividers.
These seem like common sense observations, and they are. The point is that the
ecological framework is able to specify this common sense with sufficient precision
such that it can be applied consistently in real situations. For instance, the cone of
potential hazards could quite easily be implemented in computer simulations to help
design actual road layouts. A computer simulation would make it possible to check,
for an arbitrary number of possible starting points along the length of the road, whether
sufficient information is available to the pedestrian to cross safely.
Road crossing is just one task that people engage in in a populated space. The
way that these spaces are designed impacts on the degree to which individuals are able
to carry out the tasks they wish to carry out. Thinking about these tasks in terms of
relations has the potential to provide clear and practical design insights.
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8.3 Exploring the field
The main aim of the thesis has been to develop a coherent programme for studying so-
cial phenomena—phenomena that involve coordination between multiple individuals—
on ecological realist principles. The relational field perspective offers a way of under-
standing these interactive phenomena while avoiding some of the standard pitfalls:
group minds, inward-facing regresses, solipsistic doubt about the intentions of others,
and the anthropomorphic tendency to assume that social animals must really be achiev-
ing their behaviour through the use of an internal language. But, as I have stressed
repeatedly, these theoretical claims will count for nothing if they cannot generate a
progressive programme of empirical research. Pursuing this programme will require
sustained and meticulous engagement with how animals make use of their environment
and of each other. I believe this field merits further exploration.
Appendix A
A taxonomy of approaches to the
analysis of collaborative activities
The purpose of this appendix is twofold. First, it places the radical empiricist ap-
proach to collaborative activities (as developed in the text) in contrast with existing
approaches, making explicit some of the key differences at the level of basic assump-
tions. Second, it identifies, very briefly, some of the major limitations and obstacles
faced by the existing approaches. The point here is not to dismiss those existing ap-
proaches out of hand, but merely to suggest that the existing approaches might come
up against problems that the radical empiricist approach is able to side-step. Of course,
to give a comprehensive treatment of all of the rival approaches would take up many
chapters. I have kept the discussion here very brief. I have found it necessary to place
this material here in an appendix in order to avoid the text itself from becoming overly
disputatious and preoccupied with small differences.
A.1 Overview
Collaborative activities pose a conceptual problem for psychologists. Standard psy-
chological methodology privileges the individual as the unit of analysis. But a collab-
orative activity is one that involves more than one individual. If psychologists wish to
talk about collaborative behaviour we need to have clear answers to two questions: 1)
where is shared structure located in the system: internal to individuals’ minds, or out in
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Where is shared structure located?
Internal













Figure A.1: A taxonomy of approaches to collaborative activity
the world, or both? and 2) should the group be considered an actor in its own right, or
should we stipulate that only individuals can act? Responses to these questions define
a taxonomy of five logically distinct approaches to the study of collaborative activi-
ties: standard cognitivism, group mind theories, distributed cognition, interpersonal
synergy or group actor theories, and radical empiricism. It is important to be aware of
the differences between these approaches if we are to avoid confusion when discussing
group behaviour.
Psychologists have long struggled with the question of how to understand the re-
lationship between the individual actor and the group. An individual person with an
individual brain can play chess, but how does an individual soccer team coordinate its
actions given that it possesses multiple brains and everyone is running around? It is
tempting to think that there are basically two extreme positions that one could take on
this, and that these constitute two ends of a continuum. Solomon Asch’s 1952 text-
book on Social Psychology makes exactly this argument; he contrasts two theses: ‘The
individualistic thesis ... begins with the assertion that individuals are the sole reality
and often ends with the denial of the reality of groups. ... In extreme opposition to the
preceding view is the group mind thesis. It begins with the observation that when men
live and act in groups there arise forces and phenomena that follow laws of their own
and which cannot be described in terms of the properties of individuals composing
them.’
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But this oversimplifies things. For one thing it leaves out any mention of the struc-
ture of the shared world in which group activities take place. In reality there is not
merely a single continuum. Fig. A.1 presents a more detailed map of the logical
space. Any attempt to incorporate collaboration into a psychological framework must
give an account of how the system made up of environment and collaborating actors
is assembled. And further, for collaborative activity to be possible, it is necessary that
some structure in this system, in the form of either mental representations or perceptual
sensitivity to physical structure, must be shared between actors. Two main questions
follow: 1) where is this shared structure located in the system: internal to individuals’
minds, or in the environment, or both? and 2) should the group be considered an actor
in its own right, or should we stipulate that only individuals can act?
The branches on the left hand side in Fig. A.1 correspond to the set of traditional
cognitivist approaches to collaborative activities (this is Asch’s continuum). These are
characterized by the assumption that actions are the products of minds, be it the mind
of an individual or of a group. On the right hand side are the non-representational
approaches, which conceive of actions as consequences of the dynamics of actor-
environment systems. The distributed cognition approach emerges here as a hybrid,
combining elements from both branches.
A.2 Internalist approaches
A.2.1 The group mind
What we might call the strong version of the group mind thesis would hold that groups
are conscious entities with their own subjective experience. Though this is logically
possible, one would be hard pressed to build a psychological research programme on
such an idea. The weaker version states merely that it may be useful, for analytical
purposes, to treat groups as if they possessed agency in their own right. Thus, Theiner
et al. (2010) propose that ‘specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to
individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups.’ As an example they cite
the unplanned formation of trails, or desire lines, over grass-covered areas within built
environments. These trails appear as the grass gets worn down by people taking the
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shortest path between buildings. The authors argue that this trail-formation cannot be
ascribed to any individual, since there is no one person that deliberately sets out to wear
down the grass. Are we then justified in ascribing the behaviour to the group? To say
that the group creates the trails is a perfectly valid description in everyday language,
but it has no clear explanatory value for psychologists’ purposes. It does not allow us
to predict the group’s future behaviour, for instance. This glide from description to
explanation was also diagnosed by Floyd Allport (1924) nearly a century ago. Allport
rejected the group mind thesis with some disdain: ‘The crowd mind theory is not only
false; it retards in a special manner the discovery of the truth. Pointing towards the
whole rather than the parts, it withdraws attention from the latter and incites thought
in precisely the wrong direction.’
A.2.2 Individualism
The individualist approach seeks to locate the explanation of collaborative activities
exclusively in the minds of the individual participants. This has been by far the most
common type of approach in the history of psychology as a modern discipline (for a
historical overview, see Tindale et al., 2001). Advocates of the individualist approach,
eschewing the idea that a group can have its own autonomy, are faced with the problem
of how people are able to act together at all, given that, according to the principles of
this approach, individual minds are private, sealed entities that have no direct access to
the contents of other minds, and have access to the world only indirectly, via impov-
erished sense data in the form of light beams striking a retina or sound waves tickling
an eardrum, and so on. How can a group of minds, given these conditions, ever so
coordinate their activities as to be able to act in concert?
There are ostensibly two types of solution that individualists propose as mecha-
nisms for coordinating between distinct minds: mind-reading and contagion. In real-
ity, however, there is less distance between the two positions than there appears to be
at first glance.
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Mind-reading
The first possible solution to the problem of other minds is to argue that individu-
als keep an internal record of what they believe others are thinking. This solution is
called mind-reading, or mentalizing, theory of mind, meta-representation, or other-
modelling. At present this is often taken as the standard mainstream explanation
against which all other approaches to social cognition should be measured (e.g., Over-
gaard and Michael, 2013). Given this privileged position, one might expect that the
mind-reading view must coalesce around some core agreed set of assumptions. In fact,
the opposite is the case. The one thing that is widely agreed upon is that there exist
two competing accounts of what mind-reading is: the theory theory and the simulation
theory (Gallese and Goldman, 1998).
According to the theory theory, we are able to act collaboratively because we have
explicit hypotheses about the contents of each other’s minds. Everyday understand-
ing of others’ behaviour is thus held to be achieved in much the same way that an
experimental psychologist goes about trying to understand the behaviour of a research
subject (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992). The competing simulation theory says that in-
stead of formulating explicit internal hypotheses, the mind builds an internal model
or simulation of the person being observed (Goldman, 1992). This account has the
attractive quality of making the understanding of others’ actions continuous with the
understanding of one’s own actions: if mind-reading is internally simulating someone
else’s behaviour, then understanding a given behaviour may perhaps recruit the same
internal machinery as is used when actually carrying out that behaviour. To understand
others is to put oneself in their place—to imagine, possibly subconsciously, carrying
out the observed action oneself.
Contagion
Mind-reading is presented as a mechanism by which mental content is shared. The
contagion theory makes the more eye-catching claim that it is not only mental content
that is transmitted, but behaviour as well, and that this happens without our awareness.
Thus, it is claimed that we are more likely to drive too fast if we’ve been watching
motor racing (Dijksterhuis and Bargh, 2001), that we unconsciously repeat each other’s
Appendix A. Approaches to the study of collaborative activities 170
words and syntactic constructions (Pickering and Garrod, 2004), and that obesity is
transmitted through social networks like a disease (Christakis and Fowler, 2007).
The notion of contagion here is ambiguous, however. It is necessary to distinguish
between two types of contagion theory: a naïve behaviour-tranmssion model, and a
more sophisticated content-transmission model. The behaviour transmission model
predicts that merely being exposed to a behaviour means that an individual will be-
gin copying that behaviour. The content-transmission model instead states that while
mere exposure may lead automatically to internal copying or covert simulation, the
outward behaviour of the perceiving individual is not determined by this simulation;
the stimulation instead acts as one influence on behaviour among others.
Do any of these authors genuinely believe in the first of these, the naïve behaviour-
transmission model? It turns out, when one reads them carefully, that the answer is no.
Any statements to the effect that perception directly determines behaviour is invariably
hedged elsewhere in the text, with the result that the proposal has to be read as a
content-transmission model after all.1 The content-transmission model is not clearly
distinct from the simulation theory of mind.
The naïve behaviour-transmission model does in theory make clear predictions
about individual behaviour. The content-transmission model makes only probabilis-
tic claims about populations. This is one limitation of the approach. It cannot reliably
predict behaviour in a specific individual: if a given individual fails to copy the overeat-
ing behaviour of his or her peers, we cannot tell whether that is evidence against the
contagion model itself, or merely evidence that this particular individual is not easily
susceptible to such influence.
1One example, from Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001): early on, the authors state that imitating others
‘flows directly from a fact of mental representation and organization—that perceptual and behavioral
representations for the same action overlap. [...] It is not necessary that the behavioral response be
stamped in as a habit through reinforcement and it is not necessary for the response to be intended
and strategic.’ But later on: ‘However, we also argued that these effects could sometimes be inhibited
or moderated. Without the possibility to moderate direct effects of perception on behavior, we would
indeed behave like the fish or frogs discussed earlier.’
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A.3 Distibuted cognition
Distributed cognition, under the scheme being put forward here, is a hybrid approach
which is internalist about some things and externalist about others. It inherits cogni-
tivist assumptions about the computational nature of mind, while acknowledging the
importance of the external structure that underlies the performance of tasks as we ac-
tually carry them out.
I will focus on one concept which is central to the distributed cognition approach
and which distinguishes it from the other perspectives under discussion. This is the
concept of external representations. The idea is that, in addition to representing the
world internally, in the form of mental symbols or internal representations, we also
represent the world externally, e.g. in the form of diagrams, maps, written instructions;
rather than storing all of this information internally, we store it in the environment and
consult it when necessary. The suggestion is that these external artifacts are ubiquitous
in the activities we routinely engage in.
This concept of external representations is a major strength of the distributed cogni-
tion perspective. It makes it possible for analysts to construct compelling descriptions
of team behaviour in activities such as ship navigation, which involves various maps
and instruments (Hutchins, 1995). One of the stated functions of external representa-
tions is that they can serve as ‘a sharable object of thought’ (Kirsh, 2010). Two people
looking at a map can refer to things on the map directly by pointing at them, pre-
sumably without having to take the other’s perspective into account in any deliberate
manner.
There is an ambiguity here: while ‘external representation’ is a useful label to give
to a map, it can be unclear what place the actual territory has within the scheme. Is
the territory a mere source of input for the representations—is it the thing that the
representations have to correspond to? Or might we consider the territory as a kind of
representation in its own right?
The latter is occasionally implied. Hutchins, in discussing Micronesian navigation
and comparing navigation by stars to navigation by sighting of the destination island,
says that seeing an island ‘give[s] the navigator a more direct representation of where
he is’ (p. 88), and that it provides a ‘constraint’ on where the boat might be relative
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to the island (p. 92). More explicitly, (Kirsh, 2010), talking about music, states that:
‘Prima facie, the best representation to make sense of musical structure is music itself’.
These passages seem to imply that objects can constitute representations of themselves:
seeing an island as such is not sufficient; rather, in order to make sense of it we have
to see the island as a representation of our current position relative to it. Stated like
this, the representational language appears to be quite redundant here: it is not doing
any work that can’t be attributed more straightforwardly to perceptual processes. A
potential way out of this confusion is to define the concept of external representations
in a more narrow way than has been implied. We might adopt the following definition:
an external representation cannot refer to just any piece of external structure, but only
to artificial structure that is brought into being in order to carry information about some
other piece of structure elsewhere.
A.4 Externalist approaches
Fully externalist perspectives reject the concept of mental content outright. Here, in-
terpersonal coordination is held to be achieved not through any kind of mental gym-
nastics but through perceptual processes and through the inherent dynamics of animal-
environment systems.
A.4.1 Interpersonal synergies
One type of externalist perspective places an emphasis on the group as an acting sys-
tem, a system that is said to be held together by dynamical coordination processes.
The group is described as an ‘interpersonal synergy’ (Riley et al., 2011). A synergy
is a concept derived from the study of motor control in the individual. An individual
organism is made up of a set of muscles and joints that provide the motor system with
a large set of degrees of freedom; this is said to give rise to a ‘degrees of freedom prob-
lem’: in order to control action in a given task, the organism must somehow reduce the
freedom inherent in its musculo-skeletal system by selecting a particular action (Bern-
stein, 1996; Latash, 1996). The standard example is that in wielding a hammer, an
individual must keep all of the arm muscles tense except for the one that is implicated
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in the necessary vertical motion: the degrees of freedom of the arm have to be reduced
to one. The one-degree-of-freedom system that is thus assembled is referred to as a
‘synergy’. The concept of an interpersonal synergy, then, is an attempt to extend this
description so that it can be applied to groups.
The idea here is that, in order for a set of organisms to behave as a group, they
must in fact be a group, in the sense that they must constitute a coherent, if temporary,
system, with boundaries that may be ‘fuzzy’ and difficult to identify, but that are nev-
ertheless real (Marsh et al., 2009). This interpersonal synergy perspective we might
equally refer to as the group actor perspective. Like the group mind approach, it says
that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, the parts in question being limited to
the individual actors, and the whole in this case being an acting system that emerges at
a level of organization above the individual. Silberstein and Chemero (2012) talk about
1/f noise as a measurable signature of a complexly assembled system. 1/f noise is a
feature of systems with interaction-dominant dynamics, which means that the overall
activity of the system is attributable more to the assembly of the system than to the
assembly of the component parts. It is argued that a multi-actor system can exhibit
interaction-dominant dynamics just as much as a single organism can.
This raises a specific research question: what are the mechanisms that unite in-
dividual actors together to create group actors, or to create group-level systems that
exhibit interaction-dominant dynamics? In pursuit of this question, researchers in this
tradition have focused on automatic entrainment phenomena, similar but at a lower
level to those discussed in the Contagion section above—things like spontaneous in-
terpersonal synchronization in the lighting patterns of fireflies and in crowds of people
clapping (Marsh et al., 2006).
A.4.2 Radical empiricism
Finally, we come to the radical empiricist perspective, which, like the group actor
perspective, is externalist about structure; unlike that perspective, though, it does not
postulate the existence of an emergent group-level actor as a causal factor in the car-
rying out of collaborative tasks. Instead, radical empiricism postulates the reality of
relations between external entities, and posits that these relations are accessible to the
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perceptual systems of individual organisms (Charles, 2011; Heft, 2014; Holt, 1915).
Relations are real, it says. And if this is true, then it may be possible that it is this
that underpins the ability of an individual organism to engage in tasks with others who
appear in its environment. If an individual is able to directly perceive that one of its fel-
lows intends to carry out some action (where an intention is understood to be a relation
that stands between the fellow organism and some other piece of external structure),
then this may be all that is needed for the individual to be able to jointly engage in
the task at hand. Notice that this obviates the need for the transmission of any internal
structure between the organisms, or for any elaborate mechanism whereby organism
A mentally ‘puts itself in the position of’ organism B (as the mind-reading approach
has it), or for the existence of any kind of emergent group mind or group actor with an
autonomy of its own, above and beyond that of its component parts.
The question that arises instead is over what exactly is the nature of these relations
that are said to be directly accessible to perceptual processes. This is a question that
does not admit of a simple answer. Rather, the question motivates an empirical project
in which the attempt to discover the mechanisms involved in specific activities simply
is the search for the relations underpinning those activities (see chapter 4). This project
requires a methodological commitment to seeking the necessary structure only in the
richly structure relational patterns, or ecological information, that connect an animal
to its environment, where the environment is understood in the ecological fashion,
relative to a given animal. It is also possible, within this framework, to address the
problem of learning: learning to perform a new activity is conceived as adaptive change
in the organism which by definition brings a change in what the environment affords
that animal. Learning is not conceived as the accumulation of mental content, but as
adaptive change in accordance with the doctrine of the new ball (chapter 1).
Appendix B
Glossary
Note: The definitions given here are necessarily blunt. It seemed appropriate, in giving
a set of brief definitions, to pre-suppose an ecological realist standpoint here, and not
labour over possible alternative definitions for a given term. Where applicable, a
reference is provided to the page or chapter in the main text where a given term is
introduced. I have also included here some terms not specifically discussed in the text
itself (e.g., ‘belief’), which are marked with an asterisk. These, of course, deserve more
thorough treatment in their own right. They are included here to give an indication of
what a more complete account of the ecological realist programme would look like,
above what it has been possible to deliver in the main body of the text.
affordance — an opportunity for action; specifically a relation that exists between an
experiencing organism and a piece of structure in the environment scaled such that the
organism is able to act upon it (chapter 1, p. 11, ff.)
alignment — see contagion (alignment is an awkward synonym that suffers from a
classic process–product ambiguity)
assessment/management approach — an approach to the study of animal communi-
cation which holds that the function of vocal and other kinds of signalling behaviour
is to ‘manage’ the activities of fellow animals, and that this management is possi-
ble because other animals are constantly ‘assessing’ their environment for threats and
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opportunities; this approach is an alternative to the sender-receiver model of commu-
nication (p. 51)
Baldwin effect — evolutionary adaptation within a species as a result of selection pres-
sure created by the species’ own niche construction activities; a standard example is
the spread of lactose tolerance within western human populations as an adaptation to
the invention of cow-milking technology (p. 20)
belief (*) — a label we give from the outside to describe dispositions of ourselves and
others; unlike an intention, a belief is inherently linguistic; it makes no sense to talk
about pre-linguistic infants’ or non-human animals’ understanding of beliefs, because
these individuals have no language in which to formulate beliefs (or represent beliefs
to themselves); a belief can be expressed in language in the form of a speech act that
sets its own truth conditions: to say X believes that Y is to say for example that under
conditions Z, X will anticipate event W (among other things, perhaps: Y may imply
multiple events)
blank slate — a much-derided metaphor for the infant mind; many cognitivists take
exception to the ‘blank’ part, and use this as a justification for some variety of na-
tivism; I suggest that the problem with this metaphor is not so much that it suggests
that the newborn mind is blank, but that it is a slate: a slate can only serve as a surface
for symbols; organisms are not slates with bodies attached, but acting, experiencing
systems that learn (p. 13); for an alternative, see doctrine of the new ball
brain-oriented psychology — an approach to psychology that tries to explain be-
haviour principally in terms of activity in the brain; in cognitivism, it is further posited
that the brain can be understood as being composed of modules (or perhaps partially
so composed); chapter 4 contrasts this approach with an ecological alternative, task-
oriented psychology
chimpanzee — a distant cousin of ours; unfairly maligned in the cognitive literature
for lacking a fully human-like theory of mind, or at least for not yet having evidenced
Appendix B. Glossary 177
having such a thing by passing a false belief test; in fact, it should be impossible for
any animal lacking language to pass such a test, because of the linguistic nature of be-
liefs (see above); chimps also engage in collaborative activities, such as pack-hunting
(p. 28)
collaborative activity — any activity that we want to understand that involves more
than one actor; it is not possible to define what does or does not count as a collaborative
activity in absolute terms; methodologically we can only take a commonsense actvity
that we are interested in and then analyse how that activity is carried out in terms of
what resources are involved and how they are assembled (it may turn out that after such
an analysis we do not want to call the activity collaborative after all, for example if it
turns out that only one actor is in fact instrumental in completing the task; or we may
decide, after further investigation, that where we thought there was a single activity we
actually want to distinguish more than one task); see chapter 2
collaborative learning (*) — the study of individual learning as a process facilitated
by activites carried out in a collaborative setting
collective intention — see shared intention
common ground — a label we give from outside to describe beliefs that can be as-
cribed simultaneously to multiple people, or intentions of two individuals towards the
same entity at the same time (see shared intention); said to be achieved through the
process of ‘grouding’ (p. 94, fn.)
common knowledge — a synonoym for common ground; this label, or description
of a state of affairs, is sometimes mistaken for the state of affairs itself, leading some
researchers to state that common knowledge is a necessary precondition for shared
intentions; I take these to be really just two labels with overlapping extension
communication (*) — a label we give from outside to describe a sequence of events
where an organism acts on the relational web of another, or where an organism cre-
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ates structure in the world for a second organism to act on; when structure is created
without the intention that it is for a second organism, we are not inclined to call this
communicative, but talk instead of stigmergy
contagion — in internalist approaches to collaboration, a mechanism by which mental
content is said to be copied from one mind to another, and which is held to be more or
less automatic in nature; proposed mechanisms of contagion include mirror neurons,
linguistic interactive alignment, and ‘emotional contagion’ (p. 169, ff.)
convention — a post hoc description of the fact that the verbal actions that we use ap-
pear to be used consistently, across time and by different speakers; it is often assumed
that convention is a pre-requisite for language use; a contention of chapter 3 is that the
primary phenomenon of speaking is action controlled with reference to relations, and
that the apparently conventional nature of speaking is really a consequence of the way
that the relational field is structured
convergence — see contagion
conversation (*) — canonically, a face-to-face activity in which two or more people
act on one another’s relational webs; a highly-skilled form of speaking
cultural evolution (*) — cumulative alterations to the structure of the human niche
(and perhaps that of other cultural animals), including inventions of artefacts, linguistic
structures, practices, and routines
demand characteristics — a set of affordances specific to the research laboratory; a
description of what an experimental task looks like from the subject’s point of view;
a given experiment lacks validity if it creates demand characteristics that are not neu-
tral, relative to the research hypothesis, but subtly channel behaviour either towards or
away from that which is ‘predicted’ by the research hypothesis; this is a problem for
research in the non-task-oriented tradition (see chapter 4; also Baggs, 2013).
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dialogue — a label we give from the outside to a series of verbal actions carried out
by speakers on one another’s relational web (chapter 3)
direct perception — pereption not mediated by mental pictures or other internal rep-
resentations; non-inferential perception (chapter 1)
distributed cognition — a cognitivist approach to describing tasks that alllows that
resources used in the completion of those tasks may be distributed across indivudual
minds as well as the environment, in the form of external representations (p. 171, ff.)
doctrine of the new ball — a metaphor which conceives of learning as a process of
change rather than a process of accretion; the analogy here is with a cricket ball whose
flight behaviour changes as it ages (p. 14); this is an alternative to the doctrine of the
blank slate
ecological optics — the system in virtue of which the layout of a structured envi-
ronment is transmitted to a perceiving organism (p. 8); this is also the basis of any
collaborative activity: participants to the activity share access to the same structured
environment
ecological validity — a term mistakenly used to refer to either external validity, or
representative design (p. 83, fn.)
energy array — the medium through which structure is transmitted to an organism
possessing the appropriate receptors to interpret it; for visually perceiving organisms
the most important of these arrays is generally light, but structure is also transmitted
through sounds, and through the diffusion of substances in the air that can be picked
up as smells (p. 9)
entrainment — a label used to denote coupling of rhythmic action between individuals
or between an individual and some other external event; suffers from process–product
amiguity; also used as a synonym for contagion
Appendix B. Glossary 180
event (*) — a disruption in the invariant structure of an environment; a change in the
layout of surfaces occuring over a time scale that is meaningful to an observer (see also
Chemero, 2000)
event structure — a pattern of disruption in the layout of surfaces in the environment
which can be picked up by an observer attending to the corresponding pattern in energy
arrays, e.g. sound patterns produced by speakers (p. 53)
experimenter (*) — custodian of the laboratory, builder of the experimental niche,
and potential source of experimental confounds underming validity
extended conduit — a loopy system that arises if one attempts to reconcile the sender-
receiver model of speech with the fact that ‘senders’ and ‘receivers’ are also actors in
an environment; chapter 5 rejects the extended conduit model in favour of a model
based on the relational field
extended mind — a metaphor that says that an individual’s mind can also encom-
pass external objects, such as a notebook or a mobile phone; a quarrel exists in the
philosophical literature between two entrenched camps, one camp insisting that this
metaphor is a fallacy, that it confuses coupling of the mind with external objects with
the idea that those external objects can constitute part of the mind, and the other camp
accusing these people of ‘neurochauvinism’ (Menary, 2010); this quarrel does not arise
on the present definition of mind as merely a label for the activities of an organism
in relation to external objects: since the term is only a label, any disagreement that
exists cannot be over the facts as they are in the world, but merely over what the la-
bel’s logical extension should be; if this is correct, then neither camp can win the
coupling–constitution argument; it is suggested that within task-oriented psychology
the argument is moot (p. 73)
external representation — in distributed cognition theory, external structure that car-
ries information about some other piece of structure elsewhere (in information the-
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oretic terms, but not in terms of the definition of information provided here where
information has to be for an organism); an external representation is a symbol—a
counterpart to a set of hypothetical internal, mental symbols (p. 171); it may be possi-
ble to talk about external structure as being representational in an ecological sense, but
I try to avoid doing so as this seems likely to create confusion
external validity (*) — the degree to which we can claim that our experiment in the
laboratory is representative of the real-world phenomenon we wish to model; see also
representative design
false-belief test (*) — supposedly a test of whether an organism possessess a theory
of mind; actually a test of whether an organism can pass a false belief test
goal (*) — a label applied from the outside that relates an animal with a future state
of affairs that the animal is apparently attempting to bring about; the temptation is to
assume that the animal must have some internal representation or idea about this fu-
ture state, but perhaps the animal itself only needs be in a state of being directed at a
particular piece of external structure
grand theory of communication — a quixotic project: an attempt to reduce the un-
bounded complexity of all of communicative behaviour to a simple set of rules, prin-
ciples, or mechanisms; seeks to answer questions of the form What behaviour can we
expect from agent A given a set of circumstances S?, instead of more tractable ques-
tions of the form What resources does agent A use to complete task T, and how are
those resources assembled? The grand theory approach is an attempt to solve every-
thing at once (p. 153)
group actor — a unit that would have to exist if group affordances existed; the group
actor is the ecological psychologist’s equivalent of the group mind (p. 172, ff.)
group affordance (*) — a construct sometimes proposed in an attempt to extend the
concept of affordance (something that arises out of the complementary nature of an
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experiencing organism and its environment, something that can be perceived) to the
dyad or group level; implies a group actor
group mind — the idea that a group of individual possesses mental capacities above
and beyond those of its component parts, or else that it should be treated as if it does
(p. 167, ff.)
indirect perception (*) — perception mediated not merely by energy arrays but also
by some other external structure or external representation, e.g. a diagram or a narra-
tive about a distant event; this is ecological indirect perception, in contrast to mentalist
indirect perception, where all perception is held to be indirect and mediated by mental
images or mental ideas imposed on sense data; it is, however, not clear whether it will
really be useful to talk of ‘indirect perception’ in ecological terms; the relational field
model perhaps makes such talk unnecessary
information — the basis of perception; created by an organism through its own move-
ments in a structured environment, enabling extraction invariant structure from energy
arrays (p. 10)
intention (*) — a relation that exist between an organism and another entity; these
relations can be directly perceived by others attending to the event structure created
by unfolding actions (this is a rejection of the internalist conception of intentions as
mental objects with some content that have to be ‘understood’ by others); intentions
are entirely non-linguistic (they may in some sense be caused by, or directed towards,
some piece of linguistic structure, but the term ‘intention’ here picks out only the rela-
tion between the organism and the structure, not the structure itself) and should not be
confused with beliefs, which are inherently linguistic; relations can be perceived, only
beliefs have to be ‘understood’
internal validity (*) — the degree to which we can claim that our description of what
is going on in a laboratory experiment is a true description of what is actually going
on from the subject’s point of view, i.e. whether we have accurately described the de-
Appendix B. Glossary 183
mand characteristics present; absence of internal validity may be a consequence of
the psychologist’s fallacy
internal representation (*) — in mentalist theories, the symbols through which per-
ceptual information (sense data) is transmitted to the mind, and over which mental
processes operate; in the approach advocated here, such internal representations are
avoided as a matter of methodological stipulation; closer in spirit to the ecological ap-
proach are external respresentations
invariant structure — the meaningful structure available in energy arrays; an organ-
ism can extract this invariant structure from irrelavant, variant structure through its
movement (invariant structure causes perceived surfaces to change in a lawlike way un-
der transformation during optic flow) and through physical exploration of that structure
(such as in wielding an object to judge what action possibilities it affords); ‘invariant’
refers here to the structure in the array, rather than to the objects in the world (p. 5, ff.)
interpersonal synergy — see group actor
joint action — see collaborative activity
joint attention (*) — a label used from the outside to describe a state of affairs in
which two or more individuals simultaneously attend to the same oject or event
laboratory (*) — an artifically-constructed ecological niche in which an organism is
temporarily known as a ‘subject’, and the specifics of what is afforded to this subject—
the demand characteristics of the experiment—are carefully arranged not by nature
but by a niche constructor known as the experimenter; failure to provide the subject
with demand characteristics that are externally valid may be a consequence of the
psychologist’s fallacy
language — a label given to the use of a particular set of verbal actions, or to an in-
dividual speaker’s capacity to carry out such actions, or to a set of such actions that
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are common to a particular community; a given language might also be thought of as
a technology that facilitates interpersonal coordination of attention; humans are ap-
parently especially well adapted to this technology, perhaps as a consequence of the
Baldwin effect; language (or speaking) is the topic of chapter 3
learning — change in the animal as a system that establishes new affordance relations
with the environment (p. 155, ff.)
management — see assessment/management approach
meaning (*) — what a given object or situation affords for a given animal; meaning is
apprehended by the animal in the course of its exploratory activities
mind (*) — a label we use from the outside to describe the intentions and activites of
ourselves and others towards external objects and events
mind-reading — effortful tracking of another’s perspective, often assumed to be a
necessary pre-requisite for an animal’s ability to engage in a collaborative activity (p.
169, ff.)
mirror neuron (*) — a neuron that fires both when an animal performs an action and
when it observes another animal carrying out a similar action; mirror neurons have
inspired much speculation by researchers; the hope appears to be that they provide a
means of reducing collaborative activity to physical activity in an individual’s brain;
such speculation does run the risk of anthropomorphizing the neuron itself
module — a hypothetical sub-unit of the brain that is said to have evolved for a spe-
cific purpose, e.g. processing visual input; the module is a tool used in brain-oriented
psychology to divide the problem space (explaining the functioning of the entire brain)
into tractable units (explaining the functioning of modules); see chapter 4
new ball — see doctrine of the new ball
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niche — the environment of a given organism—the subset of the structure of the world
that is relevant to that animal’s life activities; the niche furnishes and constrains what
action possibilities or affordances are availble to the organism; the organism can in turn
alter its niche through niche contruction; the human niche is largely inherited through
niche consruction activities of previous generations
niche construction — the creation of new affordances in the environment through ac-
tivity that alters the layout of that environment (p. 19)
perceptual learning — change in the animal as a system which enables it to make
increasingly fine discriminations between different types of external structure (p. 13)
perturbation — when applied to an animal-environment system, perturbation occurs
whenever the environment is changed (through, say, a natural disaster, or the actions of
other animals), or whenever the animal itself is changed (through learning, or through
brain injury, say), such that the pre-existing affordance relations is disrupted: the set
of opportunities for actions has changed because the way the animal is built no longer
corresponds to the way the environment is structured in the same way as before (chap-
ter 7)
prediction (*) — an internal mechanism supposed necessary by some cognitivists for
the control of future action in response to supposedly impoverished input in the present
prospective control (*) — a reason why prediction may not be not necessary; control
of present activity based on future events that are specified by present events, e.g. a
driver’s control of braking is based on time until collision with an object on the high-
way, this time being specified by the present rate at which the gap is closing between
the driver and the object
psychologist’s fallacy — mistaking our desription of some behavioural phenomenon
from the outside for the causal mechanism behind that behaviour; leads researchers to
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overlook structure that is relevant to the completion of a task because it is assumed
that the task is already well defined and we already know what subjects need to do to
complete the task (p. 65)
referential communication games — a type of activity carried out in a laboratory,
intended as a model of dialogue; the design of such tasks is strongly influenced by the
sender-receiver model of communication, with subjects often being given specific
roles within the activity, e.g., as either ‘sender’ or ‘receiver’ of instructions (chapter 5)
relational field — the complete, hierarchically-structured system of relations that ex-
ists in the world; the relations that make up this field can in principle be perceived and
acted upon by an animal that is built appropriately (p. 45)
relational web — the particular sub-set of the relational field that is relevant to a given
organism, and that surrounds that organism; to define the relational web of a given
animal is to define its niche (p. 46)
representation (*) — in mentalist theories, the stuff of all mental activity—see inter-
nal representations; in distributed cogntion, it is supposed that this mental activity
can also transcend the boundaries of the skin, acting directly on external represen-
taitons
representative design — a proposed gold standard for laboratory experiments, based
on the assertation that in order to claim that a laboratory experiment has external
validity, we must be able to show that the demand characteristics present in the ex-
periment are aligned with, or representative of, the state of affairs pertaining when the
task we are attempting to model is carried out in the wild (p. 83)
role — a label we use from the outside to describe what a given individual is doing in
a given collaborative activity; that we are able to assign these labels to individuals may
not be a guarantee that the individual has any appreciation of themselves as fulfilling
that role, or indeed that the task, to begin with, has any such thing as a set of roles
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among its properties (p. 90)
sender-receiver model of communication — a model based on the supposition that
communicating is like packaging ideas into a series of containers which have to be un-
packed at the other end; this may be a convenient model for some types of analysis (if,
for instance, you are interested in the structure of the language itself, and indifferent
to the question of how that language is actually used), but is a misleading basis for
studying communication in general and irrelevant to the study of collaborative activi-
ties (chapter 5)
shared intention — a label we give from the outside to describe when two or more
organisms simultaneously enter into a relation of intending towards a single entity; the
concept of shared intention has no relevance to those inside the activity, who need only
attend to others’ intentions and act accordingly, but need have no appreciation that they
are thereby entering into a wider ‘shared intention’; the supposed existence of shared
intentions is sometimes said to be diagnostic of whether an activity is genuinely col-
laborative (p. 23), but this appears to be based on a set of confusions resulting from
the commission of a researcher’s perspective fallacy (p. 150)
specification — a lawful relationship that exists between structure in the environment
and structure in energy arrays such as light: the reason we are able to see the envi-
ronment directly is because the structure in light is specified by the structure of the
environment that gives rise to it (see chapter 1)
social affordance — a perhaps unnecessary term which designates an affordance pro-
vided not by an inanimate configuration of surfaces (an object), but by another animal—
usually another member of one’s own species; not to be confused with the notion of
the group affordance
stigmergy (*) — a process in which external structure created through the activities
of one organism is used in the activities of a second organism; this needn’t be com-
municative, but can occur in the absence of intentions between organisms; it is what
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allows ants to collectively discover food sources: an ant that has discovered a food
source leaves a trail of pheromones, then other ants merely follow this trail (see also
the example of trail-formation by humans, p. 167)
symbol (*) — a component in a formal system; on the relational field model, speaking,
in its basic form, does not involve symbols; written language, however, does involve
symbols (alphabets, words with standardized spellings, punctuation marks), and one’s
ability to use written language interacts, in a dialectical process, with one’s speaking
behaviour, so that a literate individual can also become skilled at speaking ‘in full sen-
tences’
task — a commonsense label we use to pick out a particular type of activity that can
be carried out repeatedly and where completion of that activity appears to use the same
informational resources assembled in the same sort of way every time; closer study of
a given task may reveal hidden nuances, e.g. it may turn out that there is more than
one way of assembling resources to reach the same ends (see chapter 4)
task-oriented psychology — the ecological approach to empirical investigation; the
unit of analysis is the task: the animal-environment system is treated as a whole, while
the activities within this system are artificially divided into sub-units (tasks) for the
purpose of analysis (chapter 4)
theory of mind — a cognitive mechanism held by some cognitivists to be a necessary
pre-condition of an individual’s ability to engage in a collaborative activity; this is held
on the assumption that intentions cannot be perceived but have to be created internally
(either by internal theorizing about other minds or by internal simulation of others’
activities); without this mechanism, it is held, individuals are unable to ‘understand’
the actions of others; theory of mind talk appears to be built on a failure to distinguish
between non-linguistic intentions (which, under the definition given above, are simply
relations) and inherently-linguistic beliefs (p. 169)
validity (*) — the degree to which we can claim that our description of a state of af-
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fairs is true—that it corresponds to the brute facts of the world
variant structure — structure present in energy arrays that is not ecologically meaningful—
it is not invariant structure; invariant structure is the target of perception, variant
structure is noise; a perceiving organism has to filter the useful structure from this
noise; it achieves this through exploration
vervet monkey — a species of small primate native to East Africa, which engages in
vocal alarm calling behaviour, the subject of chapter 6
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